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Post-structuralism and feminism have been uneasy allies in feminism’s third wave. Critics 
of feminism’s cultural turn are calling for a critical theory and emancipatory politics that 
takes materiality as its starting point, without losing the central insights gained in radical 
attention to the operation of power through language. This thesis explores the promise of 
the “new materialist” turn for addressing the crisis of post-structural emancipatory 
politics, and seeks a theological engagement with the ontological propositions of some 
central figures implicated in this theoretical shift, including Diana Coole and Karen 
Barad. Taking up Jane Bennett’s argument that Christianity is inherently dualistic and 
that divine transcendence supports a life/matter binary, this thesis uses Rowan Williams’s 
articulation of the doctrine of creation to respond to the implication that the Christian 
understanding of divine transcendence is incompatible with non-dichotomous accounts of 
culture and nature or meaning and matter. The doctrines of creation ex nihilo and divine 
transcendence (which assert a fundamental dichotomy, rather than a dualism, between 
God and creation) prompt us to think of creation as a material, finite, and vital whole. 
Williams’s theology of language moreover suggests that reflection on the non-dichotomy 
of matter and meaning may be one way into a reflection on the existence of a 
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If post-structuralism and feminism have been allies within feminism’s third wave, it has 
been an uneasy alliance. In the wake of the “cultural” turn, many feminist theorists claim 
that despite the ways in which this critical theory has made feminist discourse more 
accommodating of “difference”, the political agency of the movement has been undercut 
by the new orthodoxy, which states that if subjects are constructed by the discourses that 
purport to emancipate them, to highlight the oppression of people bearing certain 
identities is to construct those very identities. Collective political action, which demands 
the organisation of people under the banner of shared interests, has become more difficult 
with the awareness of this problem. Moreover, the constructivist account, which aimed to 
deconstruct the binaries which serve patriarchy (among them the culture/nature and 
language/matter binaries) has arguably served to further entrench these binaries by 
granting constructive power to language alone. Matter is presented as a passive entity, the 
“stuff” that language works on. 
Yet a return to naïve realism would not be desirable for feminism because of its 
associations with biological essentialism, and out of engagement with this conundrum, a 
group of feminist theorists are calling for approaches to the construction of identity which 
take the agency of matter into account. The new materialist feminists are a diverse group 
of theorists operating from within a variety of disciplines. Their work is to challenge the 
unilateral ascription of constructive power to language, without either losing the central 
insights of post-structuralism, or falling back into Cartesian or representationalist models 
for the relation between matter and meaning. 
Can theologians make a constructive contribution within the new materialist 
conversation? Some significant voices within the new materialisms express their doubts. 
This thesis is an attempt to take up the challenge that these voices put to dogmatic 
Christian claims. It seeks to demonstrate that the terms on which these theorists believe 
theology should be excluded from the discourse are problematic. Its specific focus will be 
on the question of whether the doctrines of creation and of divine transcendence can be 
hospitable to non-dichotomous conceptions of matter and meaning. Towards this end, the 
discussion will be divided into three parts. 
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Chapter One will look at feminism in its third wave, with attention to what we 
have called the “uneasy alliance” between constructivism/post-structuralism and 
feminism. Emerging responses to the problems of third-wave feminism as we have just 
presented them will be explored. From here we will look closely at the work of Karen 
Barad and Diana Coole as theorists who are active in theorising the relationship between 
matter and meaning at the ontological level, in ways that feed constructively into more 
practical propositions for emancipatory political movements. Their ontologies bear 
certain resemblances to each other, and these similarities will be noted so that the 
contours of a new materialist ontological position can be sketched. Within their accounts, 
matter is presented as active both in meaning-making, and in the construction of the 
subjects and objects of discourse. The material existence from which knowledge practices 
emerge is presented as an unstable and innovative whole. 
Chapter Two will ask whether the doctrine of creation can allow for the kinds of 
ontological reflections that Barad and Coole are engaged in. Could such a doctrine even 
sponsor non-dichotomous thought? Taking up Jane Bennett’s argument that Christianity 
is inherently dualistic and that divine transcendence supports a life/matter binary, this 
chapter will use the work of Rowan Williams to propose the contrary. The doctrines of 
creation ex nihilo and divine transcendence (which assert a fundamental dichotomy, 
rather than a dualism, between God and creation), far from presenting creation as an act 
of cultural power over an inert matter, may actually prompt us to think of creation as a 
material, finite, and vital whole. Humans, according to Christian theology, are embedded 
within this created whole, imaging God precisely through their acceptance of materiality 
and finitude. 
Chapter Three will push this idea about the compatibility of divine transcendence 
with ontological monism further – again with reference to Williams – by elucidating 
Williams’s proposition that thinking about the non-dichotomy of matter and meaning may 
be one way into a reflection on the existence of a transcendent God. Bennett claims that 
Christianity, as a naïve form of vitalism, takes the mechanistic nature of matter as given, 
and slots God into the gaps that inhere in this model in order to explain the mystery of 
innovative “life”. But Williams’s theology of language drives between the poles of 
dualism and physicalism and posits a universe in which intelligence is an implicate 
feature of materiality. Our discussion will show how Williams’s understanding of 
language as material feeds into his argument for a natural theology re-conceived in the 
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tradition of Aquinas : the conclusion will be drawn that Williams’s interest in moving 
beyond binary thought sits compatibly within an account in which God and creation are 
fundamentally “other”. Our exploration of Williams’s natural theology will also help us 
to demonstrate that Christian thought is not dependent on positing a “god of the gaps”, 
and it therefore does not have interests to defend where mechanistic materialism is 
concerned. 
Some final comments will tie these themes together, and the conclusion will be 
drawn that there is a productive and mutually beneficial dialogue to be had between 
theology and the new materialisms. Some directions for further research will be suggested 



















Introducing the New Materialisms: Matter and Meaning in the 
Crisis of Identity Politics 
 
I hereby acknowledge and affirm that the Hooters concept is based on female sex appeal 
and that the work environment is one in which joking and innuendo based on female sex 
appeal is commonplace…I also expressly acknowledge and affirm I do not find my 




The above is a contractual clause which United States employees of “Hooters”, an 
American restaurant chain with establishments in the United Kingdom, are required to 
sign as a condition of employment. When a Hooters bar opened in Sheffield in 2008, 
rather than voice their opposition in terms of the structural “sexism” of the sex trade, the 
local Sheffield Fems opted to mount their argument against the bar on the grounds that it 
would be “tacky”. This example is used by Kath and Sophie Woodward to illustrate the 
malaise of feminism in its third wave, a phenomenon which it has become common-place 
for feminist writers of the second wave to lament. Groups like the Sheffield Fems, it 
seems, are bound now to making tactical choices based on which arguments are more 
likely to garner popular favour in a time of dwindling support:
2
 young women, even those 
who take the feminist label, no longer rally around the same banners as their 
predecessors.  
Amongst the confluences that have led to this inertia – a neoliberal market 
mentality sponsoring freedom of individual choice,
3
 combining with a popular belief that 
the work of feminism was completed with the liberal feminist achievement of equality 
under the law –
4
 another explanation points to the effects of the “cultural turn”, and the 
alliance between constructivist and post-structuralist theories, and feminism, that has 
                                                          
1
 Hooters Contract Clause, cited in Kath and Sophie Woodward, Why Feminism Matters:  Feminism Lost 
and Found (Great Britain:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 106. 
2
 Ibid., 107. 
3
 Ibid., 106. 
4
 Ibid., 109. 
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characterised the third wave.
5
 In the wake of these critical theories an awareness prevails 
that to evoke a politics of difference is always to implicate sameness or homogeneity.
6
 
The Sheffield Fems could not refer to structural sexism without presuming to speak for 
“women”, that is, without reinforcing the same “linguistically constructed” category 
which has led to the oppression of people identified with that marker. 
This chapter seeks to explore the crisis of feminism following the impact of the 
“cultural turn”, through an engagement with social constructivism, and more specifically 
with Judith Butler. Substantive criticisms of Butler and of constructivism more generally 
will be taken up, and the discussion will move into a treatment of certain responses that 
are emerging within feminist theory, out of critical engagements with the problems that 
inhere within the “cultural turn”. These problems principally include the entrenchment of 
the culture/nature binary that this turn has occasioned, as well as post-structuralism’s 
presentation of matter as a passive entity awaiting human inscription. The discussion will 
nevertheless attempt to explore ways in which the kinds of anxieties and questions 
driving the post-structuralist critique may have been inevitable. This is given the 
prevalence of an ontological paradigm – variously referred to as Cartesianism, or 
“representationalism” – that constructivists and post-structuralists have attempted to 
engage critically with, but have failed (we will argue) to go beyond. Our chapter will 
explore a collection of diverse thinkers under the banner of “the new materialist 
feminisms”, whose work remains sympathetic with (even dependent on) many of the 
central insights of post-structuralism, but who are working to move feminist theory 
forwards in ways that recover a sense of the agency of matter. Karen Barad and Diana 
Coole will be explored in this capacity, as offering possible ontological alternatives to the 
Cartesian/representationalist model. As will be demonstrated with reference to the work 
of Rosemarie Garland-Thomson and Tobin Siebers, Barad’s and Coole’s proposed 
alternatives (which bear certain resemblances to each other) are a promising entry into 
feminist discourse, given the possibilities they recover for political agency after the crisis 
of identity politics. 
                                                          
5
 Henceforth I try to separate the general category of social constructivism from the label post-structuralism 
which is more associated with Butler. This picks up on the fact that the criticisms of the “linguistic turn” 
that I have highlighted as central to emerging materialisms are focussed around Butler, whose work is to a 
great extent built on that of Michel Foucault. A distinction is often drawn in such discussions between 
Butler’s work and the more linguistically focussed work of other social constructivists. Butler’s theory of 
performativity highlights discursive practices and so is seen by some to emphasise the material, though the 
consensus is that matter is still a passive entity within her thought. 
6
 Ibid., 86. 
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i) The Uneasy Alliance of Post-Structuralism and Feminism 
If constructivism has negatively affected the political mobilization of the feminist 
movement, far from being lauded, this has confirmed only the worst fears of feminist 
academics and scholars implicated in that shift, many of whom considered themselves to 
have been writing (critically) from within feminism.
7
 The deconstruction of the 
sex/gender binary was intended as a complicating and emancipatory move, troubling the 
neat divide made use of by second wavers in order to avoid biological essentialist 
justifications for the subordination of women.
8
 Feminist theory has often focussed on 
establishing the primordial causes of patriarchy, the historical or psychic turning point at 
which the biological female is “transformed into a socially subordinate woman”.
9
 The 
sex/gender distinction held out the possibility of policing the border between nature and 
culture to catch genderization in process. But a number of related objections to this 
framework could be made. First, all of the core binaries grounding Western thought and 
discourse, feminists have argued – mind/body, culture/nature, subject/object – have been 
gendered male/female,
10
 and have been structured in hierarchical relationships of 
substance/lack. Any reproduction of the culture/nature binary must therefore be suspect 
for feminism, since it threatens to confirm and reproduce the same asymmetries that 
sustain patriarchy. Second, the strong historical-cultural association of women with the 
body and with nature means that where a sex/gender distinction is posited, sex determines 
only female gender: as Simone Beauvoir famously argued, the universal “subject” is 
always already masculine and disembodied. Only women have a sex.
11
    
The work of post-structuralists like Judith Butler was therefore to dismantle the 
category of sex altogether, showing sex to have been gender all along. Brief attention to 
the central claims of Butler’s work is necessary here, since, although much of her early 
work was a reformulation and extension of theories of sex already partially developed by 
proponents like Michel Foucault and Monique Wittig, her position has become perhaps 
the most well-known, and most controversial in the postmodern/post-structuralist shift, 
                                                          
7
 See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York and London: Routledge, 1999), vii. 
8
 Asberg, Cecilia and Lynda Birke, “Biology is a feminist issue:  Interview with Lynda Birke,” European 
Journal of Women’s Studies 17:4 (2010): 419. 
9
 Butler, Gender Trouble, 47. 
10
 Stacy Alaimo and Susan Heckman, “Introduction: Emerging Models of Materiality in Feminist Theory,” 
in Material Feminisms, edited by Stacy Alaimo and Susan Heckman (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2008), 2. 
11
 Woodward, “Why Feminism Matters”, 143. 
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and as we shall see, many theorists seeking to move beyond constructivism find 
themselves needing first to engage with Butler. 
In Gender Trouble, Butler argues that certain ways of framing the question of 
gender in feminist discourse foreclose the discussion in certain respects. There can be no 
pure “descriptions” of gender, she warns, only normative operations.
12
 The sex/gender 
divide smuggles in an assumption that ought to be open to dispute, namely that gender 
and sex are in principle discontinuous, gender being an unstable social interpretation of 
the more immutable category of “sex”.
13
 Feminists, rather than assuming such a reality as 




Butler’s distinctive position on the production of “sex” as “fact” takes its bearing 
from Foucault, and from her Foucaultian disagreement with psychoanalysis.
15
 Criticising 
psychoanalytic theorists for romanticising the notion of a pure maternal sexuality prior to 
the “paternal law”, Butler argues that an exclusive focus on a prohibitive concept of the 
law fails to do justice to its generative force.
16
 If we reformulate our theory of the paternal 
law, casting it as power rather than prohibition, we will see that the law produces both 
“sanctioned” sexuality, and its transgressive or “repressed” forms.
17
 In Foucault’s work 
on the punishment of criminals, the law operates on bodies externally to “compel their 
bodies to signify the prohibitive law as their very essence, style, and necessity.”
18
 Far 
from being internalised, the law produces interiority itself: “bodies are produced which 
signify the law on and through the body.”
19
 The operation of the law, once it is reified 
through incorporation, masks the prior fact of external social inscription. In Foucault 
then, power is always both productive and elusive, the law operating to construct reality, 
                                                          
12
 Butler, Gender Trouble,  xxi. 
13




 This relationship is somewhat complicated by the fact that Butler believed Foucault’s work on sexuality 
to have some troubling convergences with psychoanalysis. Foucault’s own homosexuality, Butler suggests, 
gave his theory of “sex” an emancipatory thrust which reads against his own best insights. Foucault’s 
interpretation of the case of the hermaphrodite, Herculine, romanticises Herculine’s sexuality as the 
unregulated play of multiplicity before the law. This sounds (to Butler) uncomfortably close to the 
psychoanalytic positing of a primary sexuality and an antecedent law. See ibid., 135. 
16
 Ibid., 118. 
17
 Ibid., 94. 
18





while simultaneously constructing “a narrative account of its genealogy” which masks its 
own means of operation.
20
 Might sexuality not operate in analogous terms, asks Butler?  
“Sex”, in this understanding would not be prior to the law, but rather an effect 
posing as a cause.
21
 Out of an external compulsion (an incest taboo and a prohibition on 
homosexuality),
22
 we are compelled through discourse from birth to perform certain 
gender identities.  The literalizing effect of this performance is the organisation of 
matrices of desire and pleasure around signifying body parts. Within these matrices the 
very boundaries of the body are established, and an interiority we come to understand as 
“sexuality” materialises. In the naturalising of this interiority through bodily habit, the 
body comes to seem like the cause of desire, rather than its occasion.
23
 This collective 
illusion of a stable “self” as the origin of sexual desire is sustained in regulatory practices 
that hide the external political origins of heterosexuality from view.
24
 Presumably such 
practices include the punishment of homosexuality as “unnatural”, medical discourses 
and practices which promote the view of differentiated body parts as the natural cause of 
sexual pleasure, and psychological therapies which locate the origin of sexual desire in 
the “self”. Butler hints in these directions but does not often provide detailed analyses of 
precise situations for the operation of power. 
 Butler’s political prescriptions for feminism develop out of her insistence on 
gender as pure act, or “performativity”. Some performances of gender - its complete 
subversion through the practice of drag, ironic appropriations of femininity by “female 
bodies”, or the practice of homosexuality – can, through parody, rob heterosexuality of its 
claims to stability. In effect, doing gender as a conscious performance, wearing gender 
knowingly as a mask, will reveal the unsettling fact that nothing exists behind the mask 




The dismantling of sex/gender has been important for highlighting the kinds of 
imbrications between sex and gender that a binary model obscures, and many have found 
Butler convincing, particularly when she is read alongside biologists like Anne Fausto-
                                                          
20
 Ibid., 92. 
21
 Ibid., 94. 
22
 Ibid., 172. 
23
 Ibid., 90. 
24
 Ibid., 174. 
25
 Ibid., 176. 
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Sterling, whose findings are often seen as “consonant with Butler’s argument for the 
fluidity and contingency of sex”.
26
  Even our bones, an aspect of our human life we 
regard as purely material, can be shown to “carry information about gender and race and 




Moreover, through drawing attention to the operation of power through language, 
and through simultaneously unmooring “identity” from the stability of a material anchor, 
post-structuralist feminists at least sought to put what theorists have called the 
“simultaneity of oppression”, or “multiplicity” at the centre of feminist thought.
28
 Critics 
of second wave feminism often argue that the political movement was centred on the 
needs of white, bourgeois, heterosexual women.
29
 The audacity to speak authoritatively 
about the collective experiences of women as a political and social class, which gave the 
movement its efficacy, arguably led to the further marginalisation of individuals whose 
membership in more than one oppressed class (for example “Black” and “women”) meant 
that the negative impacts of both patriarchy and racism were compounded. As Michael 
Hames-Garcia contends, to be understood in terms of one marker of one’s identity, such 
as sexuality, is to be “understood in terms of the most dominant construction of that 
identity”.
30
 This is problematic since it leads to the assumption that multiple identities 
merely “intersect”, where in fact an operation of “mutual constitution” is at work. To be 
gay and Chicano, Hames-Garcia points out, more often means to belong in neither group, 
than to belong in both.
31
 Multiplicity in this way is profoundly alienating. It is clear then 
why a radical problematizing of the category of identity with attention to the way in 
which language can render people and their particular interests opaque, and a questioning 
of the use of identity markers in a politics of difference, seemed at one time tempting. 
But if Butler has been commended for shifting the spotlight to the margins, the 
reception of her work has been mixed. Martha Nussbaum, in her (bordering on vitriolic) 
                                                          
26




 Patricia Hill Collins coined the former term, while “multiplicity” is used by Michael R. Hames Garcia, 
see Patricia Hill Collins, “Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of Black 
Feminist Thought,” Social Problems, 33:6 (December, 1986): 19; Michael R. Hames-Garcia, “Who Are 
Our Own People,” in Reclaiming Identity, edited by Paula M.L. Moya and Michael R. Hames-Garcia 
(Berkley, LA and London: University of California Press, 2000), 102-129. 
29
 Rosemary Tong, Feminist Thought:  A More Comprehensive Introduction, Third Edition (Colorado: 
Westview Press, 2009), 43. 
30
 Hames-Garcia, “Who Are Our Own People”, 104. 
31
 Ibid., 104-106. 
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1999 article for The New Republic, “Professor of Parody”, accuses Butler of convincing 
“scores of talented women that they need not work on changing the law, or feeding the 
hungry, or assailing power through theory harnessed to material politics.”
32
 Butler’s 
insistence that the best hope for the marginalised is to make subversive symbolic gestures 
at oppressive structures might be compared, according to Nussbaum, to telling “a slave 
that the institution of slavery will never change, but you can always find ways of mocking 
it.”
33
 The point is that structural and material changes were achieved by feminists in the 
past, and, especially when our outlook moves beyond Western centrism, there is more of 
this work to be done. We have cause to question which marginalised people Butler has in 
sights, argues Nussbaum, when we find her arguing “that we all eroticize the power 
structures that oppress us” so that “Real change…would make sexual satisfaction 
impossible.”
34
 It is here Nussbaum clearly loses patience with Butler’s programme for 
“political” action: “For women who are hungry, illiterate, disenfranchised, beaten, raped, 
it is not sexy or liberating to re-enact, however parodically, the conditions of hunger, 
illiteracy, disenfranchisement, beating, and rape.”
35
 Feminism exists for more than the 
personal sexual freedoms of the materially privileged. 
Similar criticisms of the post-structuralist programme at large have reverberated 
amongst theorists of race and disability. Far from liberating those marginalised by 
multiplicity, Hames-Garcia writes, the response that all identity claims are equally 
imaginary, and the removal of any “epistemological ground on which one can claim one 
‘belongs’”, merely “increases the sense of homelessness for members with opaque 
interests.”
36
 The problem with dismantling identities, is that, however they are constituted 
(and Hames-Garcia agrees in principle that we cannot escape the social-subjective 
mediation of truth, and that identities are therefore never static entities),
37
 identities have 
tangible material consequences, and we need ways of assessing between – albeit, 
ubiquitously subjective – claims.
38
 Post-structuralism cannot inform us about what might 
constitute justifiable political action, because it cannot distinguish between the 
contingent, and the arbitrary.  
                                                          
32
 Martha Nussbaum, “The Professor of Parody,” The New Republic (Feb, 1999): 45. 
33






 Hames-Garcia, “Who Are Our Own People”, 120. 
37
 Ibid., 116, 111. 
38
 Ibid., 117. 
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The same point is made by Tobin Siebers, whose article “Disability Experience on 
Trial” offers a poignant portrait of the predicament facing advocates for marginalised 
groups after post-structuralism’s radical undermining of objectivity. In 2004, a United 
States Supreme Court ruling (Tenesse vs. Lane) made it possible to sue states whose 
court-rooms and legal facilities were not accessible to people with disabilities. This was 
following an incident in which a plaintiff who required the use of a wheelchair had been 
left to crawl up a flight of stairs to his hearing, while court employees, including the 
judge, watched on in laughter. The bedrock of the case was the plaintiff’s experience, and 
the response of critics to the ruling, according to Siebers “defines the dominant theoretical 
position on experience in historical and cultural studies.”
39
 Joan Scott wrote of the case 
that its appeals to “difference” and “identity” only served to naturalise and reproduce, 
rather than contest “given ideological systems”. There are no individuals who have 
experiences, merely individuals constituted by experience, she insisted.
40
 “Apparently,” 
writes Siebers, summing up Scott’s position, “because it is socially constructed, 
individual experience may serve neither as origin of explanation nor as authoritative 
evidence about what is known.”
41
  
Though these examples are drawn from race and disability studies, rather than 
gender politics, some parallels in terms of the predicament faced by feminism as a 
political movement are illuminating. The refusal to extrapolate patterns of discrimination 
from the experience of individuals to the collective experiences of a group can render 
movements blind to structural discrimination. At the close of this chapter it will be 
possible to demonstrate how events like the Tennessee vs. Lane ruling are providing ways 
for theorists such as Siebers and Rosemary Garland-Thompson to develop post-
constructivist approaches to identity, with strong overlaps and much to contribute to 
feminists troubled by the apparent narcissism, individualism, and consequent gender-
blindness of feminism in its post-structuralist mode.  
However, it is first necessary to consider that, even at the edges of these more 
political objections to Butler’s work and the work of other constructivists, a number of 
substantive conceptual contentions are already implied. Butler’s concept of 
performativity, which sums up her proposition that acting and speaking not only represent 
                                                          
39
 Tobin Siebers, “Disability Experience on Trial,” in Material Feminisms, edited by Stacy Alaimo and 




 Ibid., 293. 
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the world but actively constitute it, while not highly original, is “plausible and even 
interesting”, according to Nussbaum, but there are some stark theoretical gaps too: “If she 
means that babies enter the world completely inert, with no tendencies and no abilities, 
this is far less plausible, and difficult to support empirically.”
42
 Here Nussbaum echoes 
perhaps the most widespread criticism of the linguistic turn. As Barad has put it, 
“Language matters. Discourse matters. Culture matters…the only thing that does not 
seem to matter anymore is matter.”
43
 
And with this maxim, we approach an interesting irony at the heart of a theory the 
purported aim of which was the deconstruction of binaries. One binary, it seems, has been 
left very much intact. “Far from deconstructing the dichotomies of language/reality or 
culture/nature,” Stacy Alaimo and Susan Heckman write, post-moderns “have rejected 
one side and embraced the other.”
44
 In constructivism, if the existence of a material 
reality is believed at all, there remains a radical doubt as to its accessibility. We are 
therefore left with an epistemological reduction: if we cannot “know” something without 
simultaneously constructing it, then we are locked within a culture which writes itself 
over the material world. The material world remains a “blank sheet”,
45
 passive and, as in 
modernism, awaiting inscription by the human will.  Bruno Latour, referring to this as the 
staunch Cartesianism of postmodernity, concludes “We have not moved an inch”.
46
 
The objection might be made at this point that Butler’s emphasis on performance 
and reification in the body do in fact constitute an emphasis on the material. In a sense 
both Foucault and Butler were supremely interested in the power of the material, which is 
presented as a force that outruns the control of the discourses through which it was 
structured. But performativity, however “bodily” in Butler’s scheme, is always harnessed 
to a linguistic principle. It is external discourses that initiate us into the parts we act, and 
in a sense, performances can only in fact be seen as “bodily” in retrospect. This is close to 
the point made by Claire Colebrook, whose reading of Butler contests Nussbaum’s 
accusation that for Butler nothing precedes language. “What is other than the act and 
                                                          
42
 Nussbaum, “Professor of Parody”, 41. 
43
 Karen Barad, “Post-humanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to 
Matter,” in Material Feminisms, edited by Stacy Alaimo and Susan Heckman (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2008), 120. 
44
 Alaimo and Heckman, “Introduction”, 2-3. 
45
 Woodward, “Why Feminism Matters”, 142. 
46
 Bruno Latour cited in Vicky Kirby, “Natural Convers(at)ions: Or, What if Culture Was Really Nature All 
Along,” in Material Feminisms, edited by Stacy Alaimo and Susan Heckman (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2008), 225. 
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desire of practice is affected through the relations of practice; matter is not a foundation 
that precedes relations but is always already given through those relations,” Colebrook 
writes, reminding us of Butler’s deep concern with the matter of recognition.
47
 Butler is 
often seen as pessimistic about the scope for imaginative reorganisations of gender 
matrices because she believes that to be a “self” capable of subversive acts, we must have 
a recognisable bodily style. The conditions and limits of having a recognisable self for 
Butler are therefore material. But for Colebrook, Butler cannot transcend the 
language/reality dichotomy because she “allows matter to remain that which can only be 
posited after the event – as that which must have been ‘before’ the recognised 
performance of the self.”
48
  
The criticism that post-structuralism reinforces a nature/culture binary, in reading 
post-structuralism against its own intentions, poses a serious challenge to its programme. 
But it is necessary in concluding this section to point out that not all critiques of Butler 
are equally helpful in moving feminism forward in the wake of a constructivist turn it can 
hardly ignore. Nussbaum’s highest complement to Butler is to acknowledge that her 
question about how deep culture might run is somewhat “interesting”, and this seems 
almost ungracious in its understatement of how unsettling the problem ought to be, 
regardless of how one assesses the work of different academics grappling with it. By 
Nussbaum’s own acknowledgement, in the history of feminism, this question has not 
ceased to be asked,
49
 and feminists before Butler had been pushing the same limits by 
suggesting that “social forces go so deep that we should not suppose we have access to 
such a notion as ‘nature’.”
50
 It is worth wondering if the dismantling of the sex/gender 
binary was not then an inevitable response to an already troubled orthodoxy. Nussbaum, 
in “Professor of Parody”, offers no theoretical alternative, save to gesture rather vaguely 
towards “some prediscursive desires – for food, for comfort, for cognitive mastery, for 
survival”,
51
  and to call for more “subtle” studies of “the interplay of bodily difference 
and cultural construction.”
52
 Moving on to critique Butler on the basis of her political 
prescriptions, this is where Nussbaum leaves it, and leaves us, the word “interplay” 
                                                          
47
 Claire Colebrooke, “On Not Becoming Man: The Materialist Politics of Unactualized Potential,” in 
Material Feminisms, edited by Stacy Alaimo and Susan Heckman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
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betraying the assumption that we can simply return to exploring questions of gender at the 
intersection of two entities: the body, and culture.  
It is possible to agree with Nussbaum’s concerns but to remain unconvinced about 
her easy dismissal of Butler, just as it is possible to remain critical of Butler while 
conceding the benefits for feminism of radical attention to the generative operation of 
power through language. Many contemporary theorists find themselves inhabiting such a 
middle-ground. For these theorists, the question of access remains: if to “know” reality 
means simultaneously to construct it, can we know anything beyond culture? There is no 
direct route back from constructivism, nor would any simplistic return to a naïve realism 
be desirable, which is why there are persistent calls for a feminism which is able to take 
the insights of post-structuralism into account, while finding ways of treating the 
materiality of identity with due seriousness. Before introducing what have been labelled 
the “new materialist feminisms”, which are characteristically an attempt to develop such a 
position, I will turn to discuss another aspect of the context which is making the 
emergence of these post-constructivist approaches urgently necessary. 
  
ii) Shifting Scientific Frontiers and the Marginalisation of Feminism in 
the Sciences 
I, and others, started out wanting a strong tool for deconstructing the truth claims of 
hostile science by showing the radical historical specificity, and so contestability, of every 
layer of the onion of scientific and technological constructions, and we end up with a kind 
of epistemological electro-shock therapy, which, far from ushering us into the high stakes 
tables of the game of contesting public truths, lays us out on the table with self-induced 
multiple personality disorder.
53
          
        - Donna Haraway 
If the cultural turn has served to disempower feminism as a political theory and 
movement, many feminists are now acknowledging that the feminist critique of science, 
which “definitively established the social construction of scientific knowledge”, 
transforming the philosophy of science, has become “a victim of its own success.”
54
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Questioning all grounds of objectivity entails a loss of grounding in the “real”, and as 
Susan Heckman writes, science cannot afford to give up on the real.
55
 The investment of 
feminism in epistemological critique, and the investment of science in continuing with 
traditional methods, has led only to the entrenchment of disciplinary divides, meaning 
that the material world, the environment, and non-human life are left “critically 
undertheorized within feminist scholarship”,
56
 and feminist scientists find themselves 
straddling two fields which cannot comprehend each other.
57
 Lynda Birke, a feminist 
biologist, sums up the schizophrenic nature of her cross-discipline career when she 
acknowledges, in an interview with Cecilia Asberg, her inner wrestle over whether to put 
the words “real” and “nature” into scare quotes when talking about her biological 
research to a feminist audience. “Descartes must be very happy with this,” she comments, 
“we live in an intellectual world where mind pretends body doesn’t exist”.
58
 
 The shifting frontiers of scientific knowledge and technology development make 
this disciplinary Cartesianism especially pernicious. The development of genetic 
modification technology for crops (where women are typically the hardest hit in times of 
famine), and the progress of new reproductive technologies, are two examples of 
scientific advancements which raise unprecedented moral questions that feminists must 
be ready to engage with.  
At the same time, as Diana Coole and Samantha Frost point out, post-Newtonian 
physics continues to make matter strange in ways that should be of great interest to the 
social sciences: an acute challenge is currently posed to the presumption that agency in 
the construction of meaning can be attributed only to “social” life. While scientific lay 
people still tend to think in classical Cartesian or Newtonian terms about matter as the 
substance upon which forces act, physicists know that matter observed at a subatomic 
level exhibits nothing of the solidity we expect from observing the world in our everyday 
lives. Subatomic behavior consists of “constant emergence, attraction, repulsion, 
fluctuation, and shifting nodes of change.”
59
 String theory, for example, describes 
“particles” as “more like vibrating strands of energy…than like the small versions of sand 
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grains suggested by their name.”
60
 The natural sciences themselves are problematizing the 
notion of matter as static. We might more accurately describe it as “materialising” rather 
than “being”, or put otherwise, we might say “matter becomes” rather than “matter is”.
61
 
At such a time the need for new models for understanding the production of knowledge, 
developed out of, and fostering interdisciplinary engagements, seems evident. 
 
iii) Fleshing out Critical Theory: The New Material Feminisms 
“[O]ver the past three decades or so theorists have radicalized the way they understand 
subjectivity,” write Coole and Frost, introducing their 2010 edited work, New 
Materialisms, “Yet it is on subjectivity that their gaze has focussed…it is now time to 
subject objectivity and material reality to a similarly radical reappraisal.”
62
 This neatly 
summarises the shift of emphasis represented across diverse contributions to their 
collection, a shift they maintain is the hallmark of an emerging (if still heterodox) body of 
responses to the crisis of “identity” and the shifting of scientific frontiers explored above. 
These responses might best be seen as part of a research programme driven by the 
collective conviction that “matter matters”:
63
 that, far from being the shapeless “stuff” on 
which the powers of language work, matter works a power of its own, possessing “its 
own modes of self-transformation, self-organisation, and directedness,”
64
 and capable of 
constructing the “social” world as much as it is constructed by it. Post-structuralism and 
other constructivist critical theories must be fleshed out, made capable of accounting for 
the relationship of language to matter in ways that are not uni-directional. This can only 
be achieved if we see the material world as a foundation or starting point for, rather than 
as a threat to, critical theory.  
For the purposes of this chapter, with its particular focus on the reframing of the 
culture/nature debate to meet the demands of an emancipatory politics, it is perhaps 
helpful to consider two levels at which the relationship between nature and culture is 
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being re-theorised. Iris Van der Tuin, whose review of a spread of current works on the 
new materialist turn provides a helpful overview of the literature implicated in this shift, 
commends the tri-part structure of the New Materialisms for accurately highlighting three 
central themes reflected across otherwise disparate new materialist work: the “current 
posthumanist theorisation of agential matter in the natural sciences and beyond”, the 
“theoretical impetus of biopolitics and bioethics”, and the “non-linear take on the political 
economy.”
65
 Arguably, however, many theorists exploring new materialist approaches to 
biopolitics, bioethics, and the political economy, take inspiration from the work of 
feminists retheorising matter at the ontological level. A close exploration of the work of 
Karen Barad and Coole will allow us to trace some of the contours (and the flexibilities) 
of new materialist ontologies. A discussion of whether Coole’s phenomenological 
approach fits within the anti-representationalist focus of Barad’s work will be important 
to a discussion of the compatibility of the respective work of these theorists within a 
shared agenda. Then, in analysing the possible value of their contributions to feminist 
theory and political practice, the work of Siebers and Garland-Thomson will be used to 
show how effective critical theories can flow out of the conceptions of agency that Barad 
and Coole offer. 
 
a) Replacing Representationalism: Karen Barad’s “Agential Realism” and the 
Productive Performances of Matter 
Barad’s ontological theory of “Agential Realism” begins with a reading of social 
constructivism as sharing problematic assumptions with what she calls the 
“representationalist” paradigm, an understanding of language which presents it as playing 
a mediating function between external reality and the monadic subject. To address the 
problems inherent in this paradigm, Barad interprets and extends the philosophical 
reflections on quantum theory of the physicist Niels Bohr. By reading Bohr’s theory of 
scientific apparatuses and Butler’s theory of performativity through each other, Barad 
attempts to decentre the humanist emphasis of Butler’s framework to arrive at a post-
humanist account of agency. In this process, dichotomous models of discourse/matter and 
epistemology/ontology, the foundational binaries representationalism assumes, are 
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profoundly challenged. An exploration of Bohr’s theory of complementarity, a 
description of its possible ontological thrust according to Barad, and a summary of how 
Butler’s concept of performativity is extended by Barad through her Bohrian reading, will 
make the nature of this challenge clear. 
Barad has already been cited in our discussion as contending that with every turn 
we make – “the linguistic turn, the semiotic turn, the interpretative turn, the cultural turn” 
– everything is “turned into a matter of language or some or other form of cultural 
representation” so that “the only thing that does not seem to matter anymore is matter.”
66
 
Asking the question of what has led us to grant such substantialising power to language, 
and driven us to conclude that cultural representations are accessible when the things that 
they represent are not, Barad concludes that “the representationalist belief in the power of 
words to mirror pre-existing phenomena is the metaphysical substrate that supports social 
constructivist as well as traditional realist beliefs.”
67
 Representationalism, as Barad uses 
the term here, derives its name from the political concept of representation within liberal 
social theories, which present the individual as an entity (with pre-existing capacities and 
attributes) prior to “the law or the discovery of the law – awaiting/inviting 
representation.”
68
 We can now speak of “political, linguistic, and epistemological forms 
of representationalism”,
69
 but Barad asserts that the foundational metaphysic underlying 
all forms is the belief that representations and what they represent are two entities which 
exist anterior to each other (the represented exists “independent of all practices of 
representing”).
70
 When the picture is complicated with the addition of a “knower” 
(alongside “knowledge” as representation, and the “known” as that which is represented), 
representationalism is often expressed as the idea that language plays a “mediating 
function between independently existing entities.”
71
 An atoms-in-the-void conception of 
existence is implied. 
Various theories of social constructivism have attempted to bring the 
representationalist paradigm into dispute, in some ways we have already addressed. In the 
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sphere of identity politics this has happened through successive assaults on the idea that 
the political subject as represented in emancipatory politics exists before their 
construction through discourse (that is, through the act of representation). Branching into 
critiques of the scientific method, constructivists have then postulated (on similar terms) 
that knowledge practices in the sciences construct the objects that are under observation. 
But critics such as Joseph Rouse have claimed that the “adversarial positions” of realism 
and constructivism “have more in common than their proponents acknowledge”, and 
Barad states, in agreement with Rouse, that these positions agree that knowledge practices 
mediate our access to the material world. The former simply believes that “Nature” is 
being accurately represented, so that representations correspond to the world as it really 
is, where the latter presents language as a corrupt or distorting medium, and has despaired 
of the possibility of unfettered access to what lies beyond our representations. Like 
Descartes, we now have an “asymmetrical faith in our access to representations over 
things”,
72
 but our belief in a passive external material world awaiting representation 
remains. 
If it is the “taken for granted ontological gap” between knower, known, and the 
knowledge practices which mediate between them, that “generates questions of the 
accuracy of representations”,
73
 Barad believes we can get beyond the representationalist 
paradigm by taking up a metaphysic that is implicit in the work of Bohr. Bohr’s theory of 
the nature and role of scientific apparatuses and their relationship to the subjects and 
objects of scientific experiment developed in response to debates taking place in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries about the nature of light. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, empirical evidence for the wave-like characteristics of light had replaced 
Newton’s corpuscular theory, which held that light exhibited the behaviour of particles. 
During the first quarter of the twentieth century, however, this consensus was troubled by 
new experiments which seemed to indicate that light exhibited wave-like characteristics 
under some conditions, and particle-like characteristics under others.
74
 This “wave-
particle” debate spilled over when it became clear that matter (electrons) exhibited the 
same wave-particle duality.
75
 The classic “two-slit” experiment involves an apparatus 
which aims particles or waves at a partition with double slits. Passing through either of 
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the slits, the particles or waves land on a screen, making a mark. The aggregate position 
of the marks is used for determining whether wave or particle behaviour is exhibited by 
the matter passing through the partition. Waves exhibit a diffraction pattern on the screen, 
marking their interference with each other as they spread, while particles land on parts of 
the screen directly opposite the slits. However, when a single electron is aimed at the 
partition, it passes through it to produce an interference (wave) pattern, and in the 
twentieth century this raised unprecedented questions for physics. Particles and waves 
have mutually exclusive characteristics, since particles are “localised”, occupying one 
area of space at a given time, where waves “have extension in space.”
76
 Could a single 
electron be moving through both slits at once, or interfering with itself? 
Bohr and Albert Einstein made use of theoretical modifications to the “two-slit” 
gedanken experiment to explore this and other quandaries, and their differing predictions 
for how particle-wave duality might be resolved are useful for understanding the crux of 
Bohr’s position. Bohr designed a modification to the two-slit apparatus that would 
theoretically determine which slit the electron moved through. The apparatus involved 
mounting the upper slit on a movable diaphragm, so that the transference of momentum 
from the atom to the partition could be recorded as the atom passed through the slits. 
Einstein argued that with such a device, it would be possible to see how electrons could 
simultaneously act as particles and waves.
77
 Bohr argued to the contrary that using a 
“which-path” apparatus would destroy the interference pattern: electrons would display 
particle characteristics. That is, it would be impossible to see electrons behaving 
simultaneously as a wave and as a particle. If the measurement apparatus defined the 
electron as a particle, it would exhibit particle characteristics.
78
 When it became possible 
to perform Bohr’s experiment, long after his death, this prediction was found to be 
correct: there is a fundamental trade-off between obtaining “which-path” information, and 
recording an interference pattern.
79
 
Bohr’s prediction entailed the formulation of the principle of “complementarity”: 
that is, the circumstances under which matter exhibits particle characteristics, and those 
under which matter exhibits wave characteristics, are mutually exclusive 
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 The basis of this principle for Bohr was the concept of 
“indeterminacy”, which holds that it is impossible to collapse indeterminacy for one 
variable through measurement, without simultaneously excluding the possibility of 
determining the effects of measurement. It is therefore impossible to distinguish between 
the characteristics of the object being measured, and the agency of its measurement.  
Barad offers the example of the measurements needed to determine “position” and 
“momentum” to illustrate this concept. Imagine that an experiment for measuring the 
position of a particle in the air required a flash camera mounted on a tripod in a dark 
room. A single photon of light could be bounced off the particle onto a photographic 
plate, and the camera could in this way record the position of the object. The 
photographic plate would need to be fixed, or else the position of the object would be 
indeterminate. However, contact with one photon would be enough to displace the 
particle under observation. Therefore, to determine the measurement-independent 
position of the particle we would need to establish the final momentum of the photon 
after it makes contact with the particle, and subtract from this value, the value of the 
initial momentum of the photon. To measure the final momentum of the photon would 
require that the photographic plate be movable, that is, capable of marking the impact of 
the photon’s momentum. The problem is, if the photographic plate is fixed, the photon is 
part of the agencies of observation (apparatus), where if the photographic plate is 
movable, the photon becomes part of the object of observation. The circumstances 
required for measuring momentum and position are therefore mutually exclusive, or, it is 
physically impossible to sharply determine both momentum and position at once: one or 
the other variable must remain indeterminate. The trade-off between “which-path” and 
interference information works along similar lines, since in the two-slit experiment the 
measurements for momentum (for example, with an arrangement like a movable 
diaphragm) and the measurements for position (with a fixed partition) are not 
simultaneously determinable. 
A number of important implications of Bohr’s theory of complementarity are 
drawn out by Barad, and will be explored shortly, but helpful definition is added to her 
reading where she observes that the ontological significance of “indeterminacy” is often 
underplayed or ignored in both popular and scientific discourse, where it is conflated with 
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or replaced by the more famous “uncertainty principle”.
81
 At the same time as Bohr was 
exploring complementarity, Werner Heisenberg published a paper which considered the 
problem of a trade-off between accuracy of measurements for position and momentum (in 
a scenario very close to the particle-photon-photographic experiment just discussed). The 
paper, which introduced the “uncertainty principle”, focussed on the problem of 
disturbance when a photon hits an atom, the discontinuity of momentum.
82
 However, 
Barad notes that on its own, this problem would not “exhaust the possibilities for 
determining the (alleged) pre-existing properties of the particle” unless it was also 
impossible “to determine the effect of the measurement interaction and subtract its 
effect.”
83
 Bohr’s “indeterminacy principle” goes a step further than Heisenberg by 
suggesting that subtracting the effects of measurement interaction would be physically 
and therefore logically impossible because of the alternative physical arrangements 
needed to make the original measurement and to take measurement itself into account. 
The difference between these positions, as Barad marks it, is that between stating 
an epistemological problem and staking an epistem-ontological position. For Heisenberg, 
uncertainty (as the name suggests) is an epistemic problem, and he retains the concept of 
a reality beyond measurement with inherent properties of position and momentum that 
could still, theoretically, be accessed. For Bohr, on the other hand, concepts such as 
“momentum” or “position” are not simply ideational, but are semantic-ontic, because 
concepts are fundamentally inseparable from the material arrangements which give these 
properties their sense. Bohr therefore wrote in his response to Heisenberg’s paper that “a 
sentence like ‘we cannot know both the momentum and position of an atomic object’ 
raises at once questions as to the physical reality of two such attributes of the object”.
84
 If 
certainty about momentum and certainty about position require mutually exclusive 
material arrangements, we have no business positing a reality beyond our measurements, 
with measurement-independent properties of position and momentum. Properties before 
measurement are not just unknown, but ontologically indeterminate.
85
 As Barad puts it, 
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Thus while Barad is careful to admit that Bohr’s writing most often focusses on 
epistemological issues and never explicitly sets out an ontological landscape,
87
her reading 
suggests that Bohr’s position is actually a challenge to the distinction between 
epistemology and ontology itself. As we noted with the particle-photon-photographic 
experiment above, the varying material arrangements of experiments allow for various 
delineations (as Barad puts it, “constructed cuts”) between apparatus and object.
88
 But the 
boundaries between entities are in such cases local, and materially enacted.
89
 The idea of 
fixed or universal distinctions between the subjects and objects of experiment (as in 
Newtonian physics and in Cartesian ontology) is rejected by Bohr, and phenomena, 
comprised of agencies of observation and objects of observation, become the primary 
ontological units.
90
 Because the effects of measurement cannot be discounted from the 
properties measured, these properties cannot be attributed to objects as if they were 
measurement-independent (as in Newtonian physics), but must be attributed to objects-
within-phenomena. If these features of Bohr’s thought hint towards a non-dichotomous 
understanding of subject/object, the fact that “concepts” within his schema are not purely 
semantic but are embedded in material arrangements might be seen as a further challenge 
to the culture/nature or language/matter binaries. We do not stand above nature when we 




If some resonances between this position, and aspects of post-structuralism are 
becoming clear – remembering that for post-structuralism “knowing” always entails an 
act of construction –  it is useful now to examine Barad’s use of Butler, in order to see 
how Barad’s distinctive position develops out of her agreements and divergences with 
Butler. While Barad remains critical of Butler on several fronts, she regards her theory of 
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performativity as a step in the right direction, saving Butler from the charge of linguistic 
monism that might be rightly applied to some forms of constructivism.
92
 We have seen 
that Barad regards the postmodern problem of access (how we might have any access to 
nature from within the web of cultural signs we inhabit) as a sign only that with 
postmodernism representationalism has become “a prisoner of the problematic 
metaphysics it postulates.”
93
 Performativity moves us some distance from this metaphysic 
because it relies on a concept of discursive practices (that is, it is rooted in acts rather 
than language, fitting somewhere in between the worlds of words and things),
94
 and 
because it allows us to think of materialisation as a process wherein the boundaries 
between “subject” and “object” are seen in their historicity, as material “realities” enacted 
over time.
95
 In these ways post-structuralism is not a denial of the real (the flesh of 
bodies), but only a challenging of the assumption that appeals to the “real” can be devoid 
of constitutive power. In its focus on the instantiation of bodily boundaries, 
performativity echoes the notion of exteriority-within-phenomena that Bohr uses to define 
the objects of experiment: different material arrangements enact different “cuts” within an 
experiment, and the results therefore refer to a reality within a given interaction (or “intra-
action”, as Barad puts it, avoiding Cartesian connotations).
96
 Both Butler and Bohr, in this 
way, could move us towards a non-dichotomous metaphysic where relations are 
ontologically prior to relata. 
However, despite the promise of performativity, Butler fails to move entirely past 
the representationalist paradigm, because, following Foucault, she is cannot “tell us in 
what way the biological and the historical are “bound together” such that one is not 
consecutive to the other.”
97
 In fact (as we have already seen highlighted by other critics), 
matter for Butler plays only a passive role in materialisation.
98
 To allow a concept of 
performativity to truly redefine our ontological terrain, we must move past our humanist 
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Here a (broadened) Bohrian understanding of the role of apparatuses is useful. 
Where Butler cannot escape a humanist account of discursive practices because she deals 
only with the materialisation of human bodies, and therefore locates performativity in 
human acts, Bohr’s understanding of apparatuses may offer us a way to transcend this 
paradigm.
100
 Apparatuses are not just material products of human invention which sustain 
discursive practices,
101
 but are inseparably and non-consecutively material-discursive, 
playing an active role both in meaning-making (producing “concepts”), and in the 
materialisation of non-human bodies.
102
 That Bohr presents apparatuses as fixed and 
bounded entities used in a lab (and that the human subject stands somewhere behind 
Bohr’s material arrangements as an independent observer),
103
 should not prevent us from 
pushing his insights to new limits. This is especially given that Bohr’s own logic 
somewhat undercuts a fixed conception of the apparatus. Barad notes that  
In Bohr’s account, one is not entitled to presume that an object has material properties in 
the absence of their specification through the larger material arrangement. The boundaries 
and properties of an “object” are determinate only within and as part of a particular 
phenomenon.
104
   
If we were to consider the apparatus as itself an object of our observation, in other words, 
we would involve it in a wider phenomenon. In an example Bohr himself uses, when a 
man orients himself in the dark using a stick, if he holds the stick lightly, he may feel its 
contours as if it is an object, whereas if he holds it firmly, he can extend his bodily 
boundaries through it by using it to sense other objects. In a similar way, apparatuses 
themselves might be seen as specific material arrangements with shifting boundaries, 
forming part of phenomena that include, at times, the human subject.
105
  
Taking this broader understanding of the apparatus, Barad argues that we may 
centre a new understanding of agency here: in the sense that apparatuses actively 
configure and reconfigure boundaries to produce new phenomena, we should read them 
performatively, that is, as practices that matter.
106
 Thus Barad is able to arrive at her own 
                                                          
100
 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 145. 
101
 As in Foucault, see ibid., 147. 
102
 Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity”, 138-42. 
103
 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 153. 
104
 Ibid., 160. 
105
 Bohr’s example of the stick as an apparatus with shifting boundaries, see ibid., 154. 
106
 Barad actually writes that apparatuses should be understood as “discursive practices”, but this 
terminology complicates her insistence on material-discursive inseparability I think, and since it is a post-
26 
 
articulation of a new materialist ontology, “Agential Realism”, which she describes as a 
redefinition of both terms.
107
 Through applying a theory of performativity to material-
discursive arrangements rather than limiting this concept to human subjects, we find that 
what is real is not a world of human subjects and fixed material objects, but a world that 
is constantly worlding, through the performance of shifting intra-active relations with 
itself: as Barad puts it “matter is substance in its intra-active becoming – not a thing but a 
doing, a congealing of agency.”
108
 Humans are not simply situated somewhere within this 
world, rather we take part in its becoming, insofar as our knowledge practices are intra-
active with the world, productive of new relationships.
109
 Meaning is no longer seen as 
ontologically separate from matter, but knowledge practices are “part of the world 
making itself intelligible to another part.”
110
 Agency is not an attribute of subjects or 
objects, but is a dynamism of performed relations.
111
 Realism is not the belief in a world 
behind human knowledge, but a belief in the emerging world that knowledge practices 
participate in. 
 
b) Diana Coole and “Being as Folded Flesh”: Redefining Agency with Merleau-
Ponty 
Barad’s concern to redefine agency is shared by Coole, a feminist political theorist who 
takes up a reading of the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty to derive an 
ontology which shares important features with Barad’s “Agential Realism”. Setting Coole 
and Barad together, the contours of a unified position might be posited, and given the 
diverse fields from which they approach their subjects, this unity is of some interest. 
However, flexibilities within this consensus must also be acknowledged, including the 
contentious issue of whether the phenomenological appeal for a return to the “lifeworld” 
betrays representationalist assumptions (about truth as a grounding in the “real”, that is, 
the world as it is prior to representation). The remaining part of this chapter will 
summarise Coole’s political theory, and assess some of its advantages over post-
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structuralism. In making this case, it will be necessary to demonstrate how Merleau-Ponty 
(and consequently, Coole) pre-empt a number of potential post-structuralist criticisms. 
Affinities and divergences between Coole and Barad will then be explored, and the 
chapter will end by evaluating their positions together in terms the usefulness of their 
ontologies for political praxis. 
Coole presents her reading of Merleau-Ponty as an attempt to recover agency for 
contemporary political thought, given that the problems of both modernism and post-
structuralism are fundamentally related to how agency is conceived within these 
movements. The exclusive attribution of agency to the ontologically primary subject 
leaves liberalism with the problematic of how to “locate the glue that would hold society 
together”, while the postmodern critique of the subject, which renders both the individual 
and the collective “an unstable flux of shifting identities”, threatens to eliminate political 
agency altogether.
112
 Merleau-Ponty is a useful ally in Coole’s endeavour, since, although 
he was primarily a critic of modernity, and a predecessor to post-structuralism whose 
work proponents of that paradigm rejected, he shares many post-structuralist concerns, 
while anticipating and consciously attempting to avoid the kinds of problems that critics 
frequently draw attention to in the work of Foucault and Butler.  
Coole’s reading of Merleau-Ponty as primarily a political thinker is atypical, 
where his political writings are frequently treated as peripheral to his more central 
concern with returning to the lifeworld.
113
 By demonstrating continuity between his 
rejection of both Marxism and liberalism, and his phenomenological writings, Coole 
develops a convincing case for seeing Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology as driven by a 
concern for the re-organisation of collective life. Liberalism and Marxism, for Merleau-
Ponty, were two sides of the same rationalist coin at the heart of modernity,
114
 where 
rationalism means a privileging of reason over other approaches to knowledge. This 
commitment occludes recognition of “forces that elude rational control, yet which are 
inseparable from the emergence of rationality”, among them contingency, ambiguity, and 
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the elusive impact of embodied experience.
115
 Rationalism is particularly pernicious in 
politics, for Merleau-Ponty, because it sustains systems that are increasingly self-assured 
and closed to lived experience.
116
 Because of this closure, modern regimes find 
themselves thrown into crises they are unable to navigate, including conflicts between 
tradition and progress, freedom and authority, the individual and the collective.  
At the heart of rationalism is a dualist ontology, which for Merleau-Ponty finds its 
archetypal expression in the legacy of Descartes. Descartes’ successors carried forward an 
impoverished version of what was, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, originally an inspired and 
living ontological reflection.
117
 Merleau-Ponty, who (as we shall see) himself maintains a 
constant interest in the generativity of the negative,
118
 prizes the tradition of doubt in 
Descartes, but criticises Descartes’ attempt to establish certainty on the cogito, the price 
of which is a severance of mind and body where external verification becomes secondary 
to the certainty of consciousness.
119
 Liberalism and Marxism tacitly assume this ontology, 
and in stressing alternative sides of the body-mind dichotomy (subjectivist and objectivist 
respectively), they face different pressures.
120
 By universalising its principles, liberalism 
tears the free human subject from his/her material context. Liberal regimes are therefore 
prone to forgetting their own historicity, and to justifying their programmes of violence as 
they apply their abstractions to other contexts (without making recourse to concrete 
material strategies derived from their own experience). In line with his conviction that 
existential analysis of regimes within their material contexts is needed, Merleau-Ponty 
bases this conclusion on analyses of Western regimes and their relations with the 
colonies:
121
 we have begun, he writes, “to defend liberty instead of free men.”
122
  
While this insistence on material conditions is reminiscent of Marxist analysis, 
Marxism fares scarcely better in Merleau-Ponty’s assessment. While in his early career 
Merleau-Ponty expressed hopes for progress within post-revolutionary societies, based on 
the possibilities of dialectical reasoning for transformation within the flux of history, his 
later work observes with self-critical dismay that communist societies were exemplifying 
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only “the objectivist side of rationalism”.
123
 Their excessive bureaucratisation, 
authoritarianism, the lost touch of governance with the masses, and the reestablishment of 
pre-revolutionary styles of privilege, were all manifestations of a naturalism pervasive in 
the thought of different Marxist exponents. Lenin’s and Trotsky’s respective materialisms 
conceived of history in deterministic terms, with man as an effect of nature,
124
 and 
communist regimes followed suit in substituting triumphalist progress narratives for 
continued dialectical engagements,
125
 rendering them ineffective in living up to their 
promises, while they became increasingly defensive and prone to violence. For Merleau-
Ponty, these crude teleologies, and the reductive naturalism they depended on, reflected a 
correspondence theory of truth which set the subject somewhere outside the flux of 
history as an observer.
126
 Liberalism and Marxism were suffering the same Cartesian 
ailment at their foundational level. 
But Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of Marxism should not, Coole argues, be read as a 
rejection of dialectics per se.
127
 The problem with Marxism was one of closure where 
revolution (negation), had become governance. Although Merleau-Ponty recognised that 
negativity (a deliberately elusive concept, but in Merleau-Ponty’s political writings a term 
that connotes reflexivity or generative self-critique, an openness to the unpresentable 
which allows for the hazardous emergence of truth against the closure of stagnant 
ideology)
128
 could not be “a force of governance” it still needed to be “accommodated 
within the structures of power”.
129
 For Coole, the parallels Merleau-Ponty drew between 
Sartre (whose concept of negativity influenced Merleau-Ponty) and Marxism, get to the 
heart of the former’s conviction that Marxist dialectics had met a dead end. In The Visible 
and Invisible he writes “the dialectic is by principle an epithet, as soon as one takes it as a 
motto, speaks of it instead of practicing it, it becomes a power of being, an explicative 
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 Within Sartre’s voluntarism, human consciousness had been identified as 
pure negativity, where the subject, the pure reflexivity of the “for itself” stands over 
against the self-indifferent “in itself”, in acts of pure creation.
131
 For Merleau-Ponty, once 
negativity has been spoken in this way, reified as a concept or identified with any 
particular agency, it “denatures”:
132
 “from the moment I conceive of myself as a 
negativity and the world as a positivity, there is no longer any interaction.”
133
 Within 
Marxist thought, the Proletariat had been granted prima facie ontological status of pure 
negativity, similar to Sartre’s subject, and this entailed a loss of contact with the 
ambiguities of history.
134
 What was needed was a concept of negativity conceived within 
a different ontological framework, a dialectics rooted within an ontological space prior to 
the subject-object dichotomy. 
It is Coole’s attention to the political works of Merleau-Ponty, and her insistence 
that his concern with the political crisis of modernity drove his subsequent ontological 
investigations,
135
 that allows her to read his life’s work as a sustained attempt to move 
from subject-focussed (humanist) accounts of negativity, to anti-humanist accounts of a 
pervasive generativity of “the flesh”. Because this ontology emerged through a 
phenomenological approach, however, a brief excursus on some of the criticisms this 
approach has invited will highlight some key questions to consider as we investigate this 
trajectory in Merleau-Ponty’s thought. This will be important when we come to ask how 
he might escape post-structuralist dismissals, how he might avoid some of the criticisms 
levelled at post-structuralism itself, and how the position Coole develops out of his 
thought might be compatible with the thought of Barad. 
For Merleau-Ponty, rationalism is not simply a collection of abstract ideas, but is 
founded in practical orientations to the world. It is an “ontological choice” marking a 
“distinctive style of existence”.
136
 In a sense, Coole argues, such choices, the taking for 
granted of the horizons of a lifeworld where ideas or practices are accepted and 
incorporated into bodily habits, are inevitable in Merleau-Ponty’s schema.
137
 They are, on 
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the other hand, also open to reassessment through a return to lived corporeal experience, 
and thus phenomenology, the return to the lifeworld (the world of phenomena, or “the 
things themselves”, before the emergence of distilled concepts such as the subject or 
object) remained central to his project of challenging modernity’s foundations.  
On this description of phenomenology, the rejection of Merleau-Ponty’s work by 
Butler (following Foucault) may seem on first appearances to have precedent,
138
 since the 
idea of a return to the “lifeworld” raises the spectre of recourse to a prediscursive realm as 
a source for “truth”, anathema to post-structuralism.
139
 Experience is, moreover, suspect 
in post-structuralist accounts, where the subject is considered a pure effect (recall Joan 
Scott’s maxim that there are no subjects who have experiences, but only subjects 
constituted by experience). After a description of Merleau-Ponty’s ontological reflections 
it will be possible to show that his work cannot easily be accused of invoking a 
representational theory of truth, or of making naïve recourse to subjective experience. 
Merleau-Ponty’s early work in the Phenomenology of Perception is an attempt to 
replace the primacy of reason with the primacy of perception. Two concepts form the 
lynchpin of this project, the body, and intentionality. Before the emergence of the gods-
eye views of the world posited in science or rationalism, in fact before we can speak of 
consciousness at all, sense emerges in the world through corporeality, the body’s bent 
towards its surroundings as it seeks to incorporate what it perceives into its world. 
Perception is therefore a kind of between state, pre-conscious and yet not purely 
physiological. A number of examples helpfully elucidate this, but the primary one for 
Merleau-Ponty was the gestalt, the idea of a figure against a ground or field. When we put 
our attention onto an object (Merleau-Ponty uses the example of a house), we plunge into 
it, and all of the objects over which we have glanced become a horizon against which it 
stands out. Thus the things we perceive always have a field. Our view of the object is 
perspectival, so that we only see one side at a time, while other aspects are concealed. But 
this concealment “does not hamper my desire to see the object”, and the body, in seeking 
to understand its world, makes use of the horizon of objects which it has glanced over to 
focus on this one: it sees the house “according to the sides these other things turn toward 
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 The body in this way inhabits the objects it perceives, virtually situating 
itself within and around them. When an object becomes available to consciousness, it is 
the result of the body’s interrogation of the world, its taking up of the potential latent in 
the imbrication of object and horizon. 
The body then, is not an object amongst the other objects in the world, a 
mechanism receiving signals and giving rise to consciousness, but is active in sense-
making.
141
 In the case of the phantom limb, Merleau-Ponty writes, neither psychical nor 
physiological causes can be posited, rather these aspects “gear into each other”.
142
 
Physiological conditions must be present, because the phantom disappears with the 
removal of the sensory conductors. Yet the limb also shrinks with the patient’s acceptance 
of his mutilation, so psychological causes are therefore implicated. Our options then, in 
understanding this phenomenon, are to posit a mix of these subjective and objective 
causes (which would require that we “discover the means of joining the one with the 
other”), or to integrate these causes “into a milieu they would share.”
143
 Merleau-Ponty 
opts for the latter. To understand the phantom limb, we must understand that when a 
being exists, it has a world, and that this having is not “an objective consciousness”,
144
 
but a kind of style, a zone of possible operations that the body has established through 
being over time. The body is like an open situation, extending itself into its 
environment.
145
 In the loss of a limb, we are confronted by the facticity of this pre-
conscious horizon of existence. If the patient extends a phantom limb to walk, it is 
because  
like the normal subject, he has no need for a clear and articulated perception of his body in order to 
begin moving. It is enough that his body is “available” as an indivisible power and that the 
phantom leg is sensed as vaguely implicated in it. Consciousness of the phantom limb itself 
therefore remains equivocal…He has not lost his leg because he continues to allow for it…
146
  
Phantom limbs, in other words, show us something about a milieu which “exceeds the 
alternative” between objective and subjective causes.
147
 They do not “occur at the level of 
thetic consciousness” (they are not present because the patient “thinks” they are 
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 nor are they a “sum of reflexes” (since the presence of the limb is independent 
of stimuli),
149
 they occur in the space in-between consciousness and the world, a space in 
which the body aims at the world.  
Some themes thus begin emerge in the early work of Merleau-Ponty which will be 
of central interest. The first is that subject and object are being reconfigured in his work 
as historical or emergent phenomena, entities that are not just stable items “whose 
isolated parts are measured quantitatively and linked causally”.
150
 Subject and object 
emerge out of a set of processes, and in Merleau-Ponty’s characterisation of these 
processes, a number of dichotomies are being broken down. We have touched upon the 
most obvious: the refusal of the active mind and passive body dualism, where the body is 
shown to be, as Coole puts it, “an emergent phenomenon, a formative existential process 
rather than an inert collection of biological organs (or a discursive fabrication).”
151
 In the 
gestalt, sense emerges not through a presentation of stimuli to an individual brain, but the 
body must actively cooperate with its environment to bring objects into visibility.
152
 And 
not just the human body, but other bodies are involved in sense-making. Again as 
illustrated by the figure and field,
153
 there is a sense in which the body’s interrogation of 
its world is answered by the world’s unveiling of itself through inter-corporeality 
(remembering that the concealed faces of an object are present to us because the horizons 
of other bodies are implied in our horizon). For Coole, this kind of inter-corporeal 
reciprocity implies potential for a thick theory of inter-subjectivity, where, before the 
emergence of the cogito (or, we might add, of the three-dimensional object) a field of 
interacting bodies exists.
154
 Second, there is the distinction between matter and meaning 
or knowing and being. Sense emerges out of the body’s participation in the flesh of the 
world, where in examples like the figure and field, the body “reaches the world” through 
acts of “mimesis”.
155
 For Merleau-Ponty “the look” entails a kind of reciprocity that blurs 
the distinction between knower and known. The seer envelops visible things “As though 
it were in a relation of pre-established harmony with them, as though it knew them before 
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knowing them…so that finally one cannot say if it is the look or if it is the things that 
command.”
156
 Apprehension comes through “coexistence”,
157
 so that Coole can conclude 
that “knowing and being” within Merleau-Ponty’s thought “are not distinct”.
158
 Finally, 
there is the distinction between the visible and the invisible, positivity and negativity.
159
 
In the gestalt, sense emerges through an interplay of figure, horizon, and body, but also 
crucially, the spaces in between. The concealed dimensions of a figure, the pronounced 
absences of its “invisible” aspects, provoke our interrogation of the visual field and are 
therefore “necessary for anything to appear at all”:
160
 prior to the emergence of both 
subjects and objects is a landscape pocketed with latent possibility, precarious generative 
potential. As Coole puts it, in the gestalt Merleau-Ponty “recognizes a productive 
difference whereby invisible lines of force”, or things and the spaces between things, 
“structure and produce forms that are materially meaningful for the body”.
161
  
But if these themes can be said to have been present in his earlier work, Merleau-
Ponty still felt that the Phenomenology of Perception had retained a Cartesian framework 
of consciousness (albeit a tacit, silent cogito) versus the object.
162
 Contrary to readings 
which view his last reflections as a radical break with his phenomenological thought, 
Coole describes his entire body of writing as “coiling over itself”, his later thought is a 
self-critical re-exploration that pushes his work from existential into ontological 
territory.
163
 This metaphor is apt, since in The Visible and Invisible a kind of reversal 
takes place. In order to rid his work of subjectivism, consciousness had to be shown to be 
an expression of the self-reflexive nature of Being itself. While Merleau-Ponty had 
already begun to force a concept of agency beyond humanism in attributing intentionality 
to bodies (including animal bodies),
164
 it is here that his anti-humanist immanentism 
becomes marked. 
One way to map this reversal, Merleau-Ponty’s “own fold”,
165
 is through the 
extension of his metaphor of “reversibility” (one conceptualisation of human self-
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awareness) to Being, which culminates in the image of Being as “folded flesh”. Though 
the language of The Visible and Invisible is experimental,
166
 many of the phrases he uses 
to grasp at the nature of Being (folds, flesh, intertwining, chiasm, reversibility, interiority 
and exteriority) unfold from the image of two hands touching. This is evoked in response 
to the lack of exteriority afforded the Cartesian cogito. If the human subject is severed 
from the objective realm, how can anything pass between myself and the object, as, for 
example, when “I give to my hands, in particular that degree, that rate, and that direction 
of movement that are capable of making me feel the textures of sleek and rough”?
167
 
Merleau-Ponty’s answer is that, between “the exploration and what it will teach me, there 
must exist some kinship” which provides me with an “opening upon a tactile world.”
168
  
The body must be able both to touch, and to be touched, which is precisely what it does: 
when my right hand holds on to an object, and my left hand touches my right, the 
“touching subject” is able to pass “over to the rank of the touched”,
169
 and I experience 
myself as both subject and object, a body of the mind and a mind of the body.
170
  
Crucially, these things are never experienced simultaneously. The two hands 
alternate between touched and touching, so that “I never reach coincidence; the 
coincidence eclipses at the moment of realisation”.
171
 These experiences “never exactly 
overlap” precisely because they “are part of the same body”.
172
 There is a shift from one 
to another, not as something leaps across a breach, but as movement spreads across a 
hinge. The body folds back on itself, becomes strange to itself, as obverse and reverse,
173
 
and in this hiatus produced by non-coincidence, this opening in a fold, the generativity of 
the negative is at work. The shift, as Coole puts it “opens my body in two”,
174
 so that 
“tangible it descends among [things], as touching it dominates them all.”
175
  
Exploring the corollary of the two hands touching in the visual field will connect 
this sense of negativity as emergence “between folds” with Merleau-Ponty’s early 
concepts of intentionality and interrogation. The separation of vision and touch into 
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separate senses is at any rate artificial for Merleau-Ponty, since “every movement of my 
eyes – even more, every displacement of my body - has its place in the same visible 
universe that I itemise and explore with them, as conversely, every vision takes place 
somewhere in tactile space.”
176
 What Merleau-Ponty says about touch, he therefore also 
says of vision: that “he who looks must not himself be foreign to the world that he looks 
at”.
177
 We have seen that when I encounter an object of perception, with some aspects 
facing me and with other aspects which are concealed from my sight, my body is drawn 
in and around that object, and I view its concealed aspects from the vantage points of 
other objects which share its horizon. I see what is concealed of that object via the faces 
that other objects turn towards it. There is then a sense in which, in the act of 
interrogation (in which my body crosses the distance between myself and the object) I 
install myself “in the midst of the visible” and experience myself as seen.
178
 We might 
conclude that in order to see, I have to sense myself as an object of vision while I am also 
the subject of vision. My body is in a sense ruptured and folded over itself through such 
an act, it both “detaches itself upon” the world and also “detaches itself from” it in the act 
of seeing.
179
 The fold or rupture is generative: the distance between the things seen and 
the seer is “deeply consonant” with their proximity, “constitutive for the thing of its 




To speak of the emergence of the subject in terms of a folding over or a hinging of 
the body is to move from the idea of subject and object as two distinct substances to an 
idea of a single substance or flesh, gaining distance from itself and so becoming self-
aware. From here it is not a great leap to begin to talk of a monistic or immanentist 
ontology, in which subjectivity belongs to the self-reflexivity of one entity, what 
Merleau-Ponty refers to as Being itself. As Coole writes, once we have begun to talk of 
knowing and being as synonymous, of knowledge as a kind of participation, and once we 
have found that this participation is possible because the body and what it interacts with 
share an “affinity” or “continuity”, it becomes wrong to see the body’s relation to what it 
perceives “as solely an epistemological relationship.”
181
  In his writings on perception, 
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Merleau-Ponty discusses the concealed aspects of an object as literally “invisible”, but 
throughout his later work we find him talking of the “invisible” as the potentiality latent 
in what is hidden,
182
 which is a potentiality for the kind of rupture that makes possible the 
“relation of the visible with itself that traverses me and constitutes me as a seer”.
183
 The 
seeing subject here is presented as a situation through which a more universal principle is 
at work. Coole writes that in the “noncoincidence of the touching-touched” Merleau-
Ponty “discovers the upsurge of a more general flesh…‘my body does not perceive’ so 
much as ‘perception dawns through it’.”
184
 Slowly the metaphor of reversibility, the 
capacity of the body to double over itself to produce self-knowledge, is generalised to 
become a description of the flesh of Being itself. And negativity, importantly, is 
generalised beyond the subject in the same breath. If it is associated with the lacuna 
between the halves of the body as it doubles over itself, and with the generative absences 
which surround visibles and invite or instigate the body’s doubling, negativity, the 
possibility of contingency which is the necessary condition for novelty or becoming, is 
not a property of any one entity. It belongs in the intertwining of things and the spaces 
between things, the folds in the flesh of Being. 
How might this philosophy of the in-between – which explores the inextricability 
of body and mind, matter and meaning, visible and invisible, which shifts the emergence 
of sense from the cogito onto the body and into the world of inter-corporeal existence, 
and which finally ends in an ontology of Being as existence doubling back on itself so 
that new possibilities arise between its folds – be of use for feminism in the wake of the 
post-structuralist critique? While Coole’s reflections on this problem come via her 
exploration of negativity within Merleau-Ponty, she frames her response to this question 
in terms of “agency”.
185
 While the move of shifting agency (the capacity to “actively 
compose” the environment)
186
 from the cogito and onto the body goes some way towards 
decentering the human subject, there was still a “danger here” that “dualism would simply 
reappear at one remove, with agentic bodies imposing their visceral intentions on an inert 
world”.
187
 In other words, a distinction could remain between the inorganic and organic. 
Because of his generalisation of reflexivity and negativity to Being, this danger is averted 
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by Merleau-Ponty, but not at the price of a kind of spiritualisation of inert matter, and the 
body retains a kind of reversibility that is exceptional.
188
 He writes for example that 
When we speak of the flesh of the visible, we do not mean to do anthropology, to describe 
a world covered over with all our own projections, leaving aside what it can be under a 
human mask. Rather we mean that carnal being, as a being of depths, of several leaves or 
several faces, a being in latency, and a presentation of a certain absence, is a prototype for 
Being, of which the body, the sensible sentient, is a very remarkable variant, but whose 
constitutive paradox already lies in every visible.
189
 
In other words, the body’s reversibility is distinctive or exceptional, but not ontologically 
so. The body is made of the same stuff as the inorganic, which is precisely why it can 
“interact with things” being “familiar with their existential styles”.
190
 And in the kinds of 
gestalt interactions we have considered, we find even inert objects to be “intrinsically 
relational, in process” enjoying a “potentiality beyond their actual visibility” because they 
are “subtended by a plethora of invisible relationships.”
191
 There is a sense in which, in 
interacting with bodies, even inert objects exhibit a kind of agency. Agency then, in 
Merleau-Ponty, is about a dynamism of interaction between emergent entities, more than 
(prima facie) a property of any one kind of agent.
192
 
 Here then, we find the bones of the political theory that Coole constructs from this 
phenomenological source. Agentic capacities  
are now investigated in their own right, without presupposing in advance who or what 
will bear them. The phenomenological task is then to discern their ambiguous emergence 
within and across lifeworlds as singular or collective, acknowledging that they might 
achieve more or less cohesion or efficacy according to the situation, and that they can 
appear within prepersonal, personal, and transpersonal registers of existence.
193
 
Bodies, and material as well as discursive structures will need to be recognised as 
politically meaningful, where these aspects have been neglected. 
Separating agentic and subjective capacities could afford certain advantages over 
post-structuralist approaches to these themes, given criticisms of Butler draw attention to 
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the narcissism and political debilitation her work has arguably produced. Merleau-Ponty 
moves us past humanism, but, Coole reminds us “from our own perspective several 
decades later, an ontology of collective life after anti-humanism is surely needed, too.”
194
 
Butler and Foucault dismantled the subject in such a way as to fall into a very modern 
trap. Because modernity associated agency so closely with “rational agents whose 
freedom and responsibility are related intimately to their interiority”, external causes are 
always viewed by modernity as antithetical to freedom.
195
 When against this background 
the interiority of the subject is dismantled, agency is likewise shattered.
196
 Critics of 
Foucault have accused him of championing a deterministic account of the subject as a 
product of subjection, while he reintroduces an unrealistically voluntarist and 
individualist account of agency.
197
 Our reading of Butler suggested a similar dilemma 
pervades her thought: the subject being a product of the paternal law, the best hope for an 
emancipatory politics is in subversive acts, which only reveal the unreality and instability 
of supposed agents. There is no normative or collective vision for what happens from 
here on. With Coole’s reading of Merleau-Ponty, the modern subject is deconstructed, but 
since agency (in many of its traditional senses, of “potency”, “motivation” and creative 
“freedom”)
198
 transcends the subject, there is still potential for a meaningful “politics”, 
with the sense of normativity and collective life that this word conveys.  
A residual interest in language as a particularly significant locus for reflexivity 
remains for Coole, as it did for Merleau-Ponty,
199
 and this ensures that the potency of 
discursive practices can be given its critical due. However, the agentic capacities of 
bodies and of the inorganic are not eclipsed. Post-structuralism’s weaknesses, in Coole’s 
view, are similar to the weaknesses that Merleau-Ponty saw in idealism, in that our 




A preference for Merleau-Ponty’s ontological approach will nevertheless depend 
upon whether or not his work avoids the criticism levied at him by his post-structuralists 
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successors, and while his attempts to avoid naïve subjectivism when he evokes 
experience do not need further rehearsal (given we have presented his work as a sustained 
effort to show how both subject and object emerge as bounded entities), we must return 
briefly to the question of whether Merleau-Ponty was evoking a representationalist theory 
of “truth” in returning to the “lifeworld”. Coole provides some clarification here, where 
she makes a distinction between the terms “ground” and “foundation”. Both “architectural 
metaphors” these terms suggest “the foundations of a building that supports its higher 
levels by anchoring them on solid ground.”
201
 While Merleau-Ponty’s political 
philosophy is “grounded in corporeal existence”, she contends, this is “not foundational 
either in the sense that it allows the philosopher simply to deduce concepts from some 
natural origin or that it presupposes a stable bedrock for Truth.”
202
 This reading seems 
accurate when set against Merleau-Ponty’s constant refusal of “high altitude thinking”, 
and his unswerving demand for a constant return to the things themselves. While our 
position as caught in the flux of reality demands that we be able to step momentarily out 
of the flow, distilling concepts “in order to conquer facticity”,
203
 for Merleau-Ponty the 
most “important lesson of the reduction is the impossibility of a complete reduction” 
since “we are in and toward the world, and since even our reflections take place in the 
temporal flow that they are attempting to capture.”
204
  
“Truth” for Merleau-Ponty seems in this way more like a disposition than a 
transcendental reality, or as Coole writes it is “existential” rather than 
“epistemological”.
205
 This is reflected in his political theory, where rather than mapping a 
concept of truth and falsehood along a distinction between reality and appearance, 
Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Marxism concerns “the fecundity or the sterility of actors’ 
engagement with the world and with one another.”
206
 Falsehood is less a 
misrepresentation of a prior foundational realm than a lack of openness to a future, a 
refusal to recognise the fluidity and contingency of the world’s becoming, and to see 
oneself as part of that contingency. There is no pretence here of getting behind the 
imbrication of knowledge and materiality to arrive at a pure “nature”. Where matter and 
meaning are ineluctably interwoven, no philosophy can transparently mediate the 
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 And if Merleau-Ponty escapes a rationalist expression of 
representationalism because of this recognition, it also prevents him from what Barad 
considers to be representationalism’s constructivist manifestation, the world locked 
within the opacity of words. A comparison and demonstration of the affinity between the 
ontological position Coole draws from Merleau-Ponty and the work of Barad (whose 
aversion to the representational theory of truth, via Bohr, has already been catalogued), 
will buttress this reading. 
  
iv) New Materialist Ontologies: An Emerging Consensus? 
While commentators on the New Materialism refer routinely to a lack of orthodoxy 
across the movement, placing thinkers like Barad and Coole side by side also reveals a 
high degree of consensus, some features of which will now be outlined. 
 Both Barad and Coole share a post-structuralist concern to challenge dichotomous 
conceptions of culture/nature, and for both this is achieved by focussing on the material 
aspects of meaning-making. Barad’s concentration on scientific apparatuses and her 
Bohrian conception of scientific concepts as irreducibly semantic-ontic is matched by 
Coole’s focus on the phenomenal body and the synonymy of knowing and being at the 
level of perception. 
 This ontological monism, however, is for neither theorist a denial of the 
experiential plausibility of the bounded subject or the observed object. Interestingly, 
Bohr’s example of a man holding a stick in a dark room, whose differentially exerted 
pressure on the apparatus constructs two different “cuts” between subject and object, is 
almost identical to a description of a blind man holding a cane, which Merleau-Ponty uses 
to demonstrate the body’s extension of itself into space through incorporating a new 
apparatus into its limits.
208
 For Coole, following Merleau-Ponty, the body is an open 
situation, and this is another way of saying it has shifting boundaries. Likewise the object 
emerges for Coole as a result of processes through which boundaries are configured. 
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Something similar to Barad’s idea of local “cuts” within phenomena also resonates with 
Merleau-Ponty’s two hands touching, where the body shifts from subject to object. While 
neither the bounded subject nor the bounded object are attributed ontological status for 
Barad or Coole, and while the world as they describe it is one of intrinsic fluidity, there is 
a deep concern to understand the practices through which our lived distinctions emerge. 
Barad and Coole might, in this way, be considered genealogists.  
 In fact, where boundary-making practices are characterised quite negatively 
within some traditions of feminist thought – in particular the psychoanalytic tradition, in 
which boundaries are imposed by the paternal law – Barad and Coole present the 
performance of “cuts” (or for Coole, the lived horizon of a lifeworld) as both inevitable 
and productive. This is conveyed in Coole’s reading of Merleau-Ponty on the flesh’s 
generative negativity, where the “fold” is an occasion for nature’s own immanent self-
disclosure. It is echoed in Barad’s celebration of the possibility of a kind of “objectivity” 
or scientific realism, provided that this is understood as provisional. A sense of nature’s 
immanent self-disclosure might be posited with Barad too, since we cannot “know” 
anything except as reality within “phenomena”, and we cannot “know” phenomena 
except from within. What is unproductive is a reification of boundaries, either in 
Merleau-Ponty’s sense of stultified ideology, or in Barad’s sense of representationalism. 
Both situations lead to a loss of critical reflectiveness, where our embeddedness within an 
emerging reality is ignored, and either the productive force of our knowledge practices or 
their materiality is underappreciated. 
With this sense of “immanence” – the subject’s immersion within material 
existence – playing such a central role, these new materialist ontologies might also be 
jointly considered as philosophies of human limitation. In saying this, if there is a point 
on which Barad and Coole could be contrasted, it might be the degree to which their 
theories could be considered antihumanist. Here Barad’s focus on apparatuses might 
prove more disruptive to humanist assumptions than a phenomenological approach (since 
apparatuses are more obviously composed of “inert” matter than are bodies), and it is 
worth considering that from Coole’s perspective the retention of some kind of privileging 
of human reflexivity is not unwelcome. As a political theorist, Coole considers the 
recovery of normativity to be essential for communal existence. But if there is an 
insoluble difference between Barad and Coole on this front, its significance should not be 
overemphasised (and when in our final chapter we come to demonstrate how Williams’s 
43 
 
theology of language bears certain resemblances to the project Barad and Coole are 
engaged in, we may find that this particular point of flexibility within the new 
materialisms is of some advantage). There is a world of difference between an uncritical 
classical humanism, and a reconstructed humanism in full awareness of its own 
contingency, and both Barad and Coole have taken the same leap in challenging the 
prima facie attribution of agency to only human subjects. Agentic capacities, rather than 
agents, remain their focus, and these capacities have at least the potential to emerge 
across shifting relations between the organic and the inorganic. 
 Finally, and though we have touched on aspects of nature’s generativity, the 
extent to which these ontologies present nature as an open system, as a “becoming” rather 
than a “being”, deserves emphasis. For Coole’s Merleau-Ponty, triumphalist teleologies 
were the cardinal sin of Marxist regimes, ironically because they meant closure to the 
future. Marxists had failed to understand the open-ended productiveness of nature, and 
were unready for the appearance of new forms. For Barad, advancing technological 
practices are productive of new material-discursive realities, as when 3D ultrasound 
brings forth new ways of imaging life in the womb, and these images intra-act in the 
materialisation of new legislative apparatuses in the state.
209
 Nature is bursting with 
possibilities for transformation, and our knowledge practices are one expression of this 
potential. 
To what use might these ontologies of immanence, fluidity, contingency, and 
emergence be put? This chapter began with the crisis of feminism in postmodernity, and 
it is fitting that an analysis of Barad and Coole should end with an assessment of their 
usefulness for political praxis. An interesting point of departure for this will be to return 
to the work of Siebers, whose analysis of the Tennessee vs. Lane case (discussed earlier) 
demonstrates how a critical realist approach to identity, which shifts focus from 
“discourse” and onto bodies, material structures, and their interaction, might move us 
beyond the constructivist predilection for undermining experience. While resonances 
between Barad, Coole, and Siebers are deducible, Siebers does not explicitly couch his 
approach within an ontological framework. Garland-Thomson’s concept of “misfitting” is 
therefore offered as a bridging example, which clarifies the links between new materialist 
ontologies and new materialisms in practice. 
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What we witnessed in the Polk County Courthouse trial and its aftermath, Siebers 
argues, was a conservative court making radical decisions based on experience, and a 
self-proclaimed “radical” (Joan Scott) favouring absolute critique even where it 
undermined structural reform. Ironically, Siebers points out, both agreed that the 
plaintiff’s negative experiences were the result of social construction. The discrimination 
he experienced was on the basis of social perception rather than “the biological inferiority 
of disabled people.”
210
 However, the court’s finding, that the built environment had been 
constructed “in the wrong way for disabled bodies and minds”, showed its willingness to 
treat the material consequences of socially constructed identities as significant. The 
blueprint of the Polk County Courthouse was evidence of the privileging of certain bodies 
in a certain space, and on the basis of similarities across other buildings, one could 
“rightfully conclude that prejudices against disabled people are at work in the architecture 
of society itself.”
211
 This approach, Siebers argues, is a way forward after the excesses of 
the cultural turn. Disability “provides a vivid illustration that experience is socially 
constructed,” and simultaneously demonstrates “that the identities created by experience 
also contribute to a representational system whose examination may result in verifiable 
knowledge claims about our society.”
212
 Knowledge claims, then, can be formulated on 
the basis of a deconstruction: a reversal of the post-structuralist claim. But this 
deconstruction must be centred, not on the language by which experiences are described, 
but on the assessment of identity claims against the interaction of bodies within space: 




In her article “Misfits: A Feminist Materialist Disabilities Concept”, Garland-
Thomson develops this theme.
214
 Here she takes up the concept of “misfitting” as a new 
description of disability, arguing that clashes of bodies and space (of the kind we have 
examined in the Polk County Courtroom example) can show us both the reality and 
temporality of identities. Fitting and misfitting, she writes, refer to encounters “in which 
two things come together in either harmony or disjunction.”
215
 To see marginalisation as 
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“misfitting” is to see that a problem “inheres not in either of the two things but in their 
juxtaposition”.
216
 The juxtaposition of certain bodies in certain spaces makes identities 
(such as “disabled” or “female”) materialise, indeed, the “relational reciprocity between 
body and world materialises both, demanding in the process an attentiveness to the 
distinctive, dynamic thingness of each as they come together in time and space.”
217
 As 
with Siebers, in Garland-Thomson’s scheme the post-structuralist deconstruction is in a 
sense turned on its head, so that the instability of identity can be seen in empowering 
terms. Structural clashes can illuminate the very means for societal and structural change. 
Some strong resonances between Garland-Thomson’s critical praxis, and the 
features of the ontological frameworks of Barad and Coole can be listed as follows.
218
 
While Garland-Thomson relies on a conception of identity as performed (qua Butler), she 
also follows Barad in pushing performativity into the material world, recognising that the 
performance of dynamic relations has constitutive force (rather than just the discursive 
performances of individuals). While the reification of static boundaries within social life 
is analysed (the ways in which prejudices are built into architecture are carefully 
observed), at the ontological level boundaries are considered fluid, contingent, and 
immanent, constructed within temporary material-discursive arrangements (or 
“phenomena”).
219
 The physical placement of a light-switch on a wall, the social 
assumptions which led to its installation at a certain height, the bodily style of a person in 
a wheelchair as they reach for the light, are collectively productive of that person’s 
identity as misfitting within a given spatial scenario. The potential latent in the critical 
distance between self-reflexive bodies and their objects (or, the capacity to experience 
material encounters as a subjective body and to reflect on them), provides room for the 
emergence of new forms of lived existence.    
It has become commonplace within literature on third wave feminism to suggest 
that the influence of social constructivism or the post-structuralist critique has stripped the 
movement of some of its power: both its power for collective action and its ability to 
recognise and address structural discrimination. Many theorists writing from within 
feminism, with a sympathetic ear to the kinds of concerns that post-structuralism has 
drawn attention to around how concepts like identity emerge, agree that despite its 
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intentions to deconstruct a problematic modern binary, constructivism has only served to 
reinforce the idea of culture as an active principle and matter as passive and awaiting 
inscription. An asymmetrical trust in our representations over what they represent may 
have led to a disciplinary Cartesianism, with the natural sciences and the social sciences 
talking past each other. In such a climate, finding a way to deconstruct the culture/nature 
binary in ways that do not obscure a sense of the agency of matter has become a central 
agenda for the “new materialist” theorists. Barad’s “Agential Realism” and Coole’s 
interpretation of Merleau-Ponty are two approaches which attempt to dismantle the 
Cartesian ontology underpinning the culture/nature divide. By highlighting the active 
participation of bodies or material arrangements within sense-making and boundary-
making practices, these theorists attempt to show how the world as we know it is a vital 
and fluid material whole. Subjects and objects emerge as part of (and take part in) that 
world’s continual process of “becoming”. By shifting agency from the human subject and 
onto material bodies and their interaction, new and constructive ways of viewing the 
processes by which identities form are unfolding out of these ontologies. These provide a 
promising means for assessing and addressing the origins and effects of structural 
discrimination within emancipatory discourses. But if the new materialisms is a branch of 
research in which diverse conversations are being engaged across a variety of disciplines, 
a number of theorists within the discourse are openly sceptical of the place of theology 
within the conversation. The next chapter will turn towards the question of a theological 











The Doctrine of Creation and Non-Dichotomous Thought 
 
Can Christian theology be hospitable to non-dichotomous approaches to culture and the 
material world, approaches which aim at recovering a sense of the agency of the material 
world for political thought? If this seems too vague an enquiry to begin with, the level of 
hostility towards Christian theology across new materialist literature might still suggest 
that it is worthwhile setting our investigations within the context of this broad debate. 
Theorist Jane Bennett, in an article which compares the vitalism of 20
th
 Century biologist 
Hans Driesch favourably against what she terms the “naïve vitalism of soul” propounded 
by the pro-life movement, comes close to blankly suggesting that dogmatic Christian 
claims are unwelcome  at the table of new materialist enquiry. Unpicking Bennett’s 
understanding of the theological dogmas she rejects, as well as the nature of their 
incompatibility with the materialism she hopes to articulate, will help us to arrive at a 
narrower set of questions as we explore what a theological engagement with the new 
materialisms might look like. 
To begin, a discussion of Bennett’s interest in modern vitalism will be necessary. 
Bennett describes her work as developing a materialism in which “matter is an active 
principle”, and in which “non-human materialities (electricity, fats)” are “themselves 
bona fide agents”.
220
 Though her own views stand in disagreement with the conclusions 
drawn by modern vitalists like Driesch, Bennett nevertheless finds conversation with this 
tradition helpful for articulating her own position, which in one way falls somewhere 




Bennett describes Driesch’s vitalism as “born in the negative spaces” of a machine 
model of the material world: that is, Driesch works from the supposition that “matter” can 
be equated with “mechanism”, and he assumes that matter operates along predictable 
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patterns of cause and effect, chains of physico-chemical action.
222
 When Driesch’s 
laboratory research on cell-division in sea urchins calls the adequacy of this mechanistic 
account into question, he finds himself positing the necessity of a non-mechanistic (and 
therefore, by his logic,  non-material) agent, responsible for the capacities of organic 
matter that the machine model cannot account for.  Morphogenesis, which refers to both 
the process by which an organism moves from a less complex state to a more complex 
one, and the process by which a damaged organism repairs itself, cannot not be 
mechanistic in character, according to Driesch, because to claim such we would require 
us to imagine a machine which could be divided multiple times and continue to function – 
a self-repairing, self-complexifying mechanism.
223
 This being inconceivable to Driesch, 
he theorises the existence of a life principle called “entelechy”, a principle not reducible 
to matter itself (that is, not a property of matter) but responsible for animating it.  
Bennett finds Driesch an interesting proponent of vitalism because, while he 
distinguishes life from matter, he pushes this binary to its limit,
224
 consistently refusing 
the characterisation of entelechy as either a “positive” or a “psychic” force, and labouring 
to make the association of life and matter as close as possible without altogether 
collapsing the binary. The details of his argument are less important here than the way his 
conclusions demonstrate the ideas he tries to keep in tension. Driesch contends that the 
opposite of “mechanical” is not “psychical”, but simply “non-mechanical”: it should be 
possible to imagine a principle animating matter which is non-material without being 
ethereal. For Driesch entelechy pushes forward and suspends the potential within material 
arrangements, but cannot go beyond the potential already present within matter. 
Entelechy must be seen as a force which cannot exist independent of matter. 
In understanding the points on which Bennett commends Driesch, and her points 
of contention with his vitalism, a picture of her own position emerges. Here we find some 
critical convergences with the themes of the new materialisms as we saw them in the 
previous chapter. Bennett applauds Driesch’s refusal to slip into a Cartesian model – the 
ghost haunting the machine –
225
 and she writes that “as an attempt to name a force or 
agency that is naturalistic but never fully spatialized, actualized or calculable…this 
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vitalist gesture is not inimical to the materialism I seek.”
226
 Insofar as Driesch was 
attempting to enlarge our picture of nature, he was on the right track. Bennett also 
understands Driesch’s work in this regard to be motivated by the laudable aim of 
propounding a sense of nature’s indeterminacy against threats to the concept of freedom. 
Scientific determinism, with its endless chains of cause and effect, left no room for the 
spontaneous, the new, and Driesch was right to question such a model.
227
 Driesch also 
finds favour with Bennett because of his somewhat ambivalent position when it comes to 
human exceptionalism. Bennett identifies “the desire to view man as the apex of worldly 
existence” as one of the motivations driving many forms of vitalism, since positing a vital 
force allows us to view nature as hierarchically ordered from more vital down to less vital 
or even non-vital forms, depending on where the vital principle is operating most 
intensively.
228
 Though there are shades of this idea in Driesch’s vitalism, he “also 
believes that some analogue of knowing and willing exists in all organic processes”.
229
 
Bennett’s complaint with Driesch is that his challenge to scientific determinism 
does not go deep enough. The inadequacy of the machine model, instead of pushing him 
to revise his understanding of matter completely, leads him merely to hypothesize the 
existence of something extrinsic to matter. Bennett quotes (with approval) Mikhail 
Bakhtin, who argued in 1926 that Driesch too easily accepted the type of mechanistic 
model available to him, and failed to imagine a “relentlessly self-constructing, developing 
machine [which]…builds itself not from pre-prepared parts, but from self-constructed 
ones.”
230
 Matter understood in light of such an analogy would itself be both living and 
undetermined. Driesch may enlarge our picture of “nature”, but he leaves our picture of 
matter untouched; Bennett wishes to revise our understanding of matter itself. 
Thus Bennett’s critique of Driesch’s vitalism exemplifies her impulse to affirm 
ontological monism or immanentism: matter and what might be called culture (that which 
is undetermined, innovative and free) are not ontologically discrete entities but are part of 
the same material whole. There is an impulse towards ascribing a certain kind of fluidity 
and generativity to the material world, especially clear in Bennett’s endorsement of 
Bakhtin’s self-complexifying machine model. And there is a will to throw human 
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exceptionalism into question by emphasising the materiality of human practices, their 
continuity with the intrinsic character of matter itself. 
What then of Bennett’s assertions of the incompatibility of Christian claims with 
such a redescription of the material world? It is important to note here that her critique 
comes via her rejection of what she calls the “culture of life” movement, by which she 
mostly refers to Catholic sanctity of life teachings (exemplified in Pope John Paul II’s 
1995 encyclical “Evangelium Vitae”), and the “pro-life” political movement in the 
USA.
231
 However, a number of features of her article blur the lines between the “culture 
of life” movement and the wider Christian tradition, so that her criticisms could be read as 
directed at a wider target. Bennett neglects to explicitly signal how the beliefs she regards 
as hallmarks of the “culture of life” might align or diverge from mainstream orthodox 
views. She writes of the “culture of life” vitalism as just one instance of “dogmatic forms 
of Christian theology” “colonizing” the gaps in scientific enquiry (and here it is unclear in 
which sense she intends the term “dogmatic” – does she mean relating to the fundamental 
articles of Christian faith, or its more colloquial usage, denoting blind or unquestioning  
belief?).
232
 Several times she slips into more sweeping dismissals of theistic belief, ending 
her article by endorsing a materialism “which eschews the life-matter binary and does not 
believe in God or spiritual forces”.
233
 In short, while Bennett finds in the “culture of life” 
a particular penchant for violence, her attribution of this to a set of beliefs she seems to 
regard as mainstream or dogmatic means there is a much larger conversation at stake.  
According to Bennett, the “culture of life” movement could be considered an 
expression of vitalism because, like Driesch, its adherents view matter as “passive and 
predetermined in its operation”,
234
 and insist on “life” as an extrinsic principle or force.
235
 
Regrettably and unlike Driesch, Christian vitalism understands life as a force “whose 
existence is not tied to its relationship to matter”.
236
 Life is presented as detachable from 
embodiment, and Christian vitalism thus supports, it seems, a starker dualism between 
life and matter because life is considered a positive force. It also supports a firmer 
hierarchy within the structure of nature because  
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Human exceptionalism is not a contingent event, an accident of evolution, or a function of 
the distinctive material composition of the human body. Rather, an omnipotent being 
(“the Almighty”) implants a divine spark or soul into the human individual.
237
 
The idea that man “is the most animate or mobile, the most free or capable of action” 
allied with the “idea that there exist two ontologically distinct substances (brute matter 
and spirited life)” all render adherents of “culture of life” theology liable to violently 
exploit “nature”.
238
 The firm belief in a static and unchanging hierarchy, a teleological 
structure underwritten by its “Designer”, also leads Christians to ignore scientific 




The criticism that Christian theology has supported acts of domination over nature 
is nothing new, and there will be no attempt here to dispute the fact that certain 
articulations of the doctrines of creation and of the imago Dei might be implicated in the 
kinds of attitudes towards the material environment that Bennett describes. What is of 
more interest is Bennett’s apparent assumption that these doctrines are incompatible per 
se with the metaphysical propositions of the new materialisms. Divine transcendence 
underwrites human transcendence over “matter”, Bennett seems to assert, because being 
made in God’s image and as “ensouled” beings, humans are assumed to be ontologically 
differentiated from the world they inhabit. This immutable binary of man/nature runs in 
strict opposition to an immanentism which understands both culture and nature to be 
intrinsically material and ontologically continuous with each other, and which presents 
humans as limited by their materiality. Insofar as these doctrines underwrite a static 
structure to creation, with man at its pinnacle, they also undermine any sense of nature’s 
fluidity, its perpetual reconfiguration in the process of “becoming”. 
Bennett does not stand alone in highlighting these concerns, and it is worth 
drawing attention to the work of William Connolly in this regard. In his article 
“Materialities of Experience”, Connolly displays a degree of sympathy with theistic 
belief, maintaining that affirmations of humanity’s belonging to the material world “in 
both their theistic and nontheistic forms” are needed in the fight for “pluralism, equality, 
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 Nevertheless, his description of a “philosophy of 
immanence” – the position he believes Merleau-Ponty moved close to in his revision of 
modern concepts of the subject and nature – is articulated to the exclusion of belief in 
divine transcendence: 
By immanence I mean a philosophy of becoming in which the universe is not dependent 
on a higher power. It is reducible to neither mechanistic materialism, dualism, theo-
teleology nor the absent God of minimal theology. It concurs with the last three 
philosophies that there is more to reality than actuality. But that “more” is not given by a 
robust or minimal God…Rather, there are uncertain exchanges between stabilized 
formations and the mobile forces that subsist within and below them.
241
 
Connolly, like Bennett, makes an association between mechanistic materialism and belief 
in a divine power set apart from the material world. Though the connection between these 
concepts is left ambiguous, there is at least the hint of the suggestion that they form two 
sides of the same coin: divine transcendence is seen as somehow underwriting an 
understanding of the material world as fundamentally dependent and therefore static, 
unfree and non-vital. 
In light of the self-consciously anti-theological articulations that both Bennett and 
Connolly offer in describing their approaches to matter, three questions might be 
identified as important starting points for theological engagement with new materialist 
ontologies. First, are dogmatic articulations of the doctrine of creation – with their 
insistence on the transcendence of God and their concomitant assertion of Creation’s utter 
dependence – inimical to non-dichotomous thought? Another way of putting this would 
be to ask if God’s “otherness” underwrites human “otherness” in relation to nature, so 
that dualistic approaches to culture and nature can be traced back to a fundamental 
“dualism” between God and creation?
242
 Second, are Christian concepts of selfhood or 
the soul necessarily tied up with a life-matter binary, or an ontological distinction 
between human life and mere matter? Third, do Christian ascriptions of a teleological 
structure to creation – its existence for God, its incessant bent towards its creator – render 
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Christian thought incapable of allowing for a free, fluid, innovative, or productive 
universe? 
The following chapters will attempt to address the first question about the 
dependence of creation on a transcendent God, through an engagement with the work of 
Rowan Williams. While it will be impossible to give a full treatment of our additional 
questions about either Christian understandings of self-hood and the life-matter binary, or 
Christian teleology and an ontology of becoming, there will be moments for highlighting 
where our current area of research touches on these concerns. Williams provides a useful 
theological voice for a number of reasons. His emphasis on ongoing and open 
conversation as essential to theological integrity means that his theological work is 
characterised by diverse engagements with interlocutors both historical and 
contemporary, Christian and secular.
243
 On several occasions, Williams has formulated 
his understanding of the doctrine of creation in response to feminist writers whose 
concerns about divine transcendence are closely related to those we have read in Bennett. 
In his essay “On Being Creatures”,
244
 Williams addresses Sallie McFague’s criticism that 
“the classical view of creation sees it as an exercise of ‘cultural’ power, the giving of 
form to the (external) formless.”
245
 McFague rejects transcendent models of the relation 
between God and his creation in favour of a concept of the world as “God’s body”. 
Models that see God’s interests as “bound up with the world’s” are preferred by McFague 
because where there is a continuity between creator and creation there can be  
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no temptation to model one’s behaviour on a God utterly without any investment in the 
life of creation, as if the best form of life were one which repudiated involvement in or 
dependency upon the material world.
246
  
Clearly McFague would concur with Bennett that the stark differentiation of God from 
his creation underwrites a dangerously dualistic account of the relationship between man 
and matter. Similarly, in his 1994 article for Augustinian Studies, Williams engages 
critically with Anne Primavesi’s assertion that traditional readings of Genesis 1-3 present 
the physical world “as an artefact, made or constructed by God out of inert matter” and 
that “Whenever we affirm belief in God as “Maker of the Universe” we are referring to 
this image, and reinforcing the claim to have and to exercise “spiritual power” over 
matter.”
247
 Again, there are shades of Bennett here, and this suggests that one possible 
approach to our first line of enquiry could be to demonstrate, following Williams’s 
response to McFague and Primavesi, that Bennett’s understanding of divine 
transcendence is not quite how the doctrine of creation and its implications are presented 
in their classical formulations. Such an argument could be sketched as follows. 
 
i) Rowan Williams on “Being Creatures” 
Williams understands McFague and Primavesi as primarily concerned with eradicating 
the theological emphasis on disjunction or distance between God and creation, because 
they assume that this inevitably funds a “wholly non-negotiable asymmetry” of “absolute 
dependence opposed to absolute self-sufficiency”, and because they believe that such an 
asymmetry must imply domination.
 248
 Treating these anxieties sympathetically, and 
conceding the “disastrous possibilities of a certain kind of God-world differentiation, 
especially when coupled with a parallel spirit-nature disjunction”,
249
 Williams 
nevertheless responds that these apprehensions show a failure to grasp what the doctrine 
of creation means “in the hands of those who have most carefully dealt with it”.
250
 
Scrupulous attention must be paid both to the dogmatic affirmation of creation ex nihilo, 
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and the tensions or subtleties in how the “otherness” of God is articulated within Christian 
tradition, because these concepts attempt to secure “a model of creation that should never, 
in fact, produce the ideas attacked”.
251
  
The Judaeo-Christian narrative of creation was peculiar in the antique world 
because of its emphasis on a creation brought forth from nothing by the free utterance of 
God.
252
 This Biblical tradition came about in the context of Israel’s return from Babylon, 
at which time both Israel’s Exodus from Egypt and its deliverance from exile began to be 
celebrated as events which echoed God’s act of creation.
253
 Read with their analogous 
relationship in mind, creation, Exodus, and return are events in which God calls 
something out of non-existence – the cosmos, a new community, or a new identity – 
God’s word thus “establishing the very possibility of an answer.”
254
 Where traditions of 
God moulding something out of formless material existed, these gave way to a more 
dominant narrative of God as sole originator,
255
 and this is the tradition that early 
Christian exponents were concerned with articulating, among them, Augustine. 
Augustine is a somewhat confusing voice in this regard, however, because of his 
constant references to form and matter (Book XII of Confessions is rife with the imagery 
of God creating out of formless matter),
256
 and Williams notes that Augustine’s name is 
one of ill omen amongst feminist theologians for his use of these terms.
257
 Williams’s 
reading of Augustine nevertheless suggests that the latter’s understanding of the operation 
of form and matter is fully compatible with creation ex nihilo. In the wake of seventeenth 
century thought, these terms evoke an image of “solid things and ideas”. For the ancient 
world, the dialectic of form and matter was something more like the interaction between 
actuality and potentiality. At one end of the spectrum was pure form (by definition, 
changeless perfection) and at the other end matter (by definition, not a thing at all, but 
what we might call pure potentiality). Matter within this scheme cannot properly be 
thought of as “passive” since pure potentiality can have no qualities (and as soon as we 
are talking about something with qualities “we have begun talking about form”). As 
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Williams puts it, “The action of form on matter is not the imposition of one thing on 
another, let alone one system on another: it is simply the process of actualisation itself, 
the process by which organization appears.”
258
Augustine, on such an understanding, can 
say of creation “You made this next-to-nothing out of nothing” and “from this 
formlessness, from this next-to-nothing, you made all things of which this mutable world 
consists,”
259
 and can thus name God as both the ground of all potential, and the one who 
calls things from non-existence into existence. 
One possible response to McFague and Primavesi already comes into view at this 
point. Creation ex nihilo entails that God’s act of “creation” can, in one sense, be better 
understood as a kind of situation than as any kind of change, event, or process, since to 
call something into existence is to establish the very conditions for speaking of changes, 
events or processes. As Aquinas understood it  
the doctrine is equally compatible with thinking the universe had an identifiable 
beginning and thinking it exists eternally. It simply tells you that the entire situation of the 
universe, at any given moment, exists as a real situation because of God’s reality being, as 
it were, turned away from God to generate what is not God.
260
 
The implications of such a doctrine make concerns about God’s arbitrary or oppressive 
power over creation somewhat nonsensical, if power is to be understood not as a property 
but as function of relations between two entities, something “exercised by x over y”. 
Creation as an act cannot be an exercise of despotic or “cultural” power, Williams argues, 
because creation “is not exercised on anything.”
261
 As its absolute origin, God is not a 
threat to creation’s freedom, as if He were an alien power conforming creation to a form 
of existence that is unnatural to it. Creation has no existence outside of God’s will for it: 
everything is “because God wants it so.”
262
 Williams’s first line of argument is thus to 
point out that the doctrine of creation makes it logically difficult to describe God’s 
dealings with creation in the ways that McFague and Primavesi want to, since 
“domination” and “coercion” are terms which only really make sense in describing 
relations within a system,
263
 and they cease to make sense the moment we define creation 
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as a system which exists in utter dependence on the gratuitous act of one completely 
“other” to it. 
Creation ex nihilo, in telling us that creation is that which is unilaterally 
dependent, and in presupposing that it exists without thereby fulfilling any need or 
serving any lack we could ascribe to God, is also, for Williams, a way into a positive 
insight about the character of God’s life. Here we come to a second way in which the 
doctrine of creation defends against the idea of divine domination. To say that God 
desires the existence of creation “groundlessly”, or that His desire for it is nothing to do 
with its “use” for Himself, is to say that in creating He establishes Himself as a “being 
for”, one “whose joy is eternally in the joy of another.”
264
 As Williams puts it, the  
absolute difference between God and the world presupposed by the doctrine of creation 
from nothing becomes also a way of asserting the continuity between the being of God 
and the act of creation as the utterance and ‘overflow’ of the divine life.
265
  
If God sustains what is completely “other” by nature of its contingency, we are prompted 
to see creation as an expression of a characteristically dispossessive divine love. A God 
whose character is self-giving love cannot dominate because, for such a God “to act for 
God’s sake is for God to act for our sake.”
266
 
To express this insight another way, and to turn it towards the question of what 
humanity’s relationship might be to the rest of creation (the other side of McFague and 
Primavesi’s contention with divine transcendence), we must go beyond the mere fact of 
creation’s existence to look at the kind of existence it has, and at this point the language 
of process becomes appropriate. Augustine’s thought is once more a vehicle for 
Williams’s discussion of these themes, and it may be important to clarify the nature of 
this relationship. While Williams’s agreement or divergence with the detail of 
Augustine’s scheme is left somewhat ambiguous, he finds that many of the tensions 
Augustine works to maintain are the characteristic tensions that “any intelligible Christian 
theology of creation” will be obliged to wrestle with.
267
 That Augustine locates creation 
in a realm where form acts on matter (in other words, that he locates creation in the realm 
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of time, change or flux)
268
 helps us to identify a central movement between disjunction 
and continuity in Augustine’s attempts to describe the relationship between God and 
creation. This movement, necessary within any articulation of the doctrine of creation 
because of the need to hold together the goodness of creation and its existence in time,
269
 
is significant for helping us to reflect on the character of God. 
We have seen that for Augustine, the fact that creation exists in actuality rather 
than fantasy already implies that it exists in coherence – bearing in mind that to speak of 
anything real we are inevitably drawn into speaking of what has form (intelligible 
features or structure).
270
 This entails that creation participates in God, or that God has set 
something consistent with the form of His life outside of Himself. But for Augustine there 
is also a sense in which creation is being drawn towards greater coherence, that different 
potentials are realised more or less fully over time. And if creation is defined as an entity 
which exists in shifting arrangements of flux and equilibrium as different levels of 
organisation are reached, then “the difference between God and creation cannot be 
elided.”
271
 Potential implies lack, and to speak of God as the self-sufficient source of 
existence or the grounds for all of creation’s goods means to affirm that “there is nothing 
that is potentially good for God.”
272
 In this way God and creation are irreducibly “other” 
because only creation achieves its goods in time. 
Williams identifies a circularity in the fact that in reading Augustine, the 
“continuities, the ways in which creation shares in the sort of life that is God’s, steer us 
inexorably back to the fundamental difference”, and it is precisely this circularity which 
guards against assertions about divine or human exploitation.
273
 If the ways in which 
creation manifests something of the life of God are also the ways it manifests its utter 
difference – in other words, if it exhibits its coherence through existence over time – we 
are prompted to think of God’s revelation of himself in creation as somehow bound up 
with creation’s “otherness”.  And if this again leads us to think of a God who is “turned 
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outwards”, a God of self-giving love, then we might say that creation speaks of God best 
when it is most manifestly other.   
What would it mean for humans to “image God” within such a scheme? What 
Williams draws attention to in the paradox of continuity and discontinuity suggests that a 
dualistic distinction between humanity and the rest of creation may not be what the 
doctrine of the imago Dei proposes. Far from imaging God by transcending creation, 
humans are the image of God as humans, as “creatures” immersed in the finite and 
material universe. That is, like the rest of creation, we are only transparent to God’s life in 
our utter materiality and our timefulness. Augustine’s Confessions, Williams writes, 
remind us constantly that “God’s definitive clue to the divine life, and how we may open 
ourselves to it, is the event in which the everlasting Word and Wisdom shapes and speaks 
and acts out a human and material history, telling us that there is no way to God but 
through time.”
274
 And Williams himself follows this insight in his own presentation of 
what an appropriate Christian spirituality must be. We are driven down and down into our 
materiality and timefulness in order to relate to God, such that  
Contemplative prayer classically finds its focus in the awareness of God at the centre of 
the praying person’s being – God as that by which I am myself – and simultaneously, 
God at the centre of the whole world’s being: a solidarity in creatureliness.
275
 
Further thought would need to be given to the issue of where a theology of the soul might 
fit within this picture (this goes beyond the scope of our argument but there will be room 
for a few words about the direction such a discussion might take in our concluding 
comments). Here, however, it will be adequate to say that while Christian theology may 
wish to emphasise issues around human consciousness as part of its account of what it 
means to be human in the image of God,
276
 the classical doctrine of creation may also 
demand that we resist tethering our accounts of the imago Dei to any starkly dualistic 
spirit-body or humanity-nature distinction. 
If the above point is metaphysical in its thrust, Williams’s discussion of 
contemplation and his references to “solidarity” also point us towards a certain way of 
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relating to the material world, and here we move into issues of praxis. To image a God 
who makes and sustains a timeful creation means to love in ways that seek to preserve the 
integrity of the “other”. Treating created things as means to other ends is inappropriate, 
and Williams, following Aquinas, makes this point provocatively by denying that we 
should love created things as a means even to loving God: if God himself “does not want 
to be Everything”,
277
 then to value created goods for their utility instead of their inherent 
worth is to “misunderstand the nature of our unconditional dependence.”
278
 Dependence 
means that what exists does so because of God’s desire for it, and to realise this in 
practice means both to treat our own situation as “given”, and to treat other created things 
as “gifts”. 
And if, in these ways, the doctrine of the creation entails an imperative towards 
what Williams refers to as the “art” of being a creature,
 279
 it also resources us to claim the 
freedom we are given to carry this task out. Williams’s argument here begins with a 
number of closely related observations about the human condition. The origins of human 
domination or exploitation of creation are rooted in a fear of unbalanced or diseased 
dependency, and a will for autonomy or a sense of identity. To “shore up” our 
independence over-against the demands of others we habitually draw on “support from 
outside ourselves”,
280
 and thus we are caught in a double bind. Fearing dependence we 
attempt to gain control over our environment through the means at our disposal, and in 
doing so we “intensify our dependence on those external factors which assure us of worth 




Learning to distinguish our fundamental need for identity from our accumulated 
dependencies on “specific facets” of our environment may get us some way to avoiding 
the enslavement to our environment that results from our attempts to transcend it.
282
 
Learning to name and define our fundamental need properly may also be helpful: seeing 
“our need to imagine ourselves as agents or givers as a need to know we exist for 
another” might be a healthier construal of our drive for agency than a concept which 
legitimises self-sufficiency as an ultimate goal. Williams certainly endorses a conception 
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of self-hood as “identity in relation”, noting that “We can imagine ourselves as self-
regulating entities, but can only make sense of – let alone value or love – what is thus 
imagined by adopting the standpoint of another: by presupposing relation.”
283
  Self-
awareness, after all, only arrives in the commerce of language, where we recognise 
ourselves as other because we are spoken to.
284
 However, neither a strategy of 
recognising our need for identity, nor any amount of care in defining such a need, can 
ultimately address the fundamental anxiety that lies behind our coercive tendencies.
285
 
Williams maintains that we are left still with a problematic of our vulnerability to the 
“other”, since “If my identity is given by the “conversation” I enter at birth, that 
conversation is in turn a generated as well as a generating context.”
286
 The conversation 
which forms us also makes us essential to the self-definition of others, and this is a 




What is needed here, Williams suggests, is some basis for a fundamental act of 
trust as an answer to our basic anxiety in the face of our vulnerability to others. This is 
where the doctrine of creation ex nihilo comes in, with its God as maker of what is 
definitively not God. Such an understanding allows us to see our identities as “rooted in 
God’s freedom”, our existence as underwritten by God’s will for us. The doctrine also 
allows us to trust for the very reason that it presents God’s act of creation as having no 
real benefit for God. God, as the self-sufficient sole origin of creation, gives without 
needing anything in return. He cannot then use us for His own ends, or as Williams puts 
it, creation “cannot be a device to assist God in being God”.
288
 All of this provides a 
security which can be claimed without an attendant rejection of our situation of 
dependence, or our solidarity with all else that depends on the free act of God. To the 
contrary, the doctrine of creation sets us free to admit our creatureliness – to understand 
our situation (with that of the rest of our world) as one of absolute dependence, 
limitedness and death –
289
 without being debilitated by that admission. 
                                                          
283








 Ibid., 72. 
288
 Ibid., 73. 
289
 Ibid., 78. 
62 
 
What we have been building up until this point is a picture of how a fundamental 
distinction between creator and creation – framed in terms of contingency versus non 
contingency or timefulness versus changelessness – instead of instituting other dualisms, 
might be instrumental in their undoing. To summarise, creation ex nihilo makes the 
language of “dualism” problematic when applied to divine transcendence. By naming all 
reality as grounded in God’s reality, it denies any “real relation” between God and 
creation (as if they inhabited the same system), such that it becomes difficult to cast God 
as a rival to creation’s freedom. Using the more appropriate language of dichotomy or 
distinction to describe divine transcendence, we then begin to see that drawing an 
absolute distinction between God and creation might be a safer theological proposition 
than its alternatives. For God to create and sustain what is truly “other”, without necessity 
motivating such an act, expresses something about the divine life and its commitment to 
creation’s good. But if creation reflects God through its contingency, we are led to 
question the validity of forms of human exceptionalism which justify human domination 
over “nature” by casting humans as “transcendent” in any way analogous to God. 
Humans are to relate to God as “creatures” and as part of a material creation. The 
freedom to be creatures without anxiety is provided in the recognition that God’s 
independence from creation is absolute. 
Some of the conclusions we have drawn in this brief discussion relate clearly to 
some of Bennett’s objections (especially where it has been argued that the imago Dei 
should not be overlaid with a spirit-body or man-matter dualism). One further comment 
might be necessary, recalling that what McFague and Primavesi present as a 
culture/nature binary (underwritten by what is understood to be God’s exercise of 
“cultural” power), Bennett frames a little differently as a life/matter binary. Bennett 
believes divine transcendence entails a distinction between life and matter in which life is 
seen as an extrinsic substance or force, injected into and animating different kinds of 
matter to different degrees. It would be consistent with the picture we have so far drawn, 
to respond that creation ex nihilo poses a challenge to the kind of life/matter binary that 
Bennett identifies within “vitalist” philosophies. Creation ex nihilo prohibits us from 
understanding anything in the created universe as “outside” of God’s life, such that the 
idea of God interjecting here and there to breathe life into an otherwise inanimate material 
entity becomes problematic. We might, in fact, be tempted to say that creation simply is 
vital, insofar as the fact that it is tells us that it already shares in God’s life. On a related 
63 
 
note, and again throwing doubt on the compatibility between the doctrine of creation and 
the premises of vitalism, we might draw attention to one of the conclusions Williams 
derives as part of the insight that “God does not want to be everything”. God, Williams 
suggests, does not “intrude into the integrity of this or that aspect of the world” either as  
justification or explanation for specific events. If the explanation of every event, every 
determination of  being, every phenomenon or decision were simply or directly God, then 
the life of creation would not be genuinely other than God. God grounds the reality and, 




By naming God as the one who wills and preserves creation’s integrity, Christian 
theology itself teaches us to be cautious of attempts to slot God in where explanation fails 
(for example, where what appear to be stable formations give way to more complex 
structures, or at those moments when matter appears to move from less animate to more 
animate forms). Within the framework we have explored, there are no strong reasons to 
defend a “life” principle, understood in Bennett’s terms as a force or substance 
ontologically distinct from matter. Neither are there obvious reasons to reject the concept 
of a material universe capable of complexification, innovation, and growth. 
We may then begin to see ways in which certain articulations of the theology of 
creation open the kind of space that a philosophy of ontological monism could plausibly 
inhabit. But while some key concepts have been identified, and some central ideas 
characteristic of Williams’s thought have been introduced, another approach to the 
question of compatibility between a conception of creation as unilaterally dependent on a 
transcendent God, and the new materialist programme, might be possible. This approach 
builds on the argument already outlined, and will rely on a culmination of themes present 
in many of Williams’s writings but made more explicit in some of his most recent work 
on the theology of language. The next chapter will go beyond thinking about how divine 
transcendence may imply continuity between materiality and human culture or language. 
It will do so by turning that proposition on its head, by reflecting on how attention to this 
continuity may lead us in turn to contemplate something like the framework posited in the 
Christian doctrine of creation.  
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God and the Habits of Language: The Continuity of Language 
and Matter and the Reframing of Natural Theology 
 
In February 2012 a dialogue took place between Williams and Richard Dawkins, in which 
Williams’s very interesting position in relation to scientific determinism, and something 
like what Bennett has described as “Christian vitalism”, emerged.
291
 In a number of 
exchanges in the debate, Williams rejects the sets of alternatives that Dawkins appears to 
assume are open to Christian thought when it is confronted by evolutionary theory as an 
explanation for the origins of life on one hand, and when it comes to questions of free will 
and determinism on the other.  
Jokingly referring to himself as a “cultural Anglican”, Dawkins’s first 
contribution to the debate is to quote, with his own adaption, the opening lines of a hymn 
by William Walsham How:  
‘It is a thing most wonderful, almost too wonderful to be,’ that, at least on this 
planet…the laws of physics have conspired to make the collisions of atoms get together to 
produce… plants, trees, kangaroos, insects, and us…to produce collections of matter, 
collections of atoms, which don’t just obey Newton’s laws in a passive way…but which 
move and jump, and spring and hunt, and flee and mate, and think.
292
  
The intricacy of what natural selection has produced gives the illusion of design, Dawkins 
contends, such that many people have difficulty believing a Darwinian explanation, and 
resort to an unsatisfactory resolution to the problem by saying “an intelligence did it”.
293
 
In thinking about the origins of the universe, we are faced with the decision, as Dawkins 
sees it, between two incompatible and competing explanations. Either we accept a 
naturalistic account of everything that exists, or we introduce divine intervention at the 
same explanatory level. 
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Dawkins appears to interpret Williams as assuming the latter position, where early 
in the debate Williams expresses a wariness about simply saying “we have recourse to the 
laws of physics, and that’s it” when it comes to the question of consciousness. Neither 
Darwin, nor recent scientific exploration, Williams contends, give us much insight into 
how self-consciousness, or the first person perspective, emerges. Dawkins’s rejoinder to 
this statement is to affirm his own firm commitment to a materialist explanation for 
consciousness (“consciousness emerges in brains”), though he concedes there is a gap in 
scientific accounts where the emergence of self-reflexive consciousness is concerned 
(“nobody understands how, and I regard that as one of the problems for the future”).
294
 
Dawkins nevertheless cautions that where we identify gaps in scientific inquiry, we 




Williams’s response to this is key in demonstrating an important subtlety in terms 
of the way he believes theistic accounts of the origins of the universe should be framed: 
I’m not suggesting we buy in God to get us a cheap get out of jail card…but what I am 
interested in is what it means to say that this is the kind of universe in which 
consciousness will happen, given these coordinates. Because it seems to me that the 
question is not, ‘Is there some point at which God interferes to say “Let there be 
consciousness”.’ The question is, does an entire universe, a system of physical law, which 
produces something not obviously physical, does that require some context of intelligence 
that is not simply the intelligence of one finite?
296
 
Dawkins, it seems, understands Williams as attempting to do what Bennett accuses 
dogmatic Christian theology of continually doing: colonising the gaps within mechanistic 
accounts of the universe. What Williams actually wishes to do, the above response 
suggests, is simultaneously more modest, and more complex. He is precisely not 
interested in bringing God in at any supposed moment of distinction between “mere” 
matter and self-conscious matter. What he wants is to consider how a material universe 
can be “anthropogenic”; he is interested in thinking about the kinds of questions we are 
prompted to ask after we have identified this universe as “the kind of universe which has 









produced conscious language-using subjects (that is, us).”
297
 Williams, in other words, is 
not only comfortable with the idea that consciousness emerges somehow out of 
materiality, but he hints that a certain kind of theistic account of the world could arise 
from reflection on this very idea, and on the questions that the existence of self-
consciousness raises about the character of matter itself. 
On that last point, the questions that consciousness may prompt us to ask about 
matter, the discourse between Williams and Dawkins about the issue of determinism is 
highly suggestive. Pressed to discuss his position on free will, Dawkins comments that he 
has been misunderstood as a genetic determinist when in fact he understands genes to be 
only the fundamental unit of natural selection. Dawkins understands himself not as a 
genetic determinist, but simply as a determinist, given his assumption that everything, 
including human actions, is predetermined by systems and events in the universe. Self-
consciousness, and the human capacity to take decisions, Dawkins believes, can only be 
understood as “illusions”. His rationale for taking this position rests on his understanding 
of the alternative: “I don’t think that you can get away from determinism by postulating a 
ghost inside which takes decisions which are somehow independent of physical 
reality.”
298
 Because Dawkins understands the universe to be mechanistic in its operation, 
he believes we are faced with the choice either of postulating a non-material entity 
capable of free action, such as the human “soul”, or we are committed to regarding with 
suspicion what experience presents to us as our ability to decide. Williams’s reaction is to 
ask whether this presentation of the options is adequate, or whether our experience of 
consciousness and our felt ability to manipulate our environment demand that we 
conceive of materiality rather differently: 
I don’t think that believing in free will commits you to a ghost taking decisions 
independent of your physical reality. But…if the distinction between absolutely inert stuff 
and mind is not quite where it is frequently thought to lie; if the universe does not just 
break down into – sort of – “ghostly stuff” and “hard stuff”, then a decision is not 
something which some independent homunculus inside me makes, never mind what 













Evident here is the unmistakeable likeness of Bennett’s challenge to rethink matter, in 
Williams’s opening of a space between mechanistic materialism and naïve vitalism. Quite 
fascinating for our topic is the question of how such a resemblance finds its way into this 
side of the argument in this particular debate, or, why the enterprise of redefining matter 
as in some sense active might be desirable for a theologian representing theistic belief in a 
discussion about the origins of the universe.   
The thoughts behind Williams’s comments at the Oxford debate were given a 
fuller airing in the 2014 Gifford Lecture series, which were published as the monograph 
(of the same year) The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language.
300
 It is the 
proposition of this chapter that Williams’s theology of language follows the pattern of 
argumentation that we have just identified in his conversation with Dawkins. That is, 
Williams’s theology of language takes mechanistic physicalism as a primary interlocutor, 
and his response to this philosophy shows an awareness of Cartesianism (or its linguistic 
equivalent, what Barad calls “representationalism”, the assumption that semantic 
concepts transparently mediate features of the environment) as a possible alternative.
301
 
Williams, however, rejects the adequacy of both of these options for accounting for the 
everyday habits of speech, and The Edge of Words is engaged in the task of demarcating a 
space between them. This “space” is characterised by what could be called an agentic 
materiality: “thinking harder about the oddities of language” Williams writes in the 
opening section of this book, may “open up for us some thoughts about how the material 
world carries or embodies messages, how matter and meaning do not necessarily belong 
in different universes”.
302
 The linguistic habits he takes up invite us to think of matter as 
“a specific ‘situation’ of intelligible form” so that “the mythology of a ‘naturally’ 
meaningless or random materiality…becomes impossible to sustain”,
303
 and we must 
think of “the entire material environment that generates [language]” as “intrinsically 
capable of producing the actions we call understanding.”
304
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As we have hinted, Williams’s framing of ontological alternatives is of clear 
significance because of the resemblance between Bennett and Williams that can be 
demonstrated on this basis. This connection, and the ways in which the ontological 
landscape Williams sketches bears similarities to both Coole and Barad also, poses a 
serious challenge to Bennett’s portrayal of orthodox Christian theology as a threat to non-
dichotomous thought. Williams, in allowing the existence of language to prompt 
questions as to the character of matter itself does precisely what Bennett chastises Driesch 
for failing to do, but of utmost importance for our thesis is the fact that all this is explored 
by Williams en route to posing a question of ultimate context that the oddities of 
language might edge us towards. Above all, Williams is concerned with demonstrating 
how the eccentric language of orthodox Christian faith – as the representing of that which 
eludes representation – becomes intelligible precisely in the contemplation of a material 
world that is “irreducibly charged with intelligibility”.
305
 The final part of this thesis will 
argue that Williams’s proposition overall is for a Natural Theology in which God is not 
“of the gaps” as it were, another force available to routine description, but in which God 
might be apprehended – not grasped, but some way sensed, contemplated, or perceived – 
as what Eckhart might call the “terminus” of all acts of description and representation,
306
 
their ultimate hinterland. 
In terms of methodology, a reader familiar with Williams work in The Edge of 
Words may note how, from a text which is engaged in multiple and (by Williams’s own 
admission) eclectic conversations with diverse partners,
307
 one particular conversation has 
been brought into relief in the discussion which follows. This is the conversation with 
Richard Rorty that Williams engages in order to present something of the freedom or 
fluidity of language, an aspect which any rigorous physicalism must deny. There are a 
number of considerations in the rationale for beginning with this conversation, and for 
spending more time with it than what its duration in the book may appear (to some 
readers) to warrant. The most obvious reason should already be somewhat clear. 
Bennett’s presentation of the positioning of the new materialisms has been allowed to 
shape the kinds of questions that we approach Williams with: if he rejects physicalism, 
where do his grounds for doing so place him with regard to either a philosophy of parallel 
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substances, or a philosophy of agentic materiality? Williams’s full response to Rorty is 
indispensable to the task of answering this question. 
This is partly because Rorty is representative of more than one philosophical 
tradition. It is interesting, given earlier themes in this discussion, that Williams should 
choose one of the prominent voices of postmodernism to represent mechanistic 
materialism. More accurately in fact, and as we shall shortly discuss, Williams considers 
Rorty’s position as a doomed-to-fail attempt to preserve a radical kind of freedom for 
language against the physicalism that Rorty nevertheless takes to be an ontological given. 
Recalling Barad’s words that in postmodern thought, representationalism simply became 
prisoner to the problematic metaphysic it postulated, there will be space to argue that 
Williams appears to see Rorty in something like this light. At the very least, the thought is 
echoed that Rorty’s postmodern response to representationalism fails because, in the end, 
the culture/nature dichotomy informs his understanding of the alternatives to dualism. 
Though the connection will need some elaboration, relating Williams to Barad in this way 
will help us to begin to clarify Williams’s own position in relation to representationalism, 
which is considerably less clear than his more explicitly stated disagreement with 
mechanistic materialism.  
On the subject of that unclarity, it should be highlighted at this point that Williams 
never uses the term “representationalism”. The ontology it assumes – the idea of a world 
of things “out there” which basic descriptive language makes straightforwardly available 
to us “in here” through producing virtual representations for the subject – is however very 
much present in his work as a model to avoid.
308
 Thus the absence of the term 
“representationalism” would not, perhaps, be problematic on its own. But the persistence 
of Williams’s refusal to treat meaning and matter as ontologically distinct does appear 
under pressure where the prominence of a lynchpin concept in his thought on language, 
the pervasive activity of “representation”, becomes obvious. Williams notes at the outset 
that representation is a fraught concept because of the word’s wide variety of usages in 
philosophy, and indeed for our purposes his choice of terms is unfortunate.
309
 Our 
discussion of Williams’s disagreement with Rorty, and the way it aligns him with Barad 
may nevertheless help us in demonstrating that Williams’s theology of language is in no 
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way “representationalist” (though other arguments to reinforce this reading will also be 
offered).   
To lay out the impending discussion in brief: we will begin with Williams’s 
argument for the undetermined nature of language, which he seeks to demonstrate 
through drawing on a number of features of language which could be broadly referred to 
as the difficulty and the complexity of speech. Williams’s rejection of both physicalism 
and representationalism and his intention to seek an ontology that avoids these 
alternatives will be established through this discussion. Possible tensions within his 
account, which might raise questions as to the success of his attempt to offer a non-
dichotomous ontology, will be acknowledged. But these will also steer us helpfully into a 
series of clarifications (around Williams’s understanding of “representation” and 
“description” as linguistic registers) which will, in combination with an exploration of 
Williams’s account of language and embodiment, allow us to argue that Williams’s 
understanding of language moves him towards an account of matter as inherently 
innovative and meaningful. Some affinities between Williams’s ontological propositions 
and the work of Barad and Coole will be drawn out, with reference especially to the 
implications of Williams’s thought for epistemology. A final section will put Williams’s 
thought on language into its theological context, so as to raise a question with Williams 
about how reflection on the imbrications of matter and meaning might connect ultimately 
with reflection on a transcendent God.  
 
i) Difficulty, Complexity, and the Constrained Freedom of 
Language 
Williams’s observations on language begin with the question of whether we “can say 
what we like”. The claim that speech is a physical action, a “form of physical behaviour”, 
though in itself somewhat uncontroversial, nevertheless throws us into a set of problems 
which are by no means straightforward, related to freedom and determinism. “There are 
those,” Williams writes, “who have not shrunk from the conclusion that [language 
is]…no less determined than any other form of physical behaviour.”
310
 Such an 
understanding presumes that we cannot say what we like, nor do our utterances reproduce 
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or reflect “what the constraints that cause it to happen are really like”; utterance could 
only be “a rough guide” to the stimuli at work.
311
 The moral and logical problems with 
this lie fairly close to the surface, and Williams’s first undertaking in thinking about the 
character of language is to establish a framework for thinking about language as 
“undetermined”. But this characterisation itself is not clear cut. Williams promptly sees 
off the argument for determinism, but he is aware that the grounds he employs to do so 
point to some strong limits to the “freedom” of speech. Speech can be said to be free, but 
not arbitrary. What is meant here deserves elaboration.  
The inherent paradox, that to “give reasons for believing determinism is true is to 
undermine determinism”, provides Williams with the first riposte to the determinist 
account. If we make the claim that all speech is the “mere effect” of physical causality, 
we behave as if the statement made is exempt from its own implications (we behave, in 
other words, as if our statement reflects “extra-mental truth”, where consistency would 
require us to regard all claims of this kind as arbitrary).
312
 The second problem with 
determinism comes in where we notice the “grammar” of “future action” that we take for 
granted. Humans quite simply behave as if we have choice in what we say. In Williams’s 
example, if at some point in the future we were able to predict a person’s utterance, once 
told of the inevitability of that utterance, that person would be immediately able to 
entertain the possibility of saying something else. This suggests first the logical 
conundrum that this kind of prediction could not be announced “without being rendered 
uncertain.”
313
 It also suggests that the options, for those who would wish to continue with 
a determinist account of speech in the face of the instinctive grammar of decision-making, 
would be to propose some variation on the idea that this innate sense of choice about what 
we say must be “illusory”, or to posit a radical freedom at the point where we distinguish 
between utterances and their meaning, some kind of indeterminacy of the imagination 
(such that what we say is inevitable, but we can mean what we like).  
This is the position Williams associates with Rorty, who paints a “determinist 
picture of the actual history of linguistic activity”, but argues that this history is irrelevant 
to “the history of meaning”.
314
 Williams refers here to a thought experiment that Rorty 
employs in the course of his argument for replacing classical, foundationalist 
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“epistemology” with “hermeneutics” (or, more accurately, Rorty’s argument against 
replacing epistemologically-centred philosophy with any discipline that seeks to achieve 
similar results). Epistemology, according to Rorty, aims at the discovery of a neutral 
framework which would allow us to decide between truth claims. Hermeneutics eschews 
foundationalist pretensions to knowing the ultimate hinterland behind all such claims, and 
settles for the more modest goal of conversing between different frameworks in the hope 
that agreement can be reached.
315
 Rorty’s argument is launched via a critique of scientific 
objectivity, since “the epistemological tradition since Descartes” has grounded its belief 
in objectivity in the fact that science allows us to attain “accurate representations”.
316
 If it 
can be demonstrated that science, a discipline we understand to be involved with “the 
discovery of what is really out there in the world”, does not “differ in its patterns of 
argumentation from discourses for which the notion of ‘correspondence to reality’ seems 
less appropriate”,
317
  then we will be forced to redefine the purview of epistemology and 
hermeneutics. As such then, Rorty positions himself over-against what Barad might 
describe as representationalism or a correspondence theory of truth, and a closer study of 
his thesis, as well as the nature of Williams’s disagreement with Rorty, will be helpful for 
assessing Williams’s work around the question of representationalism.  
Developing the pragmatic logic of Kuhn’s paradigm shift,
318
 the upheaval which 
moves us from one epoch of interpretative history into another, Rorty argues that any 
assumed distinctions between science and the arts, or fact (as the traditional domain of 
epistemology) and value (as the traditional domain of hermeneutics), cannot be upheld. 
These very distinctions are “endangered by novel and substantive suggestions”, just as the 
assumed domains of science and religion were challenged in the Copernican Revolution. 
There was no framework by which Galileo could have been judged “scientific” and his 
religious opponents “unscientific” before Galileo’s findings led to a slow revolution in 
attitudes to both the scope of Scripture and to our understandings of what being 
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“scientific” meant. If we accept that no discipline can predict where the lines between fact 
and value will be drawn in the future – or, as Kuhn might put it, if we accept that “no 
algorithm for theory choice is available” –
319
 then philosophy must dispense with the idea 
that science provides a closer representation of, or closer correspondence to, what is “out 
there” than disciplines like history or ethics.
320
  
For Rorty, science functions in more or less the same way as these other 
discourses, which is to say that only one important distinction is operative across all 
disciplines. This is the distinction between “normal” discourse (“commensurable” 
discourse in which problems can be solved and positions extended or strengthened against 
the background of consensus) and “abnormal” discourse (discourse which is 
“incommensurable” because it does not obey current conventions). Philosophers should 
learn to use the terms “epistemology” and “hermeneutics” in ways that reflect only the 
fundamental difference between what is familiar and what is not. They will be 
“epistemological” in their approach, seeking to build upon or codify or extend positions, 
when the terms of the discussion are known.
321
 “Hermeneutics” will describe their 
agnosticism as they seek to understand or grasp discourse which is as yet unfamiliar, on 
its own terms.
322
 Neither form of discourse should be seen a degenerate form of the other, 




Rorty anticipates, just as Kuhn did, the accusation that this schema amounts to a 
regress into “subjectivism”, and he labours to address this attitude by raising questions 
about the senses we apply to the objective-subjective dichotomy. Rorty writes that 
“objectivity” has associations with what can be universally agreed upon, and with what 
can be shown to have undeniable links with reality “out there”. These meanings have 
been run together in such a way that we think agreement indicates links to external 
reality, and disagreement arises where we merely refer to internal states of affairs. 
Reading Kuhn, we then fear that having “no algorithm” for agreement forces us into an 
irrational position where truth is a matter of “taste”.
324
 If we aligned objectivity with 
“normal”, consensus-based speech, and subjectivity with “abnormal” speech, and if we 
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dispensed with the association of these categories with their supposed alignment with 
external and internal states, we would be free from the anxiety that the absence of an 
algorithm entails a “reduction” of our world to what is “spiritual” rather than “natural”, or 




Rorty presses these points in a discussion of spirit-nature dualism, determinism 
and freedom, and it is here that Williams identifies problems. In the background of 
criticisms of Kuhn lie a set of assumptions about the spirit and nature, the inheritance 
(according to Rorty) of German idealism, which associated the spirit with the mind’s 
“constituting” faculties. With this idea of the spirit in mind, critics imagine doing 
philosophy or science as hermeneutics entails “constituting” the reality we study rather 
than “discovering” it. Rorty is ambivalent about both the language of making and the 
language of finding, believing nothing metaphysical turns on our choice: in no sense do 
we “make” the physical stuff around us,
326
 and (as the Copernican revolution tells us) in 
no sense do we really “find” it either.
327
 It might be easier, he concedes, to stick to the 
language of “finding” when we talk about physics, but this will be just a matter of good 
story-telling (it is easier to tell stories of historic change against the backdrop of an 
unchanging physical universe).
328
 The point is, the language of “making” and “finding”, 
however it is used, should not be conflated with “the line between incommensurability 
and commensurability”,
 329
 which is the only distinction with any efficacy, and which is 
pragmatic rather than ontological in nature.  
Where the supposed “making” or “finding” faculties of the self are taken out of 
the equation, there might be a limited sense in which other insights related to the 
traditional distinction between the spirit and nature might be affirmed. The impulse 
behind spirit-nature dualism is the instinctive sense that humans enjoy a kind of freedom 
from physical determinism.
330
 Rorty contends that if we draw the hermeneutics-
epistemology distinction where he proposes, between abnormal and normal discourse, we 
can affirm this sensibility without assuming it has metaphysical guarantees. The denial of 
the availability of a “permanent neutral matrix” for translating between discourses can be 
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“generalized to the claim that we should not assume the vocabulary used so far will work 
on everything else that turns up.”
331
 This guarantees a kind of freedom, and Rorty grants 
this in a provocative illustration. “Physicalism is probably right in saying that we shall 
someday be able, ‘in principle’ to predict every movement of a person’s body (including 
those of his larynx and his writing hand)”, however 
even if we could predict the sounds made by the community of scientific inquirers of the 
year 4000, we should not yet be in a position to join in their conversation…the necessary 
and sufficient microstructural conditions for the production of noise will rarely be 
paralleled by a material equivalence between a statement in the language used for 
describing the microstructure and the statement expressed by the noise.
 332
 
Essentially then, Rorty defines the “spirit” as that which is culturally obscure or as-yet-
untranslatable, and therefore free by nature of its capacity to transcend explanation.
333
 But 
the position he assumes in the course of replacing all dichotomies with his normal-
abnormal matrix can be summed up as follows. Rorty accepts a thick causal connection 
between human language and the material world, but insists that this is the only kind of 
connection we can speak of. There is no correspondence or interaction between the 
history of meaning and the history of matter. 
But any account which (like Rorty’s) attempts to hold together a determinist 
description of utterance with a radically voluntarist description of meaning will collapse, 
Williams argues, for a number of reasons. The moral implications are worrisome. If 
nothing significant turns on the words we use to tell our story, our language of “deciding” 
or “inventing” (the kinds of terms we use to distinguish between actions that we own, and 
actions we have taken under compulsion) becomes an optional surface discourse, 
irrelevant to “the real analysis, which is always about neurones”.
334
 If this were the case 
there would be little reason to take one another’s moral reasoning seriously, and Williams 
thus questions how “the liberal polity and culture Rorty commends” could be “rationally 
derived from his basic position”.
335
 Rorty also tries to factor voluntarism into a scheme 
which cannot ultimately accommodate it. If our speech is determinate, our “representation 
to ourselves of what we say” must “also be determinate – otherwise we have simply 
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introduced into the material system a set of uncaused phenomena”.
336
 There is no “soft” 




And there are other problems too, related to two features of human experience. 
First, we appear to materially affect our environment and circumstances by what we say. 
If the newsagent hands me the newspaper I ask for, we cannot say his actions would have 
been the same if I had not asked, nor can we say my request caused him to hand the paper 
to me unless we are prepared to allow a “culturally mediated element to enter in” (the 
newsagent responds to what he takes to be my meaning), in which case we disrupt the 
closed-circuit system of physical causality with something like a history of meaning.
338
 
Second, the idea that we can “mean what we like” does not fit with the ways in which a 
cluster of everyday habits of speech seem to indicate that language operates within a kind 
of constrained freedom. We appear to be embroiled in a restless struggle “to make what 
we say both recognisable and defensible”.
339
 We use our speech to establish trust between 
speakers, and to establish joint trust in our environment as a basis for shared action.
340
 
Faced with these challenges, we fear we represent states of affairs inadequately, and 
employ different approaches to improve on what has gone before. We test the bounds of 
what can be said to establish the limits of recognition. Our language, in other words, 
appears responsive to “pressure that is not simply generated by the speaker’s conscious 
agenda”,
341
 and what is more, it appears to be capable of responding to this pressure by 
calling on a number of resources at its disposal. This family of observations could be 
roughly categorised under two headings: language’s manifestation of complexity, and 
language’s manifestation of difficulty. The two are intimately related, with the diversity of 
the tools we employ to communicate being indicative of the difficulty of that task, and 
many habits of our language use tell us a great deal about both aspects.   
For Williams, the complexity of language is manifest where we “notice the 
interplay” between two “registers” that are present in our everyday speech: description 
and representation.
342
 Description is defined by Williams as “a mapping exercise in 
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which we assume the task is to produce a certain traceable structural parallel between 
what we say and what we perceive”;
343
 it is language which aims at prediction and 
control. Representation is “a way of speaking that may variously be said to seek to 
embody, translate, make present or reform what is perceived”;
344
 it is “schematic”, 
seeking to articulate something like the context for the objects of our perception, or their 
interrelation.
345
 Close attention to the day to day habits of speech, according to Williams, 
reveals that our language moves constantly between one strategy and the other, never 
settling with the activity of simply “registering” or “mapping”,
346
 but also “playing away 
from home” to enlarge its understanding of, or to engage somehow with, what is 
characteristic or coherent in the life of what is perceived, its interweaving with other 
lives.
347
 A series of statuettes fashioned by Ice Age cave-dwellers which were exhibited 
in the British Museum in 2013 – lions with part-human and part-leonine bodies – present 
the two registers poignantly, and attest that our early ancestors were taken up with the 
task of metaphorization in much the same ways as we are. The perceived form of a man 
and the perceived form of a lion (literal descriptions), are disaggregated and reformed, so 
that the resulting figures look like nothing which really exists, but the arrangement allows 
each form to “speak of” the other.
348
 “Human identity as a vehicle of leonine, leonine 
identity as a vehicle for human”: the two identities are “grasped schematically”, the artist 
modelling “more than what is ‘directly’ perceived” in order to creatively evoke something 
elusive about an object’s sensed nature (that men are powerful, perhaps, or that lions have 
a kind of dignity).
349
 “Our speech,” Williams writes “declares its distance from simple 
reproductive listing: what we can say is more than what we might be obliged to say in 
creating a formal picture of a set of elements.”
350
   
 
As indicated in our introduction, there will be cause to spend more time 
examining the relationship between these registers in the course of later discussion, but 
for now it must suffice to note that the difference between them is not between a 
foundational level of speech (description) on which various forms of representation 
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(metaphor or other more schematic forms of speech) builds.
351
 Actually we will soon 
explore how the distinction between description and representation is not at all clear 
cut,
352
 which is a point that Williams wholeheartedly acknowledges. In asking us to 
notice the interplay of registers, he is asking us simply to notice a fairly practical 
difference between two ways of speaking we routinely employ, and to think about when 
and why we employ them. We can all grant there is a mode of speech that “does not 
expect or routinely seem to require much in the way of schematic or representational 
treatment” because for “practical purposes we know pretty much what it means and how 
to deploy it; its metaphors are buried”.
353
 Williams asserts as an example that it is more or 
less obvious that to “speak of the hands of a clock causes no ripple on the surface of 
routine communication.”
354
 But we also seem continually engaged in the practice of 
pushing speech beyond this language that we habitually take for granted. Eccentric and 
adventurous forms of speech are pervasive, and there is an ongoing practice within 
communication between people of reformulating and testing schemata, finding new 
metaphors. To identify the points where this mode of speech comes in is to be confronted 
with the question of why language appears to want to do more, or appears to require 
more, than the use of a “basic” or familiar set of descriptive terms. And this is to begin to 
identify something of the unstable connection of language with what it refers to, and so 
ultimately its riskiness or difficulty. 
 
To draw these connections out, another way to appreciate the complexity in 
language is by focusing on questions around “falsity”. Once we have noticed the creative 
capacity inherent in the “lion-man” example – our ability to reproduce and then 
disaggregate, to “reorder what is given” –
355
 we arrive at the observation that language is 
capable of the counterfactual, and we are simultaneously confronted with the possibility 
that speakers can use their ability to move away from the reproduction of strict likeness 
both to conceal and also to make manifest. By thinking through the question of when we 
consider the utterance of falsehood to be morally problematic, we come to see that falsity 
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actually “stands at the heart of speech” as a creative agent.
356
 The ability to think and 
speak hypothetically (to think of what is not, but could be, the case) is essential to our 
ability to imagine possible future actions, for example, and we do not commonly think of 
this capacity for the non-literal as untruthful or morally objectionable.
357
  And then, 
questions of when we do think of conscious deception as morally objectionable are 
themselves complex. Williams gives the example of Augustine’s prohibition against 
lying, which would have Augustine denying the permissibility of conscious deception 
even in the proverbial case of a person asked by the Gestapo to reveal the location of a 
Jewish family. Williams invites us to probe whether “truthfulness” in such cases (where, 
for example, we sense that a world of greater justice, or human dignity, is at stake) 
requires more than a simple manifestation of “facts”. He concludes that  
 
it is a more complicated question than it seems to ask what it is that creates and maintains  
trust in the exchange of language: the obvious answer (telling the truth) is not quite 
enough. Someone who was known to tell the truth unfailingly in situations like the Jewish 




These kinds of casuistic examples highlight the ways in which (what a rigorously literal 
interpretation might regard as) “falsehoods” might be fundamental rather than aberrant, 
even within speech we intuitively regard as adequately representing a state of affairs. “We 
cannot easily imagine human speaking…without the possibility of fiction”, Williams 
writes.
359
 And where this is true a picture emerges in which “truth” appears to be bound 
up, not with some kind of straightforward articulation of atomised facts, but with issues of 
recognition and trust, the interpersonal making of sense through a hazardous process of 




And this is where difficulty comes in. Pay attention to any “serious personal 
exchange”, Williams writes, and we will find moments “when we struggle for words; 
when emotion of one kind or another leaves us baffled and inarticulate; when we cannot 
without a sense of dishonesty reproduce what we have said or heard in other 
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 We do not have to go far to observe the refusal, 
within everyday interactions, to tie things up in words too glibly: Cordelia’s inability to 
describe her love for King Lear is “painfully recognizable”, writes Williams,
362
 and the 
purposeful pressure that we apply to speech in various situations (the way poets impose 
the “requirements of metre or rhyme or metaphorical patterning” on language in order to 
generate new and unexpected connections between things) is for Williams an 
“extrapolation” of the same hesitation that Cordelia expresses, the sense that some 
situations are beyond expression in familiar terms.
363
 Yet the connections we make under 
this pressure can “fail to be credible, leave out certain criteria for recognisability, override 
what is given and so on,” writes Williams. Hesitation, and the intentionality within speech 
that it discloses, shows us that the use of language is always bound up with risk: “We 
cannot say in advance just how diverse may be the range of possible and recognisable 
schemata. We can only try it, and see where we fail to persuade some other speaker or 
perceiver of the recognisability of our version.”
364
   
 
Looking at a number of issues related to language and time gives us further insight 
into difficulty, risk and recognition. Put in its most simple formulation, Williams asks us 
to notice that language is an unfinishable business. Despite our use of the phrase, 
language never behaves as if there are “last words”:
365
 we never reach a point of universal 
agreement where we cease to “go on” from what has just been said. While we are used to 
reaching levels of reasonable convergence in conversation, so that we acknowledge 
moments of “meaning the same thing”, such convergence is, according to Williams “not 
guaranteed, never complete and always suggesting new possibilities of divergence.”
366
  
What is said offers itself as material to be enlarged upon, and two key features of our day-
to-day interaction highlight this phenomenon. If I repeat the thing you have just said (in 
Williams’s example, “There’s a mouse in the kitchen”) it is unlikely that I mean exactly 
the same thing as you do, in fact it is most likely that I mean something different. I might 
be responding to your statement with surprise, or asking for confirmation of what you 
have just said (“There’s a mouse in the kitchen?”; “There’s a mouse in the kitchen?”). We 
also take it for granted that “understanding” has to do with knowing how to go on from 
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what has just been said, quite the opposite of direct repetition.
367
 Children in the early 
stages of linguistic development may repeat adult phrases, but we do not consider them to 
have grasped fully what their words mean until they can use them appropriately within 
new formulations, rather than simply parroting. And if we experience a disjunction in 
conversation with another speaker, an inappropriate response to what we have just said, 
we know our meaning has not been understood. In these ways speakers behave as if, far 
from “being a matter of gaining insight into a timeless mental content ‘behind’ or ‘within’ 
what is said”,
368
 as if words were “fixed tokens of the distinct objects they referred to”,
369
 
language is an ongoing and communal project. It moves in time, so that, in order make 
themselves intelligible, every speaker must reckon not only with the environment as they 
perceive it, but with what has already been said about it.
370
  And every speaker through 
the venture of speaking in turn leaves themselves open to agreement, divergence, 
challenge, or disagreement. To “make sense” is to “make the noise or gesture that will 
prompt sufficient and appropriate acknowledgement on the part of another – an 
acknowledgement from an earlier noise-maker that we have heard correctly or an 
acknowledgement on the part of another noise-maker that I have been correctly heard.”
371
 




Where do these linguistic behaviours leave us with regard to Rorty and the 
freedom of language? For Williams, the difficulty of language will not permit an 
explanation in which meaning what we please could be “a constitutive strategy” of our 
speech.
373
 The signs of a struggle within language – the fact that it is downright hard “to 
know how to make the sort of noise/gesture that will secure recognition and the 
continuation of practice” – are indicative of certain constraints within which language 
operates, constraints which a Rortian-type scheme, in which the history of meaning and 
the history of matter stand in strict separation, cannot account for.
374
  As Williams writes, 
difficulty could only mean “that our speech is ‘engaged’, that it is not without relation to 
what is given.”
375
 And this givenness, though initially “a matter of what is said or spoken 
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by another”, must also (if we are to take the search for recognition into account) include 
“a point between or beyond speakers, a point to which both are gesturing.”
376
 But if this is 
to dismiss Rorty’s radical voluntarism, Williams’s description of language’s complexity 
and difficulty simultaneously points to a certain kind of freedom within language, which 
tells strongly against the deterministic materialism that Rorty also takes for granted. If 
language were a matter of cause and effect, we might expect events and utterances to 
follow a dyadic or predictable patterning. The fact that language is in search of ever more 
complex formulations, the fact that many situations leave us struggling to find any words 
at all, and the fact that the course of time appears to matter in language so that two people 
uttering the same sentence is no guarantee that they mean the same thing, all suggest that 
the connection of language to what it refers to must be fundamentally unstable. 
 
But of major interest for us is the way in which this latter rebuttal of a dyadic 
relation between language and the environment entails a rejection of Cartesianism (or 
representationalism) just as much as it entails a rejection of deterministic materialism. 
The features of language Williams points to are as impossible to explain within a 
metaphysic which understands words as neatly correlated or transparent to the world of 
“things out there”, as they are by a metaphysic which understands words as predictable 
indexical symptoms of energy exchange,
377
 and Williams appears more than comfortable 
directing his criticisms in both of these directions. Williams notes that the “salience of 
Rorty’s picture” lies in his intuition that “what we say is not actually dictated by what is 
simply there”,
378
 and here he appears not only to affirm but to take up something of 
Rorty’s deep challenge to the idea that language stands in a relation of stable 
correspondence to what it describes. Williams’s argument with Rorty is not then with 
Rorty’s anti-representationalism, but with his solution to the problems which that 
ontology poses. Significantly (though it is couched in a footnote) Williams’s riposte to 
Rorty includes a criticism of the latter’s apparent assumption that “a Cartesian dualism of 
parallel kinds of substance is the only ontological alternative to physicalism.”
379
 
Williams’s implication here is that both alternatives are problematic, and he appears in no 
way ready to concede that a choice against physicalism commits anybody to ontological 
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dualism, or vice versa. Perhaps (and this is where resonances with Barad’s critique of 
post-structuralism suggest themselves most strongly) there is an insinuation here that 
Rorty’s mistake is in his yielding too much to one side of a Cartesian dichotomy that he 
fails to properly go beyond.  
 
Thus Williams’s differences with Rorty take us far enough to identify two poles 
between which Williams intends to navigate (physicalism and representationalism), and 
to consider a number of features of language that he commits to in the process of 
demarcating this middle ground. But what account of language can be given which 
succeeds in holding together both freedom and difficulty, both instability and 
engagement? And what account of the relationship between language and what it 
represents can we give, once we have problematized both the “cause and effect” 
relationship, and the idea of fixed signs neatly corresponding to items in an environment?  
 
One way of beginning, in line with the language Williams uses  as he starts to 
build his picture of what speech is and does, is to ask what kind of analysis we might 
submit language to, if not the dyadic analysis appropriate to physical transactions or 
exchanges of energy within an environment?  Williams follows the American novelist 
Walker Percy in inviting us to consider a difference between indexes and symbols within 
speech. If a person with toothache groans we might consider this as an index, a wired-in 
response: “if smoke, then fire”.
380
 But if a second person says “Ouch!’ and third says “My 
tooth hurts”, two varieties of learned response, these need “something more than an 
energy exchange model” to account for them, since they involve the application of a set 
of symbols (words) to a perceived state of affairs. As soon as we are talking about 
symbolization, we are talking about the attempt to speak of one thing through something 
not naturally or obviously “like” it. But symbols work by being transformed by this 
process, “a word takes on the ‘feel’, the associations of what it points to”.
381
 Human 
utterance proceeds in the confidence that noises bearing no obvious relation to what they 
represent can yet “hold” something of our experience within a different medium.
382
 We 
must then submit language to triadic rather than just dyadic analysis; language involves 
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triangulations between the language user, object, and symbol.
383
 Another way of 
expressing this for Williams is to say that  
An utterance in a natural language establishes a world, which is importantly 
different…from an ‘environment’; a world is a scheme of sentences proposing a coherent 
set of relations, which may be actual or fictive…Which of these it is will be settled by a 
complex process taking place in a community of speakers.
384
 
To name what we encounter by applying a symbol to it is to shift that thing from 
environment to world, to “pair the apprehended thing with another thing, a cluster of 
sounds that may have other pairings and resonances”.
385
 That we are continually involved 
in this world-making process, this exploration of possible resonances in the company of 
others, is in one way most easily identifiable when we notice “mistakes” or “accidents” 
within speech. Percy gives the example of the mishearing of one half of a metaphor: in 
the American South the “blue darter hawk” has come to be colloquially referred to as a 
“blue-dollar hawk”, a new pairing which “presents the hawk as dense with significance, 
as puzzling or inviting”.
386
 “Mistakes” like this, disruptions of a “plainly descriptive” 
level of speech (the original term “blue darter” aims more straightforwardly to name the 
bird’s activity), pairings that present themselves as impenetrable or eventually 
unconvincing to us, can alert us to what speakers seem to be incessantly in the process of 
doing: inviting each other to see one thing through another, a communal search for “new 
connections” that might – if they “make sense” to others – bring newly apprehended 
aspects of our environment to light.
387
  
   
This account of language as triadic rather than dyadic has a number of merits with 
regard to some of the themes we have explored so far. It makes sense of our experiential 
awareness that language can “stand apart from the causal nexus”, and the surprising 
insight that some of the central practices of human speaking appear to involve a deliberate 
“cutting of links” with the environment: we invent what does not exist both to conceal 
things from sight and to allow “diverse aspects of what we encounter to emerge into 
view.”
388
 In acknowledging this “standing apart” Williams’s account also answers for the 
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restlessness that language exhibits. Our sense that language involves choice comes tied up 
with the intuition that it demands care. Our linguistic “worlds” never finally or 
completely seem to encompass the full texture of what is given to perception, and our 
language is continually moved forward under the pressure of this awareness to say more 
or to say better, it “moves into its subject over time”.
389
 Finally, and on the subject of 
time, in presenting language as relating to what is not language in “a shifting pattern of 
correlation” rather than an “index-like relation of cause and effect” (in presenting 
language as engaging with but not mapped neatly onto the environment it represents)
390
 
Williams’s account helps in understanding why two identical sentences can mean such 
different things, why what has just been said matters. As Williams writes, quoting Percy, 
“the sentence ‘I need you’ can provoke a very wide range of responses depending on the 
‘world’ in which it occurs. And…the same words may be spoken as literal, as metaphor, 
as trite metaphor, as significant or banal”.
391
 To sum up some of these observations, 
Williams’s picture allows for the freedom of language, but not at the cost of denying a 
kind of connectivity between what we say, and what we say it about. The connection he 
posits, which is neither a matter of “causation” nor a matter of direct “correspondence”, is 
also neither timeless nor guaranteed, but is always vulnerable, always incomplete. 





But we can go no further without acknowledging certain ways in which 
Williams’s anti-Cartesianism, signposted both in his introduction, and manifest in his 
reaction to Rorty, seems somewhat under strain with his employment of Percy’s world 
versus environment model, and with a number of features of the argument Williams 
builds in working up to it. Arguably, Williams’s articulation of the complexity of 
language is responsible for generating some of the pressure here (though, as we will 
spend the next section of our chapter exploring, it is just this aspect of his work that on 
closer examination allows us to resolve some of these tensions and to address possible 
misreadings). We noted at the outset that Williams’s use of the term “representation” as a 
way of identifying certain kinds of speech apart from description is, at least at a 
superficial level, problematic because of its associations with the concept of a mentally 
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reproduced virtual version of the thing represented. Another layer of complication is 
added where Williams’s distinction between description and representation seems to 
come close to designating description as a kind of reproduction in precisely the sense we 
just considered (reproduction of a virtual version), with representation as a mode of 
speech which then disaggregates and reformulates the more straightforward picture that 
description gives us. The “lion-man” example, though useful in highlighting both 
registers at work in quite a primitive form of communication, does carry something of 
this implication when it comes to description. The possible inference that metaphorical 
speech builds on the more foundational category of literal description (as if description 
was a primary mode of speech more apt at mirroring our environment), is explicitly 
resisted on more than one occasion, and actually Williams ends an early summary of his 
thesis with the claim that all of the features of language that he identifies in his book 
“carry a challenge to the idea that there is a ‘primitive’ literal level in our speech on 
whose foundation metaphor and symbol are built up.”
393
 Williams thereafter consistently 
distances himself from this reading by qualifying or scare quoting many instances of his 
use of terms like “literal” (referring, for example to “(what is imagined to be) literal 
description”).
394
 But readers can be forgiven for retaining some confusion on this point. 
That Williams frequently contrasts description and representation in terms of language 
that is more straightforward versus language that is more risky (involved in making fresh 
connections between objects not obviously related),
395
 and that he designates schematic 
representation as a “more complex” mode of speech,
396
 means that a clarification of these 
terms and their relationship is essential to the task of demonstrating how Williams’s 
philosophy diverges from the representationalist model he is at some points more 
explicitly bent on dismantling.  
 
Finally, Percy’s image of language creating a world as opposed to an 
environment, where a world entails triadic relations, and dyadic relations pertain to an 
environment,
397
 on first appearances seems to promote the age-old characterisation of 
matter with what is passive and language as what is active or dynamic. Percy’s 
breakdown of triadic relations – as relations between subject, object, and symbol – does 
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not help much in avoiding these overtones.
398
 Thus by the time Williams’s argument for 
the freedom of language has been presented, there is still a sense of ambiguity around the 
question of what it is that language actually represents. And a great deal hangs on this 
question, remembering that the assumption that we can posit a reality beyond language, a 
world of objects with (as Barad might put it) fixed independent properties, is basic to 
classical Cartesian approaches to epistemology.  
 
Williams’s clear discomfort, throughout his argument for language’s freedom, 
around which terms to employ when naming speech’s referent, and his constant need to 
clarify what he is “not saying” in order to pre-empt certain readings, are revealing. On 
one hand these things confirm his cognisance of how easy it can be to smuggle in 
Cartesian assumptions through the language we use, and this is encouraging in terms of 
our argument for Williams’s anti-Cartesianism. On the other hand, there is a certain 
caginess here, a concession that his case for a non-dichotomous ontology (so boldly 
signalled in his introductory proposition that “matter and meaning do not necessarily 
belong in different universes”)
399
 has not necessarily been made in the course of his 
discussion for language’s freedom. The shared reference point between speakers which is 
presupposed by speech’s difficulty is variously referred to by Williams as “what is 
perceived”, “what is spoken of”, “the environment”, “what language engages with”, and 
“what is given”,
400
 and his concern to avoid what he regards as more loaded terminology 
on these occasions is summarised when he asks us to notice that 
 
I am not talking about the relation of ‘language’ with ‘the world’: once again this begs a 
question, assuming that there is somewhere a straightforward catalogue of neutral 
phenomena to be isolated as what is basically there, and that anything else is what we 





Reiterating the same thing at a slightly later point in his discussion, he writes 
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 I am once again – rather obviously – trying to avoid speaking of a ‘world’ beyond language, if 
only to avoid a not very helpful word/world dualism which encourages us to think of 
language as the labelling of a passive environment.
402 
 
On this latter occasion, however, Williams goes on to maintain that what he has argued 
up to this point (his case for the freedom of language on the basis of language’s 
complexity and difficulty) should already demonstrate why he might be “unhappy with 
this”, and that his argument about language and the body “will spell this out further.”
403
 
These comments direct us towards a helpful process for working through some of the 
problems we have just raised. They are Williams’s indication that understanding what is 
entailed by the complexity of language, and understanding where embodiment comes in, 
are the keys to conceiving of matter differently. In what follows, we will look more 
closely at “representation” and the metaphysics it presupposes in order to show how 
Williams’s conception of language’s freedom really does begin to evoke the idea of a 
kind of agentic materiality. From here we will turn to look at the relationship between 
representation and description as an entry into the question of where the body comes in 
(with help from Iain McGilchrist, whose influence on these subjects is traceable in 
Williams’s work), and we will follow how Williams’s treatment of language and 
embodiment shows the freedom and dynamism of language to be an expression of the 
intrinsic character of matter itself. We will finish the next section with a comparison 
between Williams’s ontology and the ontologies offered by Coole and Barad, in order to 
show some affinities between his thought and the new materialisms. 
 
 
ii) Representation and Description, Recognition and 
Embodiment: Language as Matter Making Sense  
 
Percy writes that once we consider “how symbolization actually works” we are faced 
with the need to consider the question: “how can one thing ‘be’ in another?”
404
 In the 
same way Williams points out that significant metaphysical issues are raised in 
connection with representation as a mode of speaking clearly removed from the attempt 
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to reproduce or to imitate. Our seemingly instinctive confidence that something unlike its 
subject matter can nevertheless “speak of” what it is not – the confidence that we 
manifest in our use of metaphor (where one element becomes a vehicle for the other) and 
at an even more basic level in our claims to represent the physical environment by means 
of sound – presupposes “that some level or aspect of what is perceived can come to be in 
another medium.”
405
 For Williams representation thus demands an account of 
participation, an account of how a characteristic form of something can be recognised and 
recaptured in another phenomenal shape, or put otherwise “an ‘analogical’ discourse that 
is able to identify continuity in material distinctness”.
406
 For this we will also need to 
think about “a distinction between intelligible forms of action and the precise 
embodiments in which they are encountered”,
407
 a distinction, he hastens to add, which is 
not like a doctrine of form and matter in any dualistic sense, but which recognises   
 
that even within a material account of the world, the communicative sense made by this 
or that object is not another feature of its material composition – as, to use the 
Wittgensteinian example, the expression (smile or frown) is not a material feature of the 




Representation and the metaphysics it implies must then entail both a certain 
anthropology and a certain kind of account of what speech refers to. On one hand humans 
appear to have the capacity to recognise patterns of intelligible form at work across 
diverse agents, so that human subjects are “constantly involved in drawing out the life of 
what is represented by more and more initiatives in ‘reading’ the object through one 
medium or another.”
409
 On the other hand the incessantness of this activity prompts us to 
consider the environment, not as passive raw material, but as “a complex of actual and 
potential life, of structures breeding not only complexity but different levels of unity.”
410
 
It is as if our language is responsive to an entity that is “consistently ‘proposing’ more 
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Williams’s concept of representation does then begin to evoke the idea of an 
agentic materiality, a material world which is “irreducibly charged with intelligibility”,
412
 
or which is innately communicative, embodying messages, so that matter and meaning 
may not be ontologically distinct. But the radically non-dichotomous nature of the 
ontology Williams presumes becomes most explicit, not with the idea that our 
representations pick up on the communicative sense inherent to material forms (although 
this is certainly part of the picture), but with the idea that the activity of representation 
itself is a work of the material universe, so that representation is nothing less than matter 
becoming self-conscious. This latter proposal is not fully exposed in his work until it is 
argued that our human capacity to recognise sameness-in-difference (the capacity so 
fundamental both to representation and to the communal process of making sense) is 
itself inextricably rooted in our embodiment. What makes us capable of recognising and 
holding one form in another, and of (in this way) establishing a world in common, is our 
material participation in the environment that we represent. 
 
The deep connection between recognition and embodiment is first presaged in 
Williams’s distinction between representation and description, or at least it can be found 
in this distinction if we read Williams through McGilchrist’s presentation of a set of 
issues in neuroscience. This is a reading that Williams himself invites, more than once 
naming McGilchrist’s work as important background to his thoughts on language,
413
and 
tying his own concept of description to McGilchrist’s left-brain-associated “referential” 
language, while he connects his concept of schematic speech (representation) with 
McGilchrist’s right-brain-associated activities.
414
 A summary of McGilchrist’s work will 
help us to discern a normative presumption which underlies Williams’s account of 
representation and description, and this will connect Williams’s concept of “registers” 
within language to his understanding of language and the body. 
 
McGilchrist’s book The Master and His Emissary challenges the conventional 
view of language as associated with left-brain activity alone, presenting instead the more 
nuanced understanding now widely accepted amongst neuroscientists that both right-brain 
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and left-brain functioning are essential to language, though the hemispheres specialise in 
different aspects of language use.
415
 The left-brain mostly subserves syntax and 
vocabulary,
416
 and has rightly been linked with denotative language (syntactical language, 
or what Williams calls description),
417
 but the right-brain is involved in invoking plural 
meanings of words, understanding the meaning of whole sentences, their context, tone, 




To understand the significance of this for McGilchrist (and thus for Williams), it 
is necessary to say something of McGilchrist’s suggestion that the structure of the brain 
might give us clues as to the structure of the world it mediates and partially creates.
419
 In 
particular, the impact of the human mind in shaping the world that we live in might be 
understood better if we shifted away from talking about the right- and left-brain in terms 
of their function, and saw them as something more akin to different personalities, with 
different drives, and which deliver different “worlds” to us.
420
 Brain lateralisation (the 
division of hemispheres and their specialisation) has evolved from the need to attend to 
the environment in two different ways. To experience it as unfamiliar and in flux on one 
hand, in order to give it a full and vigilant attention; on the other hand to “fix it as it 
flies”, that is, to be able to step out of the world of flux and to isolate, focus on, and 
categorise components (the kind of attention we need to give to the environment in order 
to learn, predict, and produce).
421
 To carry out their different tasks without inhibiting each 
other, the hemispheres require a certain distance from each other, and each remains 
largely ignorant of what the other is doing. The “emissary” of McGilchrist’s book title is 
the left-brain, which has been delegated certain tasks by the more diversely skilled right 
hemisphere on which it depends: tasks related to fixing, holding, categorising, seeing the 
world in terms of parts, reconstructing a whole from the parts and thus providing 
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ourselves with a simplified version or “map” of the world. These skills enable us to deal 




McGilchrist believes that the fact the two hemispheres approach the world with 
certain kinds of attention is of great importance from a phenomenological perspective, 
given that how we attend to the world “changes what kind of a thing comes into being for 
us.”
423
 Broadly, his thesis is that the defining features of our humanity relate to our being 
able to gain critical distance “from our selves and from the immediacy of experience” 
because this enables us to take some amount of control of the environment around us 
rather than “responding to it passively.”
424
 However, one “needs to bring what one has 
learned from one’s ascent back to the world where life is going on”, and to “incorporate it 
in such a way that it enriches experience”.
425
 He therefore believes the worlds that both 
hemispheres deliver are essential to the human condition, but that there is an ideal 
movement from experience to abstraction and back to experience (right hemisphere to left 
hemisphere and back to the right) which gives us optimal distance.
426
 This synthesising 
process is threatened by the fact that the left hemisphere’s specialisation in certainty, 
fixity, and familiarity, combined with its ignorance of what the right brain is doing, 
render it remarkably self-assured, competitive, and active in attempting to become a 
world unto itself. The left hemisphere’s increasing attempts to dominate (which, given the 
right conditions, it can successfully do) have shaped the history of thought.
427
 The 
impacts of this are felt not least in the prevalence of dichotomous thought after Descartes 
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McGilchrist emphasises the somewhat counterintuitive fact that expansions in the 
parts of the brain we now associate with language, as well as the advancements in vocal 
capacity that were needed to produce controlled sounds, predated the development of 
human language.
429
 There is strong evidence to suggest what produced this change in the 
brain’s structure or capacity, creating the “space” that language later co-opted, was a kind 
of communication involving music allied to gesture.
430
 In sub-Saharan Africa tribes still 
use drum beats to communicate, and, rather than mimicking the sounds of words and 
verbal phrases, the rhythms mimic the bodily gestures of the communicator, so that the 
receiving of such signals is accompanied by the visualisation of (and participation in) the 
communicator’s dance, which is where meaning is to be found. This cannot be far from 
the kind of “I-thou” communication through music that McGilchrist (along with many 
neuroscientists) believes language grew out of.  Before denotative or syntactical language 
came a form of communication strongly connected to bodily experiences and to emotions, 
the essence of language’s predecessor being a kind of participatory or empathetic 
imitation of other communicators,
431
 such that a person could in a sense “’inhabit the 




Though we now use it for communication, it therefore seems that we did not need 
denotative language to communicate or to think, McGilchrist writes.
433
 But if denotative 
language, a later entry in the linguistic development of humans, did not arise from the 
drive to communicate, why did it arise? His answer is derived in part from referential 
language’s signs of alignment to certain kinds of gestures (to do with pointing, grasping 
or holding) which suggests that, if the origins of language were indeed in music allied to 
gesture, the “syntactic elements of language” may have derived from “the more 
functional, more manipulative” hand movements.
434
 This has significant implications, 
given that touch allows us to derive only a piecemeal image of something, and that 
grasping “implies seizing a thing for ourselves…wresting it away from its context, 
                                                          
429
 Though brain asymmetry has certainly been accelerated since humans began to use language, this is an 
epiphenomenon: language was not the initial driver of brain lateralisation or the asymmetry of brain 
function. See ibid., 100.  
430
 Ibid., 99-105; for notes on gesture, 119. 
431
 Ibid., 118-26. 
432
 Ibid., 122. 
433
 Ibid., 105-110. In fact, in contradiction to body language, denotative language is “the perfect medium for 
concealing, rather than revealing, meaning” (see page 106). 
434
 Ibid., 111. 
94 
 
holding it fast, focussing on it.”
435
 Denotative language, it seems, may have arisen from 
the need to expand the “I-it” capacities of language, the need to symbolise elements of the 
environment in order to make them available to memory.
436
 Denotative language allows 
for greater manipulation and control of the environment because it allows for a less 
obviously corporeal, more virtual representation of reality (made up of fixed, distinct 
parts of speech, which help us to carve up, isolate or categorise elements of lived 
experience). It is in this way characterised by abstraction, a loss of the whole picture in 
the interests of greater precision and efficiency: it “enables the left hemisphere to 
represent the world ‘off-line’, a conceptual version, distinct from the world of experience, 





The fact that only the right hemisphere understands metaphor is a good indication 
that metaphorical thought and language (what Williams refers to as schematic language or 
representation, making sense of one thing in terms of another) has stronger connections 
with a more archaic repertoire than abstract language. McGilchrist writes that a metaphor 
designates relations between things, thus asserting “a common life that is experienced in 
the body of the one who makes it”, so that the separation between elements of a metaphor 
“is only present at the linguistic level.”
438
 We often mistakenly think of metaphor as 
arising from denotative speech, when in fact the matter is the other way around. “Our 
sense of the commonality of the two ideas, perceptions or entities” McGilchrist writes 
“does not lie in a post hoc derivation of something abstracted from each of them, which is 
found on subsequent comparison to be similar…but rather on a single concrete, 
kinaesthetic experience more fundamental than either, and from which they are in turn 
derived.”
439
 A clash of symbols and a clash of colours “are felt in our embodied selves as 




McGilchrist argues that the (great) advantages presented to human action and 
expression in the ability to stand back from the flux of experience by producing distilled 
or disembodied concepts in language come with potential losses with regard to 
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 Referential language would become a world unto itself without a continued 
backward and forward movement between right and left hemispheres,
442
 a synthesising 
activity which allows metaphorical speech to pervade and disrupt the “self-consistent 
system of tokens” that the left brain trades in.
443
 Our ability to think and speak 
metaphorically (in a broad, rather than a narrowly literary, sense) means that language 
can continue to “carry us back to the experiential world” in two ways. At the “bottom” 
end, and though familiarity can obscure their roots, all words have an original 
metaphorical lineage related to bodily experience (as McGilchrist points out, the most 
abstract philosophical terms like “contending”, “intending”, “impression” or 
“comprehension” have their roots in the Latin verb tendere, to grasp).
444
  At the “top” 
end, the host of implicit resonances that we can instantly associate with a single word 
have the ability to invoke that word’s ultimate context in a world before the separation 
into parts that language occasions. “The word metaphor implies something that carries 
you across an implied gap”, McGilchrist writes, and the “gap across which metaphor 
carries us is one that language itself creates.” In this way, “metaphor is language’s cure 
for the ills entailed on us by language…If the separation exists at the level of language, it 




We noted that Williams’s (relatively brief) summary of McGilchrist’s work uses 
the terms description and representation interchangeably with McGilchrist’s categories of 
denotative and metaphorical speech. But many other instances of Williams’s 
characterisation of description and representation carry shades of McGilchrist’s theory, 
and this is significant in helping to address some of the potential tensions we have 
identified within Williams’s thought.  It was, for example, pointed out earlier that 
Williams’s work treats description as a straightforward depiction of the environment, or 
as involved in the production of something like a virtual or disembodied map of the 
environment for the purposes of navigation, and that this could be problematic in terms of 
our argument for Williams’s anti-representational impulse if this register was interpreted 
as being (for this reason) foundational. With McGilchrist’s picture in mind we can affirm 
that these senses of description are indeed present for Williams, but that the usefulness of 
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description for prediction and control does not entail a closer correspondence between 
descriptive language and some imagined world of items making up reality “out there”. 
Like McGilchrist, Williams associates description with representations that have become 
over-familiar (Williams’s example of the “hands of the clock” as a metaphor buried 
within routine description is pertinent here). He also refers to representation as “basic” 
and “not reducible to the…functional goals of left-brain description”,
446
 and several times 
names description as a sub-category of representation (“some of the mechanisms of 
metaphor are essential to the meaning of any descriptive language whatever”):
447
 here he 
seems to follow McGilchrist in presenting representational language as the more 
primitive activity. Description is also consistently related (by both theorists) to the 
activities of cataloguing or listing, or with the attempt to itemise or carve up the landscape 
of perception.
448
 Crucially, these aspects (for Williams as for McGilchrist) mean that, 
despite its usefulness in terms of the precision needed for prediction and control, 
descriptive language constitutes a further removal from (rather than a closer 
correspondence to) the environment in which experience takes place. Representation, 
rather than description, is understood to be the linguistic practice with the greater chance 
of allowing what is given to perception to modify and pervade our speech (though this is 
acknowledged to be a somewhat “paradoxical” matter in the work of Williams,  who 
proffers the counter-intuitive claim that with representation the “distinctive form” of that 
which is represented comes more plainly into view, because there is no attempt here to 
imitate, rather the form is detached from its “original specific embodiment” and linked to 
another context).
449
 Description aims to name, but representation is oriented to “knowing 
whose point is simply knowing, in the sense of intelligently enjoying the presence of the 
other.”
450
  The association of rain and grief in the metaphor “weeping skies” for example, 
may tell us more about both elements within of the comparison than any description 
could, because it “points up something about weeping by association with weather, as 
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And Williams is not afraid to echo McGilchrist’s more startlingly normative 
formulations in presenting this insight about representation. The concept of an “ideal” 
movement of language from experience to distillation and back to experience is 
entertained in Williams’s work also, so that representation is in a sense championed as 
that which allows for a renewed or fresh encounter with what is between or beyond 
speakers: representation “rebels” against “any attempt to install a tyranny of 
description”,
452
 description being the more violent practice.
453
 This is the persistent 
thought behind Williams’s chapter on “excessive speech”, which makes the argument that 
extreme speech (as found in poetry, ritual, and narrative: practices which deliberately put 
our language under pressure) is not an “aberration” within language, but is a common 
“tool of exploration”,
 454
 which answers to an intuitive sense that over-familiar 
representations can obscure what is available to perception. “Complicating” our speech 
deliberately by imposing the need to rhyme or to fit with a syllabic patterning can 
“uncover what ‘normal’ perception screens out” because “Finding a rhyme…requires a 
unique moment of holding an idea in suspense while the writer looks for a way of saying 
it that will echo specific sounds”:
455
 unique and surprising connections are thus brought 
into being through a discipline of forcing familiar rhythms of speech out of shape. Poetry 
is hard to make head or tail of, apart from something like the understanding of description 
and representation that McGilchrist and Williams presume (the idea of description as a 
degree further removed from perception than representation), and Williams asks us to 
consider why we should “assume that our language can discover anything simply by 
playing games with itself”, unless we are somehow using excessive speech to “converse 
with ourselves, with our unexamined perceptions, our half-conscious associations of 
sounds and sense alike”.
456
 Poetry is an expression of quite a “remarkable act of faith in 
language, an act of faith which assumes that words can be persuaded to say more than 
they initially seem to mean”:
457
 Williams writes that we trust our speech “to deliver us 
precisely from the traps of speech.”
458
 This is strongly reminiscent of McGilchrist’s idea 
of metaphor as the remedy for the gap that language itself creates, and this resemblance is 
hugely significant, given McGilchrist’s proposal that the efficacy of metaphor for the 
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renewal of language is tied up with its strong connections with the kinaesthetic, where 
both the creation of and the recognition of metaphor rely on our bodies experiencing 
multiple sensory perceptions as one event. 
 
Williams alludes to the connection between representation and bodily 
participation in a number of instances throughout his argument for language’s freedom. 
He assumes, for example, that the limitedness of language, its timefulness and finitude (as 
displayed in the fact that language is always following on from what has been said, and is 
always expectant of being followed) should alert us naturally to its inherent materiality.
459
 
But this identification is shored up finally in a discussion of the phenomenology of 
perception, which Williams introduces through a description of Autistic Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD) and its therapies, observing that breakdowns in the “normal” means by 
which humans organize their perceptive fields and establish a world in common helps us 
to identify things that most of us take for granted about how our perception of the world 
emerges and where language fits in. 
 
ASD patients experience a kind of “system overload” through being exposed to 
sensory stimulations without the means to select which ones are important. Retreating 
into a private world by focusing on a single sensory stimulation (for example, banging a 
hand on a hard surface) is a common strategy for establishing “a controllable level of 
feedback”.
460
 Pioneering ASD therapist Phoebe Caldwell works with people experiencing 
the isolation of over-stimulation with a therapy she calls “Intensive Interaction”, a process 
in which the actions taken in order to control sensory feedback by a person exhibiting 
distressed behaviour are mimicked by a helper. When the distressed person bangs the 
table, the helper bangs the arm of a chair. A bridge from isolation and into shared 
interaction is in this way constructed. The distressed person begins to recognise their own 
action is being reflected back to them from a source outside of themselves. They repeat 
their sound in order to prompt another repetition, and a “conversation” is entered into; the 
person with ASD becomes calmer with the assurance that their action is heard – that it 
“makes sense” to another – and the interaction can build into more diverse patterns of 
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 The therapy works because ASD is caused by “an apparent absence” of a 
normal “process of neural connection”: the ability that prevents most of us from 
experiencing sensory overload, which is an “ability to see that our patterns of activity 
(including noise-making) are reflected elsewhere in the sensory world”, is disrupted. In 
most people’s mental function, the “same neural connection happens both when I do 
something and when I perceive it done” even if it is done “in a different mode or 
medium”. But for the sufferer of ASD, only imitations of their own immediate or familiar 
behaviour will produce recognition and response. Thus a therapist working with a person 
with ASD must first establish the means by which that person is talking to him or herself, 




Williams’s foray into the subject of Intensive Interaction therapy is intended to 
highlight something about the origins of linguistic communication, and about the close 
connection between language and the development of “a coherent model of the physical 
world”.
463
 ASD tells us that  
 
our communicative activity normally selects and organizes stimuli and, when overloaded, 
narrows and focuses that activity in self-defensive ways; and further, this communicative 
activity also normally functions by a process of reinforcing…its own workings in relation 
to the reflections it perceives in others. A potentially overwhelming environment is made 




This implies that complex physical and relational processes are at work in my acquisition 
of a world that I can navigate and to some extent control. “Objects” come to be, not 
through the “presentation of a set of material stimuli to an individual brain”, but through a 
number of inseparably interwoven strategies. My physical development involves 
accumulating experiences in which I meet with physical resistance from points in my 
environment, such that I begin to create “an internalized map and set of rules encoding 
[it]”, but this happens in “tandem” with the reception of “confirmatory or non-
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confirmatory material from other agents whose visible strategies for managing the 
environment resemble mine.”
465
 It is the “convergence of different possible points of 
view and points where resistance is met” which allows me to experience depth, for 
example, so that I can experience the world as three-dimensional, and my idea of an 
object’s “continuity over time” is provided by the same apprehension of different possible 
perspectives. It is in seeing and being able to recognise my own behaviour – my own 
responses to points of resistance, my own growing apprehension of depth – reflected in 
the modulation of other bodies in response to the environment as they experience it that 
allows me to obtain “a map of my environment in which I can locate myself in relation to 
other physical presences” and to recognize “something of the paradoxical character of my 
own physical presence, which I perceive in a unique way.”
466
 Language, against this 
backdrop, and when we see its birth in the “conversational” techniques taught by 
Caldwell, can only be seen as a practice, a certain kind of modulation of the body which, 





The invitation to see language as an extension of gesture is important for a number 
of reasons. For Williams, it helps us definitively to move away from any model which 
presents language as “a tool for getting information from one container to the other” (as 
representationalism presents it).
468
 Williams’s account, which has a clear and 
acknowledged debt to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, resonates with the latter’s idea 
of sentience as belonging to the body by nature of the fact that the body’s extension into 
the lifeworld (its intentionality) is the basis for perception.
469
 And when Williams names 
language as an activity of reinforcing our perception through recognition of the 
behaviours of other intelligent or intentional bodies, we also find him making a 
connection that both Merleau-Ponty and McGilchrist make: the idea of language as tied 
up with empathy or mimesis, the ability to understand or to recognise an action done 
because of an ability to relate – as a body – to another’s bodily style. We saw this in 
McGilchrist’s example of the proto-language of drum beats allied to dance in sub-Saharan 
Africa, but Merleau-Ponty usefully summarizes the concept when he says that  
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Communicating or the understanding of gestures is achieved through the reciprocity 
between my intentions and the other person’s gestures, and between my gestures and the 
intentions which can be read in the other person’s behaviour. Everything happens as if the 
other person’s intention inhabited my body, or as if my intentions inhabited his body. The 
gesture I witness sketches out the first signs of an intentional object. This object becomes 




The point is that speech, if we see its connections with gesture, is not an “envelope or 
clothing for thought” which works by “arousing ‘representations’ in me” (as Merleau-
Ponty puts it),
471
 and words are not “objects designed somehow to depict other objects” as 
Williams paraphrases him.
472
 This would be to assume a problem exists in which my 
interior self stands in separation from external reality, and that the two need to be 
somehow connected. It assumes “that we are the recipients of individualized sets of 
material stimuli which we then translate into expression or communication, offering them 
somewhat tentatively to other speakers, never sure that their individual set of stimuli 
corresponds to ours.”
473
 With gestural expression it is easier to see the problem with such 
a conceptualisation: if a friend points out a church spire to me, their finger “is not a 
finger-for-me that I think of as orientated towards a church tower-for-me” but rather it is 
their finger “which itself shows me the tower.”
474
 Gestures do not therefore aim to 
produce mental images for us “in virtue of some pre-established harmony”:
475
 they bear 
their own sense with them. And so it is with language. Seeing and speaking are both 
“practices in which I take a particular place in a flow of activity that embraces both me 
and my neighbour” so that to express something in words is to “seek a mode of action 
that moves with the perceived environment, seeks to continue the ‘style’ of action or 
energy that it reflects or represents”.
476
 We can think of speech as carrying information, 
but just like the gesture of pointing, the information carried in speech is inseparable from 
the material act itself. Words embody the things they represent: they are the presence of 
what is represented for the speaking or hearing subject.
477
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The radical implications of the inseparability of physical, cognitive, and relational 
processes involved in perceiving and speaking, and the inextricability of recognition with 
a kind of bodily empathy (the ability to take up an invitation that inheres in words 
themselves, an invitation to empathetically inhabit the speaker’s world) are followed 
through in Williams’s work. Together these things entail that language is not just a 
“physical” act in the most obvious sense of involving the use of our vocal chords, but it is 
material in the more radical sense of flowing out of the embeddedness of our bodies in the 
world. Williams states that, as consequence 
 
one of the myths we need to be most wary of is the habit of opposing purely active 
subject to passive object, of referring to an active mind’s perception of mindless and 




Not only does language enlarge the possibilities of the material world (human culture has 
so often been celebrated for this reason), but language is a situation for the material 
world’s own enlargement, because as the phenomenology of language shows us, the 
speaker does not just exert control over matter, but matter exerts a kind of agency over 
the speaker. Williams makes this point unambiguously in a clarification of what it means 
for words to carry their own meaning (or to be the presence of what they refer to for the 
hearing subject), where he differentiates this position from “magical” versions of the 
relation between word and world (such as we find in the idea that names embody power, 
the idea that to “know a name is to know and possess an essence”).
479
 It is not that 
speaking is the “transfer of an essential content from one place to another, giving the 
subject unlimited access to the object”, he writes, but rather that “if there is no primitive 
set of atomistic data to be labelled or catalogued, speech is always looking for means of 
representing an event and in some measure therefore prolonging or re-enacting an 
event.”
480
 In this way, speech is “moulded according to how an event goes; it shows the 
impact of the event”: words might be said to bear the agency (rather than the essence) of 
what they speak of.
481
 In this way, it would be “true to say” writes Williams, “that what is 
being spoken of has the speaker at its disposal, at least to the extent that the speaker’s 
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Recalling Coole’s name for the trajectory she traces in Merleau-Ponty’s thought, 
his movement from subject-focussed accounts of negativity to the generativity of the 
flesh, we might say that Williams’s work in The Edge of Words also “folds back on itself” 
at the point where the embodiment of language is explored, because this turn in the 
discussion allows him unequivocally to present the attributes of language established 
earlier in his argument – language’s freedom and innovation – as attributes of matter 
itself. He writes for example that “Rather than looking to material processes, understood 
as mechanical in fashion, as the key to understanding what language is, it would be nearer 
the truth to say that we look to language to show us what matter is.”
483
 Speaking and 
sense making have to be seen as “intrinsically part of the order of things” rather than an 
“alien importation into a mechanical universe, an epiphenomenon that causes minor 
embarrassment to right-minded materialists.”
484
 For Williams, language’s capacity for 
cutting links with environment, taking its distance from the immediacy of experience in 
some way (an ability we have found him acknowledging in his discussions of “falsity” or 
“mistakes” within language, and in his echoing of McGilchrist’s “ideal” movement from 
experience to abstraction and back to experience), is simply an occasion for the universe’s 
representation of itself to itself: human evolution, he insists, has produced a “reflexive 
dimension; which means that it has developed a capacity to stand apart from the causal 





If these statements bear a strong resemblance to some of the major themes that are 
pressed by the new materialist writers whose work we explored in the earliest stages of 
this argument, a number of other comparisons between Williams’s work and some of the 
themes present in Barad and Coole could be made (though these are necessarily just 
preliminary reflections aimed at highlighting notes of possible convergence). First, 
Williams’s persistence in referring to speaking subjects and represented objects is notable 
in places, and for the reader approaching his work with an ear for unidentified Cartesian 
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assumptions, this can initially be off-putting (his taking up of Percy’s description of a 
triangulation between subject, object and symbol has been noted in this regard). But read 
in light of Williams’s presentation of meaning and matter as inhabiting the same 
ontological plain, his use of these categories takes on a different meaning altogether: they 
become provisional rather than ontological designations. It is worth quoting at length his 
statement that the  
 
I that thinks, observes, gestures and speaks is a point of convergence for a field of 
perception, discovering its locus and boundaries in the sheer fact of contact and 
continuity, experiencing the meaningful ‘instruction’ of someone else’s gesture/sound 
delivered from another point of convergence; each ‘I’ is thus moulded by this as by other 
elements in the perceptive field. So what happens when a human subject arrives in the 
world…is neither the advent of a mysterious spiritual monad nor the coalescing of a 




Subject and object then, are not “two items standing alongside each other” but are rather 
“two phases in a complex life”.
487
 There is a sense in which the boundaries between them 
are performed or enacted, as a corollary of the fact that representing “is performing or 
enacting a form of being in a new mode”.
488
 Here we might find a point of similarity with 
Barad’s nomenclature. Furthermore, Williams’s idea of the capacity to represent as 
entailing the possibility of enlargement (the idea that communication is a shared “project” 
which builds naturally into more complex structures), combined with his identification of 
embodiment as the locus for the emergence of our representative capacity, aligns him 
with something like the description of subjectivity that Coole picks up from Merleau-
Ponty. This is the idea of embodiment as a “hinge” across which the subject is spread: our 
paradoxical presence in the world as both object in the phenomenal field and representing 
subject is an occasion for the generativity of the flesh, a significant moment for the 
folding of the flesh.  
 
Indeed Williams himself refers a number of times to the idea of the universe as an 
“unlimited flow of action” and subject and object as expressions of specific “in-foldings” 
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(he also refers to “clusterings”, or “crystallisations”) within one movement.
489
 There is a 
sense then here of the universe as a fluid rather than a static entity. Williams does suggest 
that there is a trajectory towards complexity: this much must be acknowledged once we 
consider that “the unfolding story of material evolution leads to speech, to the expression 
and sharing of intelligible structure…which allows more and more creative ‘negotiating’ 
with other parts of the environment”.
490
 But any sense of order that the universe manifests 
is expressed over time as an “overall direction of material existence towards coherent, 
sustainable, innovative, adaptable forms”.
491
 Williams presents order as the product of a 
process that involves flux and negotiation as much as stability, and his designation of 
“innovative” forms as the apex of the evolutionary story suggests that the process might 
be considered open ended, as if nature is still in the business of becoming. A few 
comments will be made in the concluding section of this thesis about how this ontology 
might sit with a Christian teleology, since, as was argued in our treatment of Bennett, this 
is another area where some new materialist theorists assume there is a basic 
incompatibility between Christian theology and the post-constructivist agenda. In the 
meantime, our current chapter will end with a treatment of Williams’s understanding of 
the world as in some ways ordered towards God, and the coherence of his thesis overall, 
which holds together both a teleological argument and a picture of the universe as 
“becoming”, will (I hope) provide a helpful lead on this question, though a full discussion 
of it falls outside the scope of this project. 
Two more observations might be made which relate Williams to Barad and Coole. 
The first pertains to a number of references within Williams’s work that suggest his 
theory of language collapses an assumed distinction between epistemology and ontology. 
He writes for example that “Material objects and the material world as such are always 
already ‘saturated’ with the workings of mind” so that “we cannot abstract the object we 
examine from the means we are using to examine it.”
492
 If this reads like a sentence that 
Barad might use about the inseparability of scientific results from the material 
arrangements through which they were procured, further parallels emerge where Williams 
begins to discuss something very close to Barad’s idea of phenomena as primary 
ontological units, with the implication that knowledge will always be knowledge from 
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within phenomena. Williams acknowledges that syntactical language, with its emphasis 
on subjects, objects, and verbs, stands somewhat in the way of the plausibility of a more 
radical ontological monism because it depicts something more akin to isolated monads 
bumping into each other in the void. He endorses the work of Margaret Masterman as a 
thoughtful meditation on (and possible corrective for) this problem. Masterman proposes 
that the use of something like Chinese ideographic language could be a way of depicting 
“states of affairs in their most comprehensively imagined contexts”:  
‘The playing of the impromptu cadenza of the last movement of the first performance of 





The idea is that adding successive qualifiers to the verb “play” presents this moment as an 
event which gathers various significant situations or convergences into one fold or 
cluster. “Truth” for Williams thus appears to relate, not to the idea of access to some 
timeless realm beyond speech, but to issues of specificity or comprehensiveness in our 
descriptions of situations, and to our acknowledgement of the unfinished or inconclusive 
nature of our descriptions.
494
 What I encounter is never separable from how I encounter it, 
and thus I never “master this object given to my apprehension”: together we are part of “a 
specific in-folding of an unlimited flow of action.”
495
 Truth is a matter of humility in the 
limitedness and localness of our own perspectives: language is not a “‘fallen’, distorting 
medium” as postmodernism sometimes presents it, but is “finite and historical”, and so 
must always be open to development and response.
496
  
A final comment pertains to the possibility of compatibility between Williams’s 
philosophical account and the more political impetus within Coole and Barad (their desire 
to shift agency from the linguistic subject and onto the performative body, the advantages 
of which we saw in a more concrete form in the work of Siebers and Garland-Thomson). 
Though Williams does not go into an assessment of the political implications of his work 
in The Edge of Words, the closest he comes to doing so may be in his discussion of inter-
subjectivity, which unfolds from his phenomenology of perception. One of the 
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consequences of identifying the relational aspect of how objects come to be for a 
perceiving subject (the emergence of objects as a convergence of different possible 
perspectives) is that objects in the phenomenal field are always apprehended “as 
something shared: there is no point at which I have to make some conscious or half-
conscious move outside of a private frame of reference to a shared one.”
497
 A thick theory 
of inter-subjectivity is then immediately implied by his framework; perhaps even more 
strongly, his framework implies a fundamental dependency between actors, and a sense in 
which “trust” in each other might be basic to existence.
498
 This means that “the broader 
our shared situation, the more securely we know and judge” and as a consequence we 
should be “wary of any strategy, cultural, religious, political, which assumes any 
perspective to be dispensable”.
499
 Somewhat surprisingly, given the part that empathetic 
recognition plays in his thought, Williams insists that even theories that put “empathy” at 
the heart of ethics should be regarded with care. But his elaboration on this idea is helpful 
for working out an area of overlap with the new materialisms. In the case of people with 
ASD, he writes, there might be times when recognition within a shared linguistic 
framework breaks down, but we are still encountering another sense-maker because 
bodies are “the point of intersection for a specific set of symbolic transactions”: the “fact 
of encountering another recognizable body presents us with a human point of view”.
500
 
However irreducibly other, however opaque that point of view may seem to me, it is one 
that “I am likely to need in my own developing intelligent life.”
501
 Williams retains a kind 
of humanism in his assessment of human bodies as the most significant situation for the 
reflexive capacity of the material world, and this may constitute a significant point of 
divergence between Williams and Barad. But what we have discussed places him quite 
close to Coole, whose radical inter-subjectivity and reconstruction of a kind of humanism 
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iii) God at the Edge of Words: Language, Matter and the Reframing of 
Natural Theology 
While we have characterised Williams’s work as searching for a space to inhabit between 
physicalism and Cartesianism, this is not the only way in which The Edge of Words seeks 
a middle ground, and we must now turn towards the framing of Williams’s meditation on 
language to understand this work as part of a discussion about the future of “natural 
theology”. Here too, Williams is found articulating a perspective between two traditions 
that have become polarized. The first, represented by the terms of Lord Gifford’s bequest, 
relates to a belief that the natural world bears witness to God and that discourses about 
God might therefore be developed “without appealing to the unreliable authority of 
claimed revelation”.
502
 The second, represented notably by Karl Barth and more recently 




Williams’s sympathies may lie finally with the concerns of those who have 
criticised “the inadmissibility of revelation and the irrelevance of sacred narrative and 
community practice in exploring the roots of our talk about God”.
504
 The problem with 
natural theology operating within the terms Lord Gifford set out for it is that, in an effort 
to avoid difficult questions about authority and tradition by bracketing out appeals to 
revelation and the God who “actively interrupts our perceptions or thought processes”, 
natural theology presents God as a passive entity waiting to be discovered.
505
 But 
Williams believes that the “insistence that we can only begin from tradition and 
community” is no less characterised by avoidance, because it suggests that “we don’t 
have to worry about tracing the history of this or that mode of speech, how and where 
people learn to speak like this”.
506
 Gesturing to revelation and gesturing to “timeless 
metaphysical argument” are two strategies which share something in common, in that 
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Put otherwise, if speaking about God is definitively different than speaking about 
another item in the universe, we might expect the “grammar” of this speech to be 
distinctive: the way it entered our parlance would be “to do with what is not resolved or 
controlled.”
508
 But both the “anti-revelationist rhetoric of Lord Gifford’s natural 
theology” and “detailed descriptions of a revealed God” can “become opposites that unite 
to frustrate an adequate account of such grammar.”
509
 By retreating into the confidence of 
the familiar,
510
 the tradition which begins and ends with revelation can obscure the 
rupture or puzzlement of the everyday that we ought to associate with the divine act. God 
is then reduced to “another ‘department’ of description”,
511
 that very problem the neo-
orthodox tradition has criticised. 
“What I should like to examine”, writes Williams “is whether there is a form of 
natural theology that is not about avoidance – so as to guard against the avoidance that an 
unqualified rejection of natural theology can lure us into”.
512
 For Williams, a defensible 
natural theology would remain open to the idea of the apocalyptic disruption, the God 
who acts, while steering straight into the questions of history and habit that both positions 
evade: if there is “at the heart of Christian theology…a story with an imperative 
attached”, what “makes us able to learn to recognize such an imperative, let alone respond 
to it?”
513
 Answering this question would require a “mapping exercise”, a contemplation 
of the everyday which would be alert for moments  
where familiar description fails – not because we have identified a problem that for the 
time being we don’t have the resources to solve, but because something is apparently 
demanded of us – in order to make an adequate linguistic response to our situation – 
which is not just another attempt to describe agencies negotiating with each other or 
combining to effect a specific outcome.
514
 
After identifying such shifts in register, it would need to be demonstrated that a response 
to the demands implicit in these moments “is not an arbitrary move, drawing us away 
from precision, labour, or indeed truthfulness.”
515
 It would need to be shown, in other 
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words, that the collections of idioms or models or metaphors that mark these shifts are not 
unrelated to the discourse which framed their formulation. As Williams sums up this 
second requirement, it would be “like putting the question ‘What sort of truth can be told 
only by abandoning most of our norms of routine description?’”
516
 
To approach natural theology as a mapping exercise in this way is to recover an 
older tradition, and Williams makes his propositions more concrete by relating them to 
Aquinas’s “Five Ways” (as interpreted by Cornelius Ernst and Victor Preller).
517
 Aquinas 
has been criticised for the “logical flaw” of moving from the assumption that every 
phenomenon is involved in causal relationships, to the conclusion that every phenomenon 
can be traceable to a single cause. But Williams argues that Aquinas’s intention is more 
accurately described as an attempt to show that if  
it is part of the definition of every particular intelligible phenomenon we encounter that it 
is contingent…we can reasonably say that it is part of the definition of finite and 
intelligible being that it is invariably involved in processes of causation, and thus marked 
by dependence. All energy we encounter is involved in energy exchanges; but are we not 




Aquinas is asking us to think to the edge of what we can intelligibly say, and then to 
notice that what we gesture towards at the end of this process of deduction cannot be 
described in the language we have so far been using. We have moved beyond talking 
about intelligible things, having already accepted that to be intelligible is to be caused. 
What we refer to is still “expressible only in connection with the language of 
dependence”, but “cannot be another instance of anything”, another “object to 
explore”.
519
 What “is depended on is evoked”, writes Williams, but “we can’t formulate a 
sensible question as to what sort of thing it is that doesn’t depend because, by definition, 
we have now moved away from asking about sorts of things, and the questions that we 
started with no longer move us forward.”
520
  
Aquinas’s method has been described by Preller as one designed “to lead the 
intellect through a series of judgments” which will move us to conclude paradoxically 
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that “the human intellect is ordered to a reality it cannot know”.
521
 Williams’s summary 
of Aquinas is suggestive of his agreement with Preller that what is encountered at the 
edge of such a process of description is a “non-intelligible level of experience incapable 
of formulation in a conceptually meaningful question”.
522
 Nevertheless, Williams departs 
from Preller on the further claim that we are ordered toward a reality we cannot know, an 
assertion that according to Williams “damagingly ignores just the complexities of what 
knowledge may mean”.
523
 It is here that we might see how The Edge of Words relates to a 
culmination of interests that are present in Williams’s earlier work, and which were 
alluded to in our previous chapter: the intimate connection of kenosis (or variations on the 
theme, such as humility, self-abnegation, cruciformity, dispossession, or the 
acknowledgment of finitude and limit) and the knowledge of God (revelation, but also the 
related themes of mystical union, transfiguration, judgement and conversion). We have 
seen that Williams’s reading of Augustine highlights how the continuities between 
creation and the divine life steer us back to the fundamental discontinuities, with the 
implication that God’s revelation of himself is somehow bound up in creation’s otherness: 
the divine life as turned out towards the other is paradoxically most clearly imaged by 
humanity when we go into our finitude and approach God through time. Contemplation or 
the apprehension of God is then bound up with our imaging God through kenosis, a 
dispossession of our own will to transcend our circumstances and an acceptance of limit, 
an act which is made possible through the knowledge that because God is other to us His 
will is not in competition with ours.  
So pervasive is this kenosis-revelation motif within Williams’s work that it might 
be considered a unifying idea of his theological vision.
524
 It is the central interest in his 
reading of Lossky, who casts apophatic theology as most truly theology when understood, 
not as an intellectual or dialectical exercise (a corrective to cataphatic claims), but as a 
kenotic or cruciform attitude undergirding theology, and which opens onto or points 
towards – though it is not synonymous with – encounter with the being of God.
525
 This 
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thought is taken up by Williams in describing his own conception of correct theological 
method, where apophasis is named as that which governs the integrity of theological 
thought. Integrity means speaking “in a way that allows of answers”, the refusal to 
“finish” what can be said. But how can religious speech decline to take a totalizing 
perspective and still establish itself as talking about the “wholeness of the moral 
universe” with God as its context and origin, Williams asks?
526
 Theology, he argues, must 
show itself to be “involved in bringing the complexity of its human world to judgement 
before God” and not “seeking to articulate or complete that judgement.”
527
 Its constant 
interest in the particular will be one sign of this commitment: theology must tell a story of 
address and response in which (as in the Judeo-Christian story) “distorting responses to 
God” generate “their own re-formation” as they “conform to the reality of what it is that 
called them forth”.
528
 The biblical writings tell this story because they are not just 
narrative, but constantly address God through liturgy. Christian speech must then be a 
“giving over” of our words to God, and this will be achieved in the extent to which 
theology speaks prayerfully, and in the extent to which it remains focussed on people who 
pray.
529
 Prayer is an act of dispossession which signals a refusal of control or closure. 
Repentant language or the admission of failure, praise which celebrates acts of God that 
seem to have no direct relevance to the speaker, and the giving over of speech to a larger 
narrative that happens in the recapitulation of the paschal drama, are strategies of 
allowing ordinary speech to be interrupted or displaced in a way that moves us towards 
apophasis, the admission of the inadequacy of any attempt to picture God, which is 
expressed in attentive silence.
530
 A theology shaped by these practises will display the 
penitent labour of revising its own workings, it will not seek to impose a normative style, 
and it “will not regard its conclusions as having authority independently of their relation 
to the critical, penitent community”.
531
 A prayerful theology will not conceive of itself as 
a science, and might even display a rigour “directed against the naïve scientific model” 
because it will be constantly attentive for and critical of the presupposition “that there is a 
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mode of religious utterance wholly beyond the risks of conversation”.
532
 Summarising 
these thoughts, Williams writes that  
the hope professed by Christians of immortal life cannot be a hope for a non-mortal way 
of seeing the world; it is rather the trust that what our mortality teaches us of God opens 
the possibility of knowing God or seeing God in ways for which we have, by definition, 
no useful mortal words.
533
 
Referring to this pattern of thought in Williams’s work is important for our 
discussion of The Edge of Words for several reasons. It sheds some light on Williams’s 
insistence that his proposition for a natural theology conceived in line with his reading of 
Aquinas is not a “knock-down argument” for the existence of God.
534
 In the same way 
that theology should refuse the temptation to complete some kind of “judgement” by 
totalizing its perspectives, natural theology reconceived as a method as per Aquinas’s 
“Five Ways” does “not move towards a probable conclusion from a survey of the 
evidence.”
535
 Aquinas was not (on Williams’s reading) attempting to “come to an 
indisputable first point in the series”, nor was he “arguing from one kind of existent to 
another, let alone defining the kind of being that can’t help existing”.
536
 Aquinas claims 
only that  
we are faced with the question of whether we can manage to talk sensibly about a 
universe of contingent being without looking for some way of pointing to a ground or 




Natural theology is a framing exercise, and it acknowledges a need to go on even “when 
‘ordinary’ description is done with”,
538
 but this “going on” is an exercise which must 
“negotiate its way around a set of unprecedentedly sharp cautions” against “projecting 
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But Williams’s broader interest in the relationship between kenosis and revelation 
equally hints that his natural theology is not conceived as a process of deduction which 
issues finally in a starkly agnostic conclusion (his divergence from the proposition that 
our intellects are ordered to a reality we cannot “know” is given some definition against 
the backdrop of his earlier work). Rather natural theology is being reconceived as a kind 
of practice,
540
 a going-down-into or a holding-up of what we understand of our finitude, 
and this practice gears ultimately toward an act of dispossession in the acknowledgement 
of having come to conceptual limits, some kind of edge to the question. This apex is then 
an apophatic moment, and as such may open 
the speaker to what is not predicted or scripted: that which we now confront as the matter 
of our speech cannot be seen as simply passive to our commanding intellect…there is at 
least an opening to what can change the speaker, to what remains strange, resistant…
541
 
The point made here is that the admission of having come to conceptual limits is not 
necessarily an ending, if it comes in as a proper refusal to control or contain what happens 
next. Elsewhere Williams has written that encounters with God may take us beyond what 
our conceptual language can cope with. But because it is wrapped up in the personal, the 
material, and the conscious (being the apprehension of God as that being through whom I 
am myself), contemplation of the divine cannot be correctly identified as beyond 
“knowledge”:
542
 safer to say perhaps that it is an experience in which the distinction 
between knowing and unknowing is transcended.
543
 In The Edge of Words Williams 
revises Preller’s statement with something like this implication: with regard to what we 
are “ordered” towards, we might “acknowledge our incapacity to form a concept – while 
at the same time enjoying a relation analogous to knowing in so far as we participate in an 
action directed towards us”.
544
  
Finally, in line with Williams’s claim that good theology progresses in the 
knowledge that it is through our mortality (and not through possession of some irrefutable 
non-mortal discourse) that we learn about God, his articulation of natural theology 
distances itself “from a process of accumulating features of the natural world that can be 
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explained only by supposing a creative agent.”
545
 This is perhaps most clearly illustrated 
by the comparison Williams invites between his proposition and the Buddhist method of 
vipassana meditation. The latter starts with a person’s recognition of suffering as a 
problem, and moves from here into a series of reflections on the world as a chain of 
infinite transaction and dependence (including “dependence on our synthesising habits of 
mind”).
546
 Release from the “imprisoning effect of taking the phenomenal world as a 
simple given” – a moment of “cessation” or a “stilling of the cycle” – is arrived at 
through this methodical immersion in the chain of dependent origination.
547
 The 
comparison is apt, Williams writes, because Buddhist meditation works up to a point of 
realisation, both that “everything falls under the rubric of dependent causation” and that 
“this is not an ending”.
548
  In the same way, in what Williams seeks to articulate “there is 
no attempt to arrest the process by identifying a single first moment or first principle 
within the system. There is no search for a gap into which a special supernatural agency 
can be fitted.”
549
 Precisely because it is a framing exercise, explanatory gaps (gaps that 
simply demand further “descriptive resources” that are not yet available) are not the 
object of focus.
 550
   
If this is the context for his argument, where do Williams’s observations on the 
freedom and materiality of language – manifest in the difficulty and complexity of speech 
– come in? Recalling that for Williams a natural theology must both map where we come 
to the edge of descriptive resources, and show how certain ways of going on are not 
arbitrary, we find that he concludes each of his generalisations about the behaviour of 
language with a question that they may prompt, but this is in turn followed by a reflection 
on how theology has traditionally sought to continue past these points, how it has “gone 
on” in ways that are intelligible. Revealed theology, he wants to suggest, does not answer 
the questions we arrive at in these moments but proposes something about why we are 
moved to ask them; it is not about “resolving difficulty but offering a perspective in 
which difficulty is what makes sense and what we must become accustomed to.”
551
 His 
proposition that natural theology can play a complementary role in relation to revealed 
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theology, by helping us to sharpen our understanding of what theology actually claims,
552
 
comes into view at these points. Speaking of his project overall, Williams notes that 
though he began with the question of “where language about God ‘came in’ in the world 
of routine or everyday speech”, his observations about language show that its behaviours 
are odd to start with: everyday speech is prone to interruptions and shifts in register.
553
 
But language about God poses “the most serious disruption of all”, and we might expect it 
to be “eccentric in a uniquely marked way”.
554
 
For example, whilst Williams concedes that in our “intellectual climate” 
Aquinas’s assertions about causality might be unacceptable,
555
 the unfinished or timeful 
nature of language, the complexity it moves into in response to the pressure to “say 
better”, and the finitude of speakers which these aspects imply, do press us towards the 
observation that dependence may be a basic reality of existence. The ways we speak – the 
ways I am opaque to others, the ways I must therefore listen for or join in a prior address, 
the risks I take when I speak in opening myself to the “perhaps abrasive” response of 
other speakers, and the fact that “I do not have the resources as an individual to sustain 
meaning or honesty in my own practice” –
556
 all  mean, for Williams at least, that “If we 
are to speak honestly about ourselves, we are committed to a more and more far-reaching 
investigation of dependence.”
557
 It appears as if we are on constant lookout for “the most 
dependable and comprehensive resource for truthfulness”:
558
 and if this tempts us to posit 
some framework in which this trajectory might be intelligible, whatever we spoke of 
could not be represented as “another point of view that itself needs assurance and 
challenge”,
 559
 another interest in competition with my own. In our previous chapter we 
saw that the doctrine of creation ex nihilo attempts to articulate such a framework (God as 
a self-sufficient entity on which creation unilaterally depends), and this is one way in 
which theology has sought to “go on”. But Williams also writes that the “phenomena of 
religious language…shows signs of working with difficulty, of having criteria for self-
scrutiny and self-correction” in such a way that we might conclude it is “operating ‘as if’ 
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it were dealing with something mind-independent”:
560
 Jesus’ parables, for example, 
represent the unrepresentable by showing “the situations in which the choices made turn 




As a side note, but of significant interest given our argument in the previous 
chapter that a dogmatic assertion about God’s transcendence might prevent rather than 
cause the kinds of pathologies feminist writers sometimes attribute to Christian thinking 
(the idea that Christian theology supports acts of domination over the material world), it 
is worth following up on Williams’s cautionary statement about what can occur if we live 
with a sense of the world as an entity in which dependence is a given, but fail to “go on” 
in some of the ways Christian theology has attempted to. Either we “‘naturalize’ human 
identity as part of an indifferent order, or else we install ourselves as self-creators in 
God’s place.”
562
 The implication here is that losing the theological framing for finite 
existence is what has led to our “rediscovering ourselves over-against nature”.
563
 
Characterising finite being as dependent is a familiar move, but Williams draws 
another characteristic out of his observations. The fact that representing seems to be a 
basic and incessant practice (the fact that language is not apparently “a matter of a certain 
determinate set of facts or truths causing/triggering a certain determinate set of signs”),
564
 
installs us in an imaginative context in which a kind of indeterminate intelligibility might 
be named as metaphysically basic: it appears that to be finite means to be representable in 
ways that are (from our vantage point) without limit.
565
 To invoke words we considered at 
an earlier point in this discussion, Williams writes that our sense that there will always 
more to say, and our confidence that “what we say itself alters what we can say next” so 
that we are enlarged by our speaking,
566
 together suggest that  
At one end of the learning-knowing relation stands an object which is constantly being 
uncovered at different levels or in different perspectives, as if there is in principle no end 
to the ways in which it can be understood and represented; at the other is a subject which 
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is constantly involved in drawing out the life of what is represented by more and more 
initiatives in ‘reading’ the object through one medium or another.
567
  
There is then a sense in which what we encounter is never “exhausted”, “absorbed”, or 
“reduced” by our representations of it,
568
 and a way in which we are part of an “upward 
spiral of partnership with our language to produce new representations – apparently 
without any final state of ‘adequacy’”.
569
 The picture evoked is one of abundance or even 
generosity, of finite reality “giving” itself “to be known” in a way that “enlarges our 
capacity and serves our welfare”.
570
 Christian theology has spoken of creation (or the 
“elements of the universe that we know”) as “crystallizations of” an “unbounded 
intelligence perceiving the innumerable ways in which its own life may be reflected in 
bounded form”,
571
 and in this spirit Eckhart names God as “the terminus of all acts of 
naming but also that which is incapable of being named.”
572
 To speak so is not to arrive at 
a conclusion that could not be otherwise, but neither is this language without warrant. 
Exploring the representative capacity as material – or materiality as inherently 
bent towards language – intensifies what we have to say about dependence, the 
limitedness of our vantage points, and about the engulfing and abundant nature of 
intelligibility. That matter carries or embodies signals, that our embodiment absorbs these 
messages and seeks to continue their life within new media, and that through these 
activities and in collaboration with other intentional bodies both subjects and objects 
materialise in ways that can be productive, are factors which suggest we inhabit a 
symbolic complex, a material system which is meaning-saturated and intelligence-bound. 
But it is also then a universe in which to understand means “to be engaged with and in a 
shared situation”, and in which to be truthful means to do “maximal justice to the 
diversity and plurality of a situation”.
573
 In this fluid context, when fresh connections 
come to light for us, others are hidden from our particular view.
574
 Williams comments 
that the “systematically secular attitude” – through a proper wariness about lazy or vague 
allusions to what is “mysterious" in the face of questions that can in fact be answered – 
wrongly assumes that “we should be able to reach and expose any ‘hiding places’, any 
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aspects of what we encounter that appear to resist conclusive description”.
575
 But if the 
use of metaphor is not a leisure activity (if that is, language cannot be reduced to a 
foundational repertoire of descriptive terms giving us access to objects and their essence) 
then we are faced with two realities. First, we seem to approach our environment as if the 
“shifting and constantly expanding perspectives of historical processes of understanding 
have no ends as far as we are concerned”:
576
 language refuses to settle and manifests its 
difficulty, as if it is in the wake of “intelligible relations whose full scale is still obscure to 
us”.
577
 Second, we continue in these practices in a way that presupposes confidence that 
we will always encounter a kind of “consistency”, “coherence”, “unity” or “regularity” 
which we are nevertheless incapable of representing “in its wholeness”.
578
 In fact “we do 
not and cannot know what it would be to apprehend the universe as a whole”, and yet the 
apprehension of “the symbolic character of the material environment” and the consistency 
it suggests does lend itself to the question “to what or in relation to what could the 
universe as a whole be intelligible?”
579
 The “imagination of a universal consistency” 
demands an imagination of “the universe as a whole as known”, but whatever it was that 
could perceive the universe in its entirety would not be another mind among other 
minds.
580
   
We began this chapter with Dawkins’s expectation that Christian theology is 
forced take advantage of the explanatory gaps in a physicalist explanation of the universe 
(an explanation that Dawkins deems to be broadly convincing, though he concedes there 
are as-yet-undiscovered pieces to the puzzle). In our previous chapter we found Bennett 
making something of the same accusation, though unlike Dawkins she considers 
mechanistic materialism to be an untenable account of matter. Divine transcendence, 
these critical voices protest, is being used to underwrite a dualistic ontology, an ontology 
which is anathema in Dawkins’ perspective, because there will eventually be a causal 
explanation for our utterances, and in Bennett’s perspective, because of the damaging 
results of the failure to acknowledge vitality and consciousness as capacities that are 
implicated in matter itself. Bennett’s criticism gave us reason to ask whether the doctrine 
of divine transcendence can be hospitable to the idea of non-dichotomy: surely, she 
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appears to suggest, the gaps within mechanistic materiality are too convenient for 
Christian thought.   
There may be forms of Christian theology susceptible to these criticisms, and 
indeed Williams considers that some forms of natural theology can be rightly criticised 
for reducing God to one candidate in a list of causes, a name we bring in where material 
explanation fails. But in light of Williams’s reflections on language, and in light of where 
they fit into his reflections on God, we have to conclude that something very different to 
this idea is being worked out in his thought. In the last chapter we used Williams’s work 
to argue that a rigorous account of divine transcendence could lead us to contemplate a 
non-dichotomous and universally vital account of creation, within which humans are 
embedded so that they share in its finitude and limitedness. In this chapter we have found 
Williams meditating on language in ways that resonate strikingly with some of the 
ontological propositions that several new materialist feminists are exploring, but this 
thinking takes place within a broader argument that states that reflection on – even 
immersion in, or acceptance of – the materiality of language and all that it entails, may 
prompt us in several ways towards the apprehension of what is beyond our understanding 
and control, a transcendent entity whose impress can be traced but who is not passive to 
our investigations. The possible convergences between natural theology and revealed 
theology that Williams posits no doubt deserve careful probing from a theological 
perspective,
581
 but few could doubt Williams’s care in seeking to preserve the central 
insights about divine transcendence and creation’s unilateral dependence that stand at the 
heart of Christian dogma. His account of natural theology is recognisably orthodox, and 
can trace a long and vital heritage within the history of Christian thought. For all of these 
reasons, Williams’s account poses a significant challenge to the assumption that, within 
conversations which raise the question of the non-dichotomy of matter and meaning, 




                                                          
581
 Because our argument is aimed at responding to question of whether a doctrine of divine transcendence 





A significant number of writers reflecting on the current status of feminism admit that the 
intellectual shifts that have underpinned the third-wave era have been in certain ways 
costly for the movement. Challenges to the sex/gender and culture/nature binaries may 
have rightly highlighted the significant constructive power of language, and questioned 
the assumption that neutral knowledge about gender identity can be derived through 
appeals to “nature”. But, as Heckman puts it “a whole generation of feminist scholars has 
been taught to put ‘matter’ into scare quotes”,
582
 and this has led many theorists to claim 
that, far from successfully deconstructing the binaries that underpin patriarchy, the 
constructivist or post-structuralist critique has granted unlimited power to “culture”, while 
conceptions of the material world as a meaningless entity awaiting human inscription 
have become further ingrained. Furthermore, the claim that emancipatory discourses 
create the subjects they represent has had some negative impacts on the political viability 
of emancipatory movements. Hames-Garcia and Siebers remind us that however 
identities are constituted, they have material consequences, and yet because 
constructivism cannot recognise the epistemological value of experience, we have lost 
some of the tools for discerning between “subjective” and “arbitrary” claims about the 
impact of discrimination.  
While the new materialists treat many of Butler’s claims sympathetically, they call 
for critical theories which can take some of the claims of post-structuralism forwards, 
while at the same time recovering a sense of the agency of matter so that fresh insight 
might be gained into the material aspects of identity. Towards this goal, Barad and Coole 
are engaged in the task of retheorising the relationship between culture and nature at the 
ontological level. Barad presents modernism and post-modernism alike as products of a 
representationalist paradigm. Reading the work of Bohr through Butler’s theory of 
performativity, she argues that scientific objects are inseparable from scientific 
apparatuses, that material arrangements therefore play a performative role in the 
knowledge practices through which subjects and objects emerge, and that we must 
therefore see matter and meaning as inseparable. Realism can be reconceived, and a 
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certain kind of objectivity becomes possible, where we understand our knowledge to be 
knowledge from within phenomena. Coole’s phenomenological contribution explores the 
work of Merleau-Ponty to show the agency of both intentional and inert bodies in the 
emergence of the subjects and objects of perception. By following Merleau-Ponty, as he 
extends the metaphor of “folded flesh” to his concept of nature, and characterises material 
existence itself as pocketed with the latent possibilities of the negative, Coole begins to 
construct a political theory that focuses on agentic capacities and intersubjective 
dynamics, rather than the agentic subject. Together these theorists agree that both 
“subjects” and “objects” are emergent, and that they are embedded in a material existence 
which is agentic, fluid, and endlessly innovative. They propose that we can formulate 
certain kinds of knowledge claims if we do so with an awareness of the contingency of 
both the subjects and objects of our knowledge, their coexistence within provisional 
“folds” in the flesh of a material universe. 
The work of Siebers and Garland-Thomson demonstrates the promise of Barad’s 
and Coole’s ontological reflections by showing the ways these ontologies might foster 
new approaches to political praxis for emancipatory movements. But for the theologian or 
Christian feminist interested in a theological engagement with this field of discourse in 
virtue of these merits, it is notable that some significant voices amongst the new 
materialists are doubtful that Christian theology has much to offer within this 
conversation. Bennett claims that Christianity is tethered to a life/matter binary 
underwritten by a conception of God as all-powerful and creation as dependent. She 
argues these binaries and the conception of a static created order of creation run in 
opposition to the immanentism posited by new materialists, and their belief in a free, fluid 
and innovative material existence. We have argued that in light of these challenges, a 
theological engagement with the new materialists might attend to three major questions. 
Can dogmatic articulations of the doctrine of creation be hospitable to a non-dichotomous 
conception of matter and meaning? Are Christian concepts of selfhood or the soul 
necessarily tied up with an ontological distinction between human life and mere matter? 
And, do Christian understandings of creation’s ordering towards its creator prohibit 
theology from positing a fluid, innovative, or productive universe? 
While the last question went beyond the scope of this thesis, and similarly the 
question of the human soul was left to one side, our engagement with Williams provides 
us with some leads as to how these questions might be addressed in further research. In 
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our second chapter, we found Williams engaged in an argument about the unelidable 
difference between God and creation, and we argued that his articulation of this doctrine 
entails an understanding of humans as imaging God through their acceptance of 
creatureliness. Though this does not explicitly answer our question as to the nature of the 
soul or the compatibility of this belief with non-dichotomous thought, Williams’s interest 
in de-spatializing concepts like the imago Dei and human selfhood (so that our relation to 
God is understood in terms of time rather than space) is a notable theme across his 
work.
583
 It would be reasonable to expect that his understanding of the soul might bear 
certain resemblances to this pattern of argumentation, and indeed in the Oxford debate 
that took place between Dawkins and Williams, Williams relates the concept of the soul 
to the self-reflexive consciousness which makes humans capable, even as material beings, 
of a relationship with God. He describes the soul as “the form of the body”, something 
which emerges in the material life of people, and he presents belief in the soul as a matter 
of faith, not in an ontological entity, but in a relationship we share with God.
584
 Further 
investigation on the issue could engage with these propositions. 
In terms of our question about Christian conceptions of created order, we argued 
in our third chapter that Williams holds together a coherent position which includes both 
a concept of creation as being in certain ways fluid and innovative (subjects and objects 
emerge within contingent in-foldings of the flesh), and a concept of creation as ordered 
towards the apprehension of God. In fact, Williams’s argument for creation’s 
innovativeness is material to his argument for such an order: in his re-conception of 
natural theology he contends that reflection on language shows us that intelligence is a 
natural trajectory of creation. The fact that the hazardous process of evolution has 
produced self-reflexive intelligence is wrapped up in the way creation is ordered toward 
an apprehension of its Creator. Further research into this question would need to pay 
careful attention to which conceptions of created order new materialist critics might have 
in mind in their criticisms (Bennett assumes that the orthodox conception is of a static 
hierarchical order), and such a study would be complicated by the fact that concepts of an 
“order of creation” are by no means uniform across Christian thought. Moreover, though 
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Barad’s and Coole’s concepts of “fluidity” or “open-ended becoming” share much in 
common, within the new materialisms there is some variety in how these themes are 
expressed. In conversation with these different understandings, it would be an interesting 
discussion whether a material existence which was productive of meaning could sensibly 
be thought of as devoid of any order.  
Our thesis, however, focussed primarily on the question of whether the doctrine of 
creation and its presentation of creation as unilaterally dependent on a transcendent God 
forms the underpinnings of a binary approach to culture and nature. Our responses were 
framed by Bennett’s presentation of the new materialisms as falling somewhere between 
vitalism and mechanistic materialism. Bennett claims Christianity is a form of vitalism 
because it presents matter as inert and predetermined, and life as a principle detachable 
from it but which animates it. Christians, according to Bennett, readily accept mechanistic 
accounts of matter, and where explanatory gaps appear in these accounts, they posit God 
as explanation. God, within Christian thought, is thus the agent responsible for animating 
matter with “life”, and because Christians believe humans as the imago Dei are the most 
vital component of creation, Christian vitalism sanctions acts of cultural domination over 
the material world. 
In order to address these concerns, we related Bennett’s claims to those of 
McFague and Primavesi, both feminist critics of orthodox theology who claim God’s 
exercise of cultural power over an inert creation authorizes humans to do likewise. 
Williams’s response to these claims was used to argue that the doctrines of divine 
transcendence and creation ex nihilo underwrite something like the opposite of this 
model. Creation within Christian thought is a bringing forth from nothing, not a moulding 
of something which already exists. It is therefore not rightly thought of as any kind of 
process, let alone an exercise of despotic power, because God and creation are not 
inhabitants of the same system, and creation is not exercised on anything. Moreover, 
creation ex nihilo is a way into a positive insight into the nature of God’s life as turned 
out towards the “other”, and creation therefore speaks of God best in its otherness. To 
image God within such a scheme is to accept one’s dependence and immersion within a 
finite creation, and this acceptance is made possible through the knowledge that God is 
independent of His creation and does not have interests which compete with our own. To 
conclude this argument, we suggested that material creation could be thought of as 
universally vital, given it shares in God’s life. And we considered that Bennett’s 
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assertions about divine transcendence and its implications look dubious against 
Williams’s reading of Christian doctrine: the doctrine of creation could be hospitable to a 
kind of ontological monism. 
But a second response to the question is also possible which turns this conclusion 
on its head. Contrary to Bennett’s claim that Christian thought colonises the gaps in a 
mechanistic materialism, so that its dualism is the flipside of its belief in a static matter, in 
both Williams’s debate with Dawkins, and his latest work on the theology of language, 
we find him engaged in mapping out a middle ground between physicalism and 
representationalism. What inhabits this middle ground bears striking resemblances to the 
kind of agentic materialism that Barad and Coole posit. Williams’s dismissal of Rorty’s 
radical physicalism depends on an understanding of language as complex and difficult, 
both of which features hint towards the materiality of language. While the pervasive 
activity of representation implies that matter is fundamentally intelligible, the human 
capacity to recognise representations is intrinsically related to embodiment. Moreover, 
Williams uses Merleau-Ponty’s conception of language as an extension of gesture – a 
physical and relational strategy of making sense which participates in the emergence of 
both subjects and objects – to argue for an understanding of language as the self-reflexive 
capacity of a material universe.  
Despite the ways in which Williams’s understanding of language and matter 
resonates with new materialist claims, his reflections belong to a theological argument of 
a surprising kind, given Bennett’s criticisms. Reflection on the non-dichotomy of 
language and matter, he contends, might lead us to identify dependence and intelligibility 
as metaphysical basics. It is not illogical to posit a certain kind of framework for making 
sense of these characteristics: reflection on the inextricability of matter and meaning 
might lead us to reflect on a transcendent God. Furthermore, to make a natural theology 
argument of this kind is not to look for God in the explanatory gaps of a mechanistic 
materialism. This and many other points just made have been part of an attempt to show 
that any exclusion of theology from the new materialist conversation on the basis of the 
kinds of objections that Bennett makes would be unwarranted. But the deeper hope here 
is that the constructive value (for both disciplines) of a dialogue between the new 





(An extended note on the kenosis-revelation connection in Williams) 
 
As per our discussion on page 111, and as well as examples we have seen throughout this 
piece (for example, Williams’s insight that contemplation of God comes through 
apprehension of God as that through whom I am myself), a few further instances where 
kenosis and the knowledge of God (or similar themes) are connected in his work can be 
listed as follows: 
In his reading of Augustine on evil, Williams argues that Augustine rightly 
recognised that having the right grammar of evil is tied up with having the right grammar 
of God. Augustine is engaged in “de-spatialising” talk about both: reflection on evil as the 
product of a process reminds us that creation only realises its goods in time, and that 
creation’s relation to God is rightly spoken of in terms of time rather than space. 
Augustine’s conception of evil drives us toward reflection on a God who is not in rivalry 
with us as another inhabitant in the universe and whose good can therefore be our good. 
Williams concludes the article by asserting that for Augustine, “talking about God is 
always talking about the temporal processes of clarification, reconciliation, self-discovery 
in love, the processes that lead us beyond rivalry and self-protection;  talking about God 
is the articulation of self-knowledge that grasps the central dependence of the self, a 
knowledge of the self as lacking and searching and, thus, as presupposing a goal of desire 
that exceeds any specific state of affairs in this world.” See Rowan Williams, 
“Insubstantial Evil,” in Augustine and His Critics, eds. Dodaro and Lawless (London and 
New York: Routledge: 2000), 105-23. Quotations 110, 121. 
In summarising Augustine on sapientia in De Trinitate, Williams argues sapientia 
(the knowledge of what is eternal) comes through yielding to a divine action directed 
towards us. Contrary to those who have presented Augustine as championing a picture of 
the individual self-contained subject as the image of God, Williams argues that we do not 
image God simply in virtue of the structure of the self, nor is imaging God “a matter of 
perfecting our possession of certain qualities held in common with God”, but it entails a 
move into our creatureliness, dependence, and timefulness: a submission to God as His 
loved creatures. In this relation we come to know God by participating in His kenotic 
action towards us, his “life as turned ‘outwards’”. See Rowan Williams, “Sapientia and 
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the Trinity: Reflections on De trinitate,” in Collectanea Augustiniana: Mélanges T.J.Van 
Bavel, eds. Bernard Bruning, Mathijs Lamberigts and J. van Houtem (Leuven: Lueven 
University Press, 1990), 317-32. For quotation, 321. 
Augustine’s mature Christology identifies Christ with sapientia, Williams argues 
elsewhere, and the results of the incarnation are an embrace of our humanity and “a 
resistance of all that draws us away from the recognition of the centrality of time in our 
learning of holiness”. As an act of grace, the incarnation “humbles us so that we may 
accept humility as the way to truth”. As the knowledge of God’s love, it allows us to face 
ourselves honestly in our weakness and so acknowledge our sin. Through humility and 
repentance we displace our own desires and are able to love, and through love we know 
God. See Rowan Williams, “Augustine’s Christology: Its Spirituality and Rhetoric,” in In 
the Shadow of the Incarnation: Essays on Jesus Christ in the Early Church in Honor of 
Brian E. Daley, S.J., edited by. Peter W. Martens (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2008), 176-89. Quotations, 177-8. 
In Anglican Identities, Williams considers a number of George Herbert’s poems, 
which deal with the Calvinist’s anxiety about having been saved, but experiencing no 
outward signs to confirm this. The poet experiences a “motionless frustration and doubt”, 
knowing the “impossibility of falling out of God’s hands”: he is justified, but has lost any 
way of experiencing justification in its classical sense of playing one’s right role in the 
order of things. In each poem, the poet protests until he exhausts himself, and what is left 
is the voice of resignation, the realisation that “To go on being conscious of a disparity 
between God’s grace and my deserving can be, not humility, but a refusal to let go of the 
self.” For Williams, the resignation of the poet is what makes the poems transparent to 
divine action: the poet understands at the end of all his protestations that it is his 
resignation which mirrors divine activity, and so the poems “enact the movement of a 
grace of self-dispossession within their own words”. See Rowan Williams, Anglican 
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